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SUMMARY 
There is a widespread view in medicine and amongst the general 
public that modern medicine is primarily a scientific enterprise and 
that the activities of clinicians rest on a secure basis of evidence-based 
science. As a clinician with a first degree in the arts, I have felt 
instinctively that this was not wholly the case. This thesis will examine 
the scientific nature of medical practice, identify and analyse what else 
is required, apart from science, for someone to be a good doctor, and 
suggest ways in which these additional attributes might be developed 
in medical education. 
I shall begin by examining the scientific evidence-base of medicine. It 
will emerge that there are three aspects to medical science: firstly, 
systematic knowledge of the systems of the body and their pathology, 
secondly, qualitative research, and thirdly, randomised controlled 
trials. Of the three only the first is truly science, but since science is a 
large family, the randomised controlled trial and qualitative research 
can be seen as members. 
Assuming, therefore, that there is some kind of evidence-base for 
contemporary medicine, I go on to ask how this evidence-base is 
modified in clinical practice. It emerges that there are a number of 
important modifications. Firstly, evidence must be individualised to 
the specific patient in the same way as a detective uses evidence in his 
investigation of a particular case. Secondly, doctors draw on wider 
sources of information than just the scientific evidence-base when they 
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are treating patients. For example, patients' anecdotes and stories 
about themselves and the origins of their complaints are an important 
source of information in constant use. Thirdly, all the information in 
use by doctors is interpreted by them in the light of their knowledge of 
the individual patient and the patient's views must be sought on 
treatment decisions in the form of consent. 
In adapting this evidence-base to the clinical situation it is clear that 
the doctor requires judgement of both a technical and a humane sort. 
Technical judgement is required for the application of the scientific 
knowledge-base and clinical skills. But, in addition to the scientific 
attitude, the good doctor possesses what I call a 'humane attitude'. 
This is revealed in the doctor's capacity for interpretation, insight and 
ethical sensitivity, the elements which make up humane judgement. I 
will analyse these elements of humane judgement. 
It must be remembered that there is a domain in medicine other than 
the clinical, namely the public. The scientific evidence-base of public 
health medicine is epidemiology, which is often seen as the paradigm 
of objectivity. But judgement is also required in deciding what, if 
anything, to do about the figures suggested by epidemiological 
studies, and in deciding what figures should be collected in the first 
place. Epidemiology, therefore, is not immune to judgement. 
Granted, then, that the doctor requires not only technical judgement, 
which derives from evidence-based knowledge, but also humane 
judgement, which derives from a humane attitude, we must then face 
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the question of whether, and if so, how, the humane attitude can be 
taught. Emphasis in medical education has concentrated on 
encouraging ethical awareness but it is equally important that medical 
education should enable doctors to develop a broad perspective. This 
may involve a'counter-culture' to weigh in the balance against the 
medical ethos. 
The General Medical Council (GMC) has created the possibility of 
introducing a broad non-medical perspective to undergraduate 
education through the use of special study modules (SSMs). I 
conclude my thesis by outlining two such possible non-medical SSMs 
and describe the educational objectives appropriate to them. 
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INTRODUCTION 
This thesis represents my attempt to come to terms with my own 
education and subsequent training and practice as a doctor and now 
also as a medical educator. My first degree was a joint honours in 
Scottish History and English Literature. I then studied medicine and, 
after basic training, practised in a specialist setting with pregnant 
women with drug and alcohol problems before becoming a general 
practitioner. I am now part-time in general practice and part-time a 
lecturer in general practice at the Department of General Practice at 
Glasgow University. This varied background created a number of 
tensions. 
First, I early became conscious of the difference between my arts 
background and my medical background. As an arts student I had 
gained a broad education on many areas of life, whereas as a medical 
student I had received a training in a number of skills and acquired a 
great deal of knowledge. My question became that of how the 
professional skills and knowledge required for medicine could be 
developed in an educational framework. This question has become 
acute since I am now employed to teach medical students. 
Secondly, I became conscious of a tension within my medical practice. 
The contemporary emphasis is on 'evidence-based' medicine and for 
some time the scientific and technical aspects of medicine have been 
much celebrated in TV presentations. But I was aware of the enormous 
problems of adapting this scientific evidence-base to my clinical 
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practice. It is a cliche that patients are more than the illnesses or 
diseases they may have, but this 'more' could not be adequately dealt 
with by adding on courses on 'communication skills', or 'ethics', 
important though they may be. What was needed was what I vaguely 
identified as a 'humane attitude'. But how was this to be analysed? 
Thirdly, supposing I could analyse the 'evidence-base' and the 
'humane attitude' how could I combine these in an educational 
programme for medical students which would result in the 
development of good doctors? The General Medical Council (GMC) 
helped with this question in that it produced in 1993 a document 
entitled Tomorrow's Doctors 1 in which it insisted that all medical 
curricula should be reorganised and should contain a 'core' (of 
essential medical knowledge and skills) and 'special study modules', 
some of which would be on non-medical subjects. I have been 
fortunate in that I have been involved in some of the planning as well 
as the implementation of the new curriculum in Glasgow. 
It became clear to me that an attempt to deal with these issues would 
involve me in a philosophical enterprise, and I am conscious of my 
limitations as a philosopher. It is difficult to have the energy for close 
reading and thinking after a long day in clinical practice, and I ask my 
philosophical readers for forbearance. I was much assisted, however, 
when my supervisor directed me to the riches of the Scottish 
Enlightenment. This, of course, fitted with my background in Scottish 
History, and I was encouraged to find clear and readable discussions 
of at least some of the problems with which I was faced. 
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In more detail, I saw my problem (of analysing what comprises 'the 
good doctor') as having three aspects. First, I had to give an account of 
the scientific evidence-base of medicine. This involved: an extensive 
analysis of the nature of science, and a consideration of how far 
medical research, and then clinical practice, are each in any sense 
'scientific'. Secondly, I had to give an account of the humane attitude 
which converts the scientific evidence-base of medicine into good 
clinical practice. Thirdly, I had to give an account of how, in the 
context of the present curriculum changes, the first and second tasks 
could be carried out. 
In conclusion, the theses I shall defend are: that there is a scientific 
evidence-base to medical research, provided we interpret 'science' 
widely; that the evidence-base of medical research, while it may 
involve technical judgement, cannot wholly determine good clinical 
practice or good public health medicine; that what additionally is 
required for good clinical practice and good public health medicine are 
interpretation, insight and ethics, which I shall collectively call 
'humane judgement'; that humane judgement derives from a humane 
attitude; that a humane attitude can, to some extent, be cultivated 
within the current new framework for medical education. 
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CHAPTER 1 
THE LAB: THE DOCTOR AS SCIENTIST 
1.1 INTRODUCTION 
Any account of what makes a good doctor must have something to say 
on scientific medicine. The good doctor, whatever else he may be must 
at least be some sort of scientist. Now, whereas it is impossible to 
dissent from this view, it is a much more complex view than might 
seem to be the case. There are two complexities. First, the assimilation 
of science by medicine is relevant in different ways to medicine; the 
impact of science in medical research is different from its impact on 
clinical practice. In this chapter I am concerned with science and 
medical research, and in the next chapter, with science and clinical 
practice. Secondly, different sorts of activities count in medical 
opinion as scientific. There are three activities regarded by doctors as 
comprising modern medical research: 
(a) the search for systematic understanding of the body in its 
normal workings and in its pathology; 
(b) empirical observation of the behaviour of patients, doctors and 
their interactions (qualitative research); 
(c) randomised trials to establish the best treatments. 
In order to discuss what is 'scientific' about activities (a), (b) and (c) I 
will describe what is meant by'science' in its general sense (1.2 - 1.6). I 
will then return to a discussion of the medical applications of science to 
the biological and pathological understanding of the body (1.7.1), to 
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the empirical observation of patient and doctor interactions (1.7.2), and 
to the design, implementation and dissemination of the results of 
scientific trials in medicine (1.7.3). Having examined medicine with 
this scientific spotlight I will conclude this chapter by offering an 
answer to the question'Is medicine scientific? ' (1.8). 
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1.2 THE NATURE OF SCIENCE : METHOD 
The question 'What is science? ' is a difficult one to answer. It was not 
always so, however, because science in its root meaning means simply 
'knowledge' from the Latin scientia. So to this day in the University of 
Cambridge a philosophy degree is a degree in the moral sciences. 
Equally, a degree in physics in some universities is still called a degree 
in natural philosophy. The problem I am addressing arises only from 
the beginning of the 18th century when there was an attempt to 
distinguish what we now mean by science from the rest of knowledge. 
It will be found that there is no one account that covers all the 
activities, aims or methods which have been regarded as 'science'; 
rather, there are a range of such activities which have a legitimate 
claim to be called scientific. The implication of this position is that, 
rather than seek necessary and sufficient conditions, we shall do better 
to look for a range of 'family resemblances'2 or overlapping sets of 
characteristics which will link together to build up the concept of 
science. This method will be particularly useful in the context of the 
discussion of the scientific nature of medicine as we will be able to 
refer to various sorts of scientific activity. This variety of activities 
thought to be scientific will help illustrate the different ways in which 
medicine might be thought to be scientific. The variety emerges when 
we try to characterise science in terms of a method (1.2), a kind of 
evidence (1.3), an aim (1.4) and an outlook (1.5). 
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Many philosophers who wish to characterise the activities of science in 
terms of a method begin by examining the features which emerged 
when science began to take its contemporary shape during the 17th 
and 18th centuries. This is not an unreasonable procedure because it is 
easier to detect the conceptual structure of science at this time than it is 
later when the content of science has become technically much more 
complex and the separate sciences have adopted identities of their 
own. If we are to distinguish the wood from the trees it is preferable to 
look at this early period. Yet there is one common failing in the 
philosophers who take this approach: it is that they are drawn in to the 
huge gravitational field of major scientists such as Galileo and Newton, 
and they define the characteristics of scientific method as a whole in 
terms of the characteristics of natural philosophy and its essential 
quantification. This, as we shall see (1.7.2), has had a disastrous effect 
on some aspects of medical research. I shall try not to ignore the major 
contributions of Galileo and Newton, but shall also bear in mind those 
of others such as William Smellie to natural history3, or Robert Hooke 
to meteorology. I shall concentrate on Hooke4. 
The main characteristics of science are to be found in a passage on 
meteorology written by Hooke, who was Newton's great opponent in 
the Royal Society. The quotation is a long one, but quoting it in full 
can be justified not only on account of its relevance to my theme of the 
nature of science but also on account of the elegance of its language (a 
feature not usually found in contemporary scientific or medical 
writings! ) 
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1.2.1 Robert Hooke's method 
'For the better making a History of the Weather, I conceive it requisite 
to observe, 
1. The Strength and Quarter of the Winds, and to register the Changes 
as often as they happen; both which may be very conveniently 
shewn, by a small Addition to an ordinary Weather-cock. 
2. The Degrees of Heat and Cold in the Air; which will be best 
observed by a sealed Thermometer, graduated according to the 
Degrees of Expansion, which bear a known Proportion to the whole 
Bulk of Liquor, the beginning of which Gradation, should be that 
Dimension which the Liquor hath, when encompassed with Water, 
just beginning to freeze, and the Degrees of Expansion, either 
greater or less, should be set or marked above it, or below it. 
3. The Degrees of Dryness and Moisture in the Air; which may be 
most conveniently observed by a Hygroscope, made with the single 
Beard of a wild oat perfectly ripe, set upright and headed with an 
Index, after the Way described by Emanuel Magnan; the 
Conversions and Degrees of which may be measured by Divisions 
made on the rim of a Circle, in the Centre of which, the Index is 
turned around: The Beginning or Standard of which Degree of 
Rotation, should be that, to which the Index points, when the 
Beard, being thoroughly wet, or covered with Water, is quite 
unwreathed, and becomes strait. But because of the Smallness of 
this Part of the Oat, the Cod of a wild vetch may be used instead of 
it, which will be a much larger Index, and will be altogether as 
sensible of the Changes of the Air. 
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4. The Degrees of Pressure in the Air; which may be several Ways 
observed, but best of all with an Instrument with Quicksilver 
contrived so, as either by means of Water, or an Index, it may 
sensibly exhibit the minute Variations of that Action. 
5. The Constitution and Face of the Sky or Heavens; and this is best 
done by the Eye; here should be observed, whether the Sky be clear 
or clouded; and if clouded, after what Manner; whether with high 
Exhalations or great white Clouds, or dark thick ones. Whether 
those Clouds afford Fogs or Mists, or Sleet, or Rain, or Snow, &c. 
Whether the under side of those Clouds be flat or waved and 
irregular, as I have often seen before Thunder. Which way they 
drive, whether all one Way, or some one way, some another, and 
whether any of these be the same with the Wind that Blows below; 
the Colour and Face of the Sky at the rising and setting of the Sun 
and Moon; what Haloes or Rings may happen to encompass those 
Luminaries, their Bigness, Form and Number. 
6. What Effects are produced upon other Bodies: As what Aches and 
Distempers in the Bodies of Men; what Diseases are most rife, as 
Colds, Fevers, Agues, &c. What Putrefaction or other Changes are 
produced in other Bodies; as the sweating of Marble, the burning 
blue of a Candle, the blasting of Trees and Corn; the unusual 
Sprouting, Growth, or Decay of any Plants or Vegetables; the 
Putrefaction of Bodies not usual; the Plenty of Scarcity of Insects; of 
several Fruits, Grains, Flowers, Roots, Cattel, Fishes, Birds, 
anything notable of that Kind. What Conveniences or 
Inconveniences may happen in the Year, in any kind, as by Floods, 
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Droughts, violent Showers, &c. What Nights produce Dews and 
Hoar-Frosts, and what not? 
7. What Thunders and Lightnings happen, and what Effects they 
produce; as souring Beer or Ale, turning Milk, killing Silkworms, 
&c? Anything extraordinary in the Tides; as double Tides, later or 
earlier, greater or less Tides than ordinary, rising or drying of 
Springs; Comets or unusual Apparitions, new Stars, Ignes fatui or 
shining Exhalations, or the like. These should all or most of them 
be diligently observed and registered by some one, that is always 
conversant in or near the same Place. 
8. Now that these, and some others, hereafter to be mentioned, may 
be registered so as to be most convenient for the making of 
Comparisons, requisite for the raising Axioms, whereby the Cause 
or Laws of Weather may be found out; it will be desirable to order 
them so, that the Scheme of a whole Month may at one View be 
presented to the Eye: And this may conveniently be done on the 
Pages of a Book in Folio, allowing fifteen Days for one side, and 
fifteen for the other. Let each of those Pages be divided into nine 
Columns, and distinguished by perpendicular Lines; let each of the 
first six Columns be half an Inch wide, and the three last equally 
share the remaining of the Side. 
9. Let each Column have the Title of what it is to contain in the first at 
least, written at the Top of it: As, let the first Column towards the 
left hand, contain the Days of the Month, or Place of the Sun, and 
the remarkable Hours of each Day. The second, the Place, Latitude, 
Distance, Ages and Faces of the Moon. The third, the Quarters and 
Strength of Winds. The fourth, the Heat and Cold of the Season. 
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The fifth, the Dryness and Moisture of it. The sixth, the Degrees of 
Pressure. The seventh, the Faces and Appearances of the Sky. The 
eighth, the Effects of the Weather upon other Bodies, Thunders, 
Lightnings, or anything extraordinary. The ninth, general 
Deduction, Corollaries or Syllogisms, arising from the comparing of 
several Phenomena together. 
10. That the Columns may be large enough to contain what they are 
designed for, it will be necessary, that the Particulars be expressed 
with some Characters, as brief and compendious as is possible. The 
two first by the Figures and Characters of the Signs commonly used 
in Almanacs. The Winds may be exprest by the Letters, by which 
they are exprest in small Sea-Cards; and the Degrees of Strength, by 
1,2,3,4, &c. according as they are marked in the Contrivance in the 
Weather-cock. The Degrees of Heat and Cold may be exprest by 
the Numbers appropriate to the Divisions of the Thermometer. The 
Dryness and Moisture, by the Divisions in the Rim of the 
Hygroscope. The pressure by Figures, denoting the Height of the 
Mercurial Cylinder. But for the Faces of the Sky, they are so many, 
that many of them want proper Names; and therefore it will be 
convenient to agree upon some determinate ones, by which the 
most usual may be in brief exprest. As let Clear signify a very clear 
Sky without any Clouds or Exhalations; Checquer'd a clear Sky, 
with many great white round Clouds, such as are very usual in 
Summer. Hazy, a Sky that looks whitish, by Reason of the 
Thickness of the higher Parts of the Air, by some Exhalations not 
formed into Clouds. Thick, a Sky more whitened by a greater 
Company of Vapours: these do usually make the Luminaries look 
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beared or hairy, and are oftentimes the Cause of the Appearance of 
Rings and Haloes about the Sun as well as the Moon. Overcast, 
when the Vapours so whiten and thicken the Air that the Sun 
cannot breath through; and of this there are many Degrees, which 
may be exprest by a little, much, more, very much overcast, &c. Let 
Hairy signify a Sky that hath many small, thin, and high 
Exhalations, which resemble Locks of Hair, or Flakes of Hemp or 
Flax; whose Varieties may be exprest by strait or curv'd &c. 
according to the Resemblance they bear. Let Water'd signify a Sky 
that has many high thin and small Clouds, looking almost like 
water'd Tabby, call'd in some Places a Mackrel Sky. Let a Sky be 
called Wav'd, when those Clouds appear much bigger and lower, 
but much after the same manner. Cloudy, when the sky has many 
thick dark Clouds. Lowring, when the sky is not very much 
overcast, but hath also underneath many thick dark Clouds which 
threaten Rain. The Signification of gloomy, foggy, misty, fleeting, 
driving, rainy, snowy, Reaches or Racks variable, &c. are well 
known, they being very commonly used. There may also be several 
Faces of the Sky compounded of two or more of these, which may 
be intelligibly enough exprest by two or more of these Names. It is 
likewise desirable, that the Particulars of the eighth and ninth 
Columns may be entered in as little Room and as few Words as are 
sufficient to signify them intelligibly and plainly. 
11. It were to be wisht that there were diverse in several Parts of the 
World, but especially in distant Parts of this Kingdom, that would 
undertake this Work, and that such would agree upon a common 
Way somewhat after this Manner, that as near as could be, the same 
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Method and Words might be made Use of. The Benefit of which 
Way is easily enough conceivable. 
12. As for the Method of using and digesting those so collected 
Observations; that will be more advantageously considered when 
the Supellex is provided; a Workman being then best able to fit and 
prepare his Tools for his Work, when he sees that Materials he has 
to work upon. ' 
What can be learned about science and its methods from this passage? 
The methods of science, according to Hooke, involve: 
1. General observation (para. 1 ff. ) 
2. The registering, i. e. recording, of observations (para. 1) 
3. The use of instruments and experimentation (e. g. para. 2,3,4) 
4. Measurement (para. 3,4) 
5. Observation of the effects produced by the phenomenon under 
consideration (para. 6-7) 
6. The making of comparisons among phenomena (para. 8) 
7. Generalisation (para. 9) 
('The ninth [Column] general Deduction, Corollaries or Syllogisms, 
arising from the comparing of several Phenomena together. ') 
8. Definitions and classifications (para. 10) 
('As let Clear signify a very clear sky without any Clouds or 
Exhalations') 
9. The use of comparative tables (para. 8-10) 
10. The use of symbols (para. 10) 
('The Winds may be exprest by the Letters') 
11. The formulation of hypotheses about causation (para. 8) 
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('Now that these, and some others, hereafter to be mentioned, may be 
registered so as to be most convenient for the making of Comparisons, 
requisite for the raising Axioms*, whereby the Cause or Laws of 
Weather may be found out... ') 
[* The term 'axiom' in 17th century science has a variety of meanings. One of them is 
equivalent to what we mean by 'hypothesis'. On the other hand, in the 17th and 18th 
centuries, hypothesis sometimes meant'speculation', as when Newton says : 
'Hypotheses non fingo'5.1 
12. Observation over a period of time (para. 8) 
13. References to the work of other scientists (para. 2) 
14. A desire for consistency in method and terminology in different 
scientific centres (para. 11) 
15. What can be termed 'reductivism' - the separation of components 
for analysis from a total whole (para. 3,4,5) 
16. A claim for better equipment and research staff (para. 12). 
These sixteen features (there may be others in the passage) are all 
recognisably activities which present day scientists engage in, even to 
the claim for better equipment! They are not necessary or sufficient 
conditions, and different sciences will stress some features more than 
others. For example, William Smellie, the natural historian, is 
interested in classification so quantification does not play a part in his 
science6. Galileo, on the other hand, does not think that nature can be 
understood without the use of mathematics: 
'Philosophy is written in that vast book which stands forever 
open before our eyes, I mean the universe; but it cannot be read 
until we have learnt the language and become familiar with the 
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characters in which it is written. It is written in mathematical 
language, and the letters are triangles, circles and other 
geometrical figures, without which means it is humanly 
impossible to comprehend a single word. '? 
Obviously the problems of characterising the methods of science in 
terms of necessary and sufficient conditions are compounded if the 
social sciences are included. We shall therefore need to be content 
with a number of loosely associated features. It might be argued that 
some of these are more central than others. But even this is not 
obvious. For example, if we say that some kind of quantification is 
essential then anatomy is pushed to the margins, and if we say that 
observations and experiment are essential then mathematics cannot be 
a science. 
Nevertheless, at the risk of oversimplification, we might say that in the 
many activities recommended by Hooke we can discern a very general 
type of scientific procedure, and from that suggest that science can be 
seen as a method or process. It was clear that Hooke was methodical 
and precise in his way of investigating the weather. But this kind of 
description could be given of the methods of many disciplines. 
Historians are methodical about the way in which they investigate a 
particular event and order and evaluate the documents relating to it, 
but their methods are not scientific in the modern sense. What is 
specific to the methods of science which distinguish them from other 
disciplines? 
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1.2.2 Salient features of scientific method 
There are a number of points to be made here. Firstly, most scientific 
enquiries start with an observation which - because science seeks to 
explain things about the world - is turned by the scientist in to a 
question. For example, the scientist might observe that when an object 
is dropped into a pool of water concentric waves spread out from that 
point in ever increasing circles until they decay. This observation then 
becomes a puzzle which must be solved. The second step in the 
process is to suggest an explanation as to why this might happen i. e. to 
set up a hypothesis. In this case the hypothesis might be that in the 
process of dropping the stone into the pool some energy is transferred 
to the water which becomes wave energy which slowly decays the 
further it gets from the source of the energy. 
Having set up the hypothesis, or possible explanation for the 
observation, the scientist in the third step has to test it by experiment to 
see if it is correct, or at least probable. His experimentation may 
confirm or deny his hypothesis. If the hypothesis is proved false, he 
will have to start again at step two with a new hypothesis and then test 
this one for its veracity. 
The important point about this third step is that the experimentation is 
designed to prove that the explanation or hypothesis applies to all 
instances when the same circumstances exist. In other words, if, every 
time a stone was thrown into the water, the scientist was able to test 
his hypothesis about the outcome, he would come up with the same 
explanation time after time. So the fourth characteristic point about 
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scientific method is that it produces conclusions which are generalisable 
and apply in all other similar circumstances. A discipline like history 
does not aim to produce conclusions which are applicable to all similar 
situations. The point about history is that each event must be studied 
on its own terms and in its own context. We may find that there are 
similarities in the circumstances which preceded the French and 
Russian revolutions but we certainly cannot say that they were the 
same circumstances or that the explanation for both was the same. 
In summary, then, scientific method usually takes the form of: 
1) Observation 
2) Hypothesis formation 
3) Experimentation, which if it confirms or, at least, renders possible 
the hypothesis, leads to 
4) Generalisation. 
This outline describes the whole scientific process, but often scientific 
'method' is taken to mean the experimental methods used by scientists. 
I will say more about this in (1.3.2), but will note here that most people 
regard the methods of science as primarily quantitative. This is the 
main reason why the colloquial sense of science has the meanings it 
now has of 'precision' and 'reliability'. However, qualitative research 
methods are now being used in some scientific disciplines in order to 
measure things which are not amenable to numerical measurement. 
This movement has a bearing now on research work in medicine and I 
will assess in a later section (1.7.2) the extent to which this might be 
regarded as scientific or not. 
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1.3 EVIDENCE 
Before leaving scientific method I must indicate what the role of 
'evidence' is. The reason why some analysis of the concept of evidence 
is necessary here is that the scientific pretensions of medicine are 
currently expressed via the concept of evidence. 'Evidence based 
medicine' has become a catch phrase which cannot be questioned in 
medical circles. But what is 'evidence' and what is its place in science? 
My method of analysis will be to investigate the logical process which 
converts inconsequential facts into 'evidence', and in so doing I shall 
discuss the proper use of the different strands of evidence which are 
available to the practising physician. In order to illuminate the nature 
of evidence as it is seen in medicine I shall draw parallels with 
'evidence' as understood in science and in detective work. 
From one point of view, evidence is really just information, but it is a 
certain kind of information in that it relates to a specific medical, 
scientific or forensic conclusion. We do not just say 'This is evidence', 
we say 'This is evidence for something or that something is the case'. 
Information and data can be about something but they do not suggest 
that we must draw any conclusions from them. A couple of examples 
might help to outline the process by which data becomes evidence. 
Henry's friend comes round to visit him one evening and gets no 
answer when he rings the bell. The friend looks for Henry's car and 
finds that it is gone. Being persistent, he checks round at Henry's back 
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door and finds it locked and that the kitchen lights are out and the 
house is silent. The friend assesses all this data in the context of his 
attempted visit and concludes that Henry is out. The facts of the 
unanswered bell, the absent car and the darkened house, therefore, 
become evidence that Henry is away from home. 
To take a legal example, in the case against McTavish, who is alleged to 
have held up and robbed a bank, the prosecuting lawyer says : 'The 
facts in the case are these: McTavish bought a gun; he was seen in the 
region of the bank at the time of the armed robbery; he was later found 
in possession of a large sum of money'. These facts become evidence 
when the lawyer suggests that the jury must conclude that it was 
McTavish who held up the bank. 
What, then, are the important aspects of the handling of the facts in 
these two cases which turn them into evidence? Firstly, the facts have 
to be relevant to the case and they must be relevant in a particular way, 
i. e. in that they are facts which contribute to a specific hypothesis 
relating to the case. The three facts in the first case (the unanswered 
bell, the absent car and the darkened house) are all relevant to the 
claim that Henry is not at home and they suggest that conclusion. 
Secondly, there must be some assessment of the extent to which these 
facts suggest this conclusion. I will refer to this aspect of evidence as 
its 'weight'. For example, facts may be relevant to a case but we have 
to know how relevant they are in order to assess whether these facts 
are more or less likely to support the hypothesis we have formed. If 
we look again at the second example, the fact that McTavish was seen 
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in the region of the bank at the time it was robbed might be said to be 
relevant to the hypothesis that it was he who robbed the bank, but 
there were also many other people walking up and down outside the 
bank at that time. However, as we are able to bring forward other bits 
of information which are relevant to our hypothesis - McTavish had 
bought a gun and he was found in possession of a large sum of money 
- the importance or weight of this first piece of evidence increases. 
The third and final point about the handling of facts as evidence is that 
they must be submitted to the judgement of an assessor8. This seems 
an obvious point in view of the above discussion, because it is 
necessary to submit facts to the judgement of someone who will carry 
out the process of assessing their relevance as evidence, weighing their 
importance and drawing conclusions from them. This point needs to 
be stressed however, as it is an important point of distinction between 
facts and evidence. Facts or data can be accepted without recourse to 
judgement but facts as evidence necessarily involve judgement. The 
concept of evidence is, therefore, parasitic upon the concept of 
judgement. Now the concept of judgement is normative in the sense 
that it is prioritising certain facts as the important ones, or it is claiming 
that certain facts amount to good evidence or put a conclusion beyond 
reasonable doubt. We can, therefore, say that the concept of evidence 
(which relies upon judgement) must also be normative. In other 
words, the conclusion that some fact or piece of data constitutes 
'evidence' for something is not arrived at through an entirely objective 
process, it depends on some individual or group evaluation. 
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From this analysis we might say that 'evidence' is information relating 
to a subject or case, which is relevant to a particular argument, and 
which gives weight to a certain conclusion about the subject. The 
existence of facts as 'evidence' is, therefore, irresistibly related to the 
concept of 'judgement' as someone has to determine whether the facts 
are relevant and whether, and to what extent, the facts support a 
certain conclusion. A collection of data cannot, therefore, be called 
evidence until the context in which it is to be used is clear and some 
process of reasoning has been exerted to determine its usefulness in 
that context. Let us now look at this process in more detail. 
1.3.1 Relevance 
The first thing to establish about information which might be used as 
evidence is its relevance. It is important to be clear exactly what we 
mean by 'relevance' in this context as the concept can have two 
meanings. The first is that the information has a general association 
with the subject matter in that it is in some non-specific way related to 
it. An example might be the suggestion that blood cholesterol levels 
are associated with the development of heart disease in some way. 
The second meaning is that the information is relevant only in the 
context of a specific hypothesis relating to the subject. In this case the 
example would be that blood cholesterol levels are related to heart 
disease in that a high level is associated with an increased likelihood of 
heart disease. The first meaning of relevance would not fit in with the 
conditions we have already established for data to be regarded as 
evidence. Data can also be about a subject but evidence must relate to 
some hypothesis about the subject. 
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This second, more precise, meaning has implications for the way in 
which data is collected to be used as evidence, particularly in the 
context of a scientific inquiry. If, as I have argued, data must be 
relevant to a specific hypothesis about a subject to be used as evidence, 
then the hypothesis must be formulated before the collection of the 
data. If it is not then the enquirer has no idea whether the information 
he is collecting or the context in which he is studying it will be relevant 
to his study or not. The philosopher of science, Carl Hempel, 
summarises this point : 
'an empirical finding is relevant for a hypothesis if and only if it 
constitutes either favourable or unfavourable evidence for it; in 
other words if it either confirms or disconfirms the hypothesis. '9. 
The implication of this conclusion is that scientific inquiry is not just 
about gathering together all the information we have about a subject 
and seeing where it takes us. We have to construct a hypothesis and 
use only that information which is relevant to the hypothesis and, as 
Hempel has said, the information is still evidence even if it disconfirms 
the hypothesis. This way of looking at evidence is particularly relevant 
to a scientific inquiry and we might, therefore, call it the 'science 
model' of evidence. 
It is, however, possible to argue for the first meaning of relevance in 
other contexts where evidence is used. The work of the detective is 
one such context. In Arthur Conan Doyle's 'A Study in Scarlet' Dr 
Watson upbraids Sherlock Holmes for not paying enough attention to 
the case they have just set out to investigate: 
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'" You don't seem to give much thought to the matter in hand, " I 
said at last, interrupting Holmes's musical disquisition. 
" No data yet, " he answered. "It is a capital mistake to theorise 
before you have all the evidence. It biases the judgement". ' O. 
The role of the detective, as described here by Holmes, is to amass all 
the material relating to a case and then formulate some hypothesis as 
to its solution. Once there is sufficient evidence to form the hypothesis 
that Jones has committed the crime then the detective can set about 
trying to prove a case against Jones. This model of evidence contrasts 
with the science model described above in that the hypothesis is 
derived from a consideration of the evidence available. 
In summary, we now have two models of 'relevant' evidence. One, 
which I have called the 'science model', says that data is relevant as 
evidence for a hypothesis only if it contributes to a specific argument 
for or against that hypothesis. The second, which we might call the 
'detective model', says that all data is relevant if it has some bearing on 
a case and can contribute to the formation of a hypothesis relating to 
that case. I will come back to these ideas later when considering the 
idea of judgement. 
1.3.2 Weight 
Moving from the two models of 'relevance' we can now consider the 
second factor about the concept of evidence. This is the 'weight' to 
be 
given to information considered as evidence. Having established 
that 
a hypothesis 'H' may be corroborated by a body of evidence 
'E' (which 
is what we would attempt to do by establishing relevance) we 
then 
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need to move on to establish the extent to which E confirms H. This 
will enable us to decide whether hypothesis H is a more plausible 
explanation of events or phenomena than another hypothesis, H1. 
Hempel breaks the problem of defining weight into two parts : 
' (1) To lay down criteria defining a metrical concept "degree of 
confirmation of H with respect to E", whose values are real 
numbers; or failing this, 
(2) To lay down criteria defining two relational concepts, "more 
highly confirmed than" and "equally well confirmed as", which 
make possible a non-metrical comparison of hypotheses' 11. 
In the medical context, Hempel's first part might refer to any standard 
randomised controlled trial where the outcomes can be measured 
numerically. Statistical calculations can be made on the probabilities of 
these outcomes coming about because of the drug being used in the 
trial (main hypothesis) or because of chance (alternative hypothesis). 
The statistical calculations used to represent such probabilities are p 
values and are appropriate for quantitative studies. Hempel's second 
part would be appropriate to qualitative studies where the concern of 
the researcher is with concepts such as patient satisfaction or students' 
anxiety. A non-metrical comparative approach is appropriate for such 
studies as the concepts they deal with cannot be given numerical 
values in a meaningful way (see 1.7.2) and another method of 
expressing the degree of weight to be given to the evidence is required. 
There is, therefore, no single correct approach to assessing the weight 
to be given to evidence in medicine. At times it is appropriate to apply 
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numerical calculations to the solution and at other times the best that 
can be said is 'more probable' or 'less probable'. 
1.3.3 Judgement 
So far we have looked at the process by which a body of information or 
data becomes evidence when its relevance and weight with respect to a 
certain hypothesis are established. Now we come to look at the way 
in which this relevance is established and importance weighed i. e. 
through the personal judgement of the investigator : 
'The investigator's task is to assemble the relevant evidence and 
then to judge whether the assay means A or B: true or false, 
innocent or guilty, well or ill. The historian, the judge, the 
physician follow methodological procedures that hinge upon a 
common characteristic: their personal judgement must play the 
decisive role in assembling the evidence, drawing the inference, 
and formulating the conclusion in each case they consider. ' 12 
In this passage Lerner emphasises the importance of personal 
judgement at all stages of the process by which data becomes evidence. 
The importance of, and elements in, personal judgement will be 
discussed again in 2.6,3.6 and the Conclusion (ch. 6). 
But let us, therefore, look at the role of judgement in relation to the two 
models of evidence that I considered earlier when considering 
relevance. The scientist relies on the prior creation of a hypothesis 
which could be tested experimentally to establish findings which 
should be true in all similar circumstances. The time for personal 
judgement in this model is at the formulation of the hypothesis which 
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precedes data collection. The hypothesis itself might come about as a 
result of a flash of insight13 (see 3.6.2) or from a period of 
contemplation, but it requires the exercise of the investigator's 
judgement to assess whether it is worth experimental testing and in 
what way. This approach can be described as hypothetico-deductive 
reasoning. The detective model relies on the amassing of all relevant 
information in a case for consideration by the investigator who would 
then construct an argument relating to the case. The hypothesis 
formation follows a consideration of the relevant data and might be 
described as inductive reasoning. 
The two models differ, therefore, in the kind of thinking that results 
from their approach to the concept of relevance. If we consider also 
the question of the aim of science as distinct from that of detective 
work, we find a further fundamental distinction. The scientist aims at 
establishing truths about the world which will hold in all similar 
circumstances. The detective looks only to discover the truth in the 
particular case he is considering. Those specific truths will have no 
universal applications, though the experience of studying the 
particular case may be of use to the detective in future cases. The 
distinction between the scientist's and the detective's approach to and 
inferences from evidence will come up again in 2.4. 
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1.4 SCIENTIFIC AIMS 
1.4.1 Understanding 
I have so far tried to characterise science in terms of methods and 
procedures, including the use of evidence. But another way of 
identifying science is in terms of its aims. I wish to maintain that the 
primary aim of scientists is to reach a particular kind of understanding 
of nature, including human nature and society. This aim is intrinsic to, 
or internal to, scientific activity as such, although of course some 
scientists may wish to apply their understanding to goals external to 
science, such as finding cures or building bridges. The understanding 
of the scientist derives from systematic knowledge, from knowledge of 
the 'connecting principles' of nature (see 1.6). 
By saying that scientific knowledge is systematic I mean that each bit of 
knowledge is known and understood in relation to other bits of 
knowledge and is dependent on other knowledge and understanding. 
If we compare science with natural history this may become clearer. 
We could suggest that the aims of natural history and science are the 
same: to discover the truth about the world. The naturalist might 
make the observation that insectivorous plants are to be found 
commonly in boggy ground. This observation is sufficient for the 
naturalist whose role is to describe what it is that he sees. The scientist 
(botanist in this context), however, would go further and wish to 
explain this observation. He might suggest from other knowledge 
that, as boggy ground is nitrogen poor, the plants that inhabit 
it need 
to get their nitrogen from somewhere else so they devour insects. 
The 
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botanist could go on to test this theory for its validity. The natural 
historian's observation does not need to be part of other knowledge; it 
can stand on its own. The scientist, however, is interested in building 
the knowledge of his subject into a systematic whole where each aspect 
makes sense in the context of the rest and must be understood in the 
light of the rest. It might be objected that the pursuit of systematic 
understanding cannot be a sufficient condition for an activity's being 
scientific since philosophy also seeks systematic understanding. Two 
replies are possible here, replies which are mutually consistent. First, 
the objection assumes a sharp distinction between philosophy and 
science which may not be defensible, and second, the systematic 
understanding pursued by philosophers may be at a different level 
from that pursued by scientists. The latter are seeking the connecting 
principles of nature whereas the former are seeking the connecting 
principles of concepts. I shall not pursue these difficult points but 
rather I shall outline a rival view of the aim of science. 
1.4.2 Control 
The origins of the view that the aim of science is to control nature for 
human betterment are to be found in the works of Francis Bacon (1561- 
1626). Bacon was not himself much of a scientist, but rather a prophet, 
or philosopher of science, and as such his writings were influential. 
His writings about science had three overlapping themes. First, he is 
caustic in his criticism of existing and preceding science. 
'Surely, like as many substances in nature which are solid do 
putrefy and corrupt into worms; so it is the property of good and 
sound knowledge to putrefy and dissolve into a number of subtle, 
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idle, unwholesome, and (as I may term them) vermiculate 
questions, which have indeed a kind of quickness and life of spirit, 
but no soundness of matter or goodness of quality. This kind of 
degenerate learning did chiefly reign among the schoolmen; who, 
having sharp and strong wits, and abundance of leisure, and small 
variety of reading, but their wits being shut up in the cells of a few 
authors (chiefly Aristotle their dictator) as their persons were shut 
up in the cells of monasteries and colleges, and knowing little 
history, either of nature or time, did out of no great quantity of 
matter and infinite agitation of wit spin out unto us those 
laborious webs of learning which are extant in their books. For the 
wit and mind of man, if it work upon matter, which is the 
contemplation of the creatures of God, worketh according to the 
stuff and is limited thereby; but if it work upon itself, as the spider 
worketh his web, then it is endless, and brings forth indeed 
cobwebs of learning, admirable for the fineness of thread and 
work, but of no substance or profit. '14 
Secondly, he holds that science can proceed only by observation and 
experiment. 
'Man is the helper and interpreter of nature. He can only act and 
understand in so far as he has observed nature's order practically 
or theoretically. Outside this he has no knowledge or power. '15 
Thirdly, and most relevantly for present purposes, he asserts the view 
that the justification for scientific research is to improve life for 
mankind. 
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'It is well to observe the force and effect and consequences of 
discoveries. These are to be seen nowhere more conspicuously than 
in those three which were unknown to the ancients, and of which 
the origin, though recent, is obscure; namely, printing, gunpowder, 
and the magnet... no empire, no sect, no star seems to have exerted 
greater influence on human affairs than these mechanical 
inventions. '16 
It should be noted that Bacon did not clearly distinguish (2) and (3), 
and writes: 
'Truth therefore and utility are here the very same thing: and works 
themselves are of greater value as pledges of truth, than as 
contributions to the comforts of life. '17 
This view, that the aim of science is to control nature for 'human 
welfare', had a large following in the 18th century, and many 
intellectual societies were established with that aim. For example, the 
Royal Society of Edinburgh was founded in 1783 with the aim of 'the 
advancement of useful knowledge. ' 
The two views, that the aim of science is to provide understanding of 
nature through systematic knowledge, and that the aim is to control 
nature for human betterment, are not necessarily incompatible. For if 
we understand the workings of the natural world we may be able to 
use that systematic knowledge to control nature. This would be called 
'applied science'. But in practice there are likely to be important 
differences between proponents of the two views in what is regarded 
as satisfactory science. The differences are shown in attitudes to the 
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Copernican theory. The Pope was quite prepared to accept the 
Copernican theory as a heuristic device, a way of calculating the 
calendar. But Galileo fell foul of the Church by insisting that the 
theory provided real understanding of nature, that the theory was true. 
As he says of the Ptolemic theory: 
'Although it satisfied an astronomer merely arithmetical, yet it did 
not offer satisfaction or content to the astronomer philosophical. '18 
A similar contrast can be found in the attitude of the two camps to 
scientific laws. For the control and utility camp, such as the Baconian, 
scientific laws are simply devices which help with predictions. But for 
the systematic knowledge camp, such as the Galilean, scientific laws 
are necessarily true. As Galileo says in his letter to the Grand Duchess: 
'Nature ... is inexorable and immutable; she never transgresses the 
laws imposed on her... '19 
This contrast in the aims of science will be important when I come to 
examine the nature of scientific medicine. But I wish here to insist that 
'applied science' is parasitic on pure science. The physicist is 
fundamentally different in his aim from the jobbing electrician, 
although both are important. The point is that the goals of the 
electrician and engineer are external to science, and follow from social 
purposes, whereas those of the scientist proper are internal to science 
and follow from the human impulse to understand and find the 
'connecting principles of nature' (1.6). Moreover, and this will become 
more central in the next section, the view that the aim of science is 
simply to understand, is psychologically, if not logically, connected 
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with the view that the true scientist is detached from vested interests. 
That is one reason why, as I shall go on to discuss, there is public 
opinion in favour of the scientific outlook. 
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1.5 THE SCIENTIFIC OUTLOOK 
I have so far tried to characterise science in terms of a method, an 
approach to evidence, and an aim. Can it be characterised in terms of 
an outlook or general view of the world? It is certainly widely 
believed that there is such a thing as a scientific world view. But when 
we examine what that is we find that it seems to be some one or 
combination of the points I have already made: that a certain method is 
involved, that strict criteria of evidence are used, or that the scientist is 
detached or disinterested. There is, however, an ambiguity in the 
public consciousness as to whether this world view is entirely a good 
thing. My main concern in this chapter is with the analysis of what 
science is but the question of the public perception of science and 
scientific method is sufficiently important to justify a slight digression. 
I shall, therefore, examine briefly the ambiguity in the public view of 
science. 
Take first the strand in public consciousness which depicts science as 
benign. It is an accepted point of advertising jargon to suggest that 
science has been applied in the making of a new product and that 
science has been involved in proving its effectiveness. For example, 
claims such as 'This shampoo is scientifically proven to cure dandruff' 
are common in advertising. This suggestions is frequently 
accompanied on screen by images of people wearing white coats and 
handling test tubes. The appeal of the advert is not, however, to the 
public's understanding of the technical aspects of the chemistry of a 
product, but to a general sense that science brings with it safety, 
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reliability and a certain guarantee that the thing will work. 'Science' 
has come to carry this meaning in everyday use because it is seen by 
most people as being the preserve of clever experts whose ways are 
mysterious to most ordinary people. The outcome of their activities, 
therefore, is mysterious and unfathomable to the ordinary mortal. This 
sense of 'science' is not just found in the advertising world; it is part of 
our everyday language. We will often say things like: 'Let's just be 
scientific about this', meaning, 'Let's just try to sort this out in a 
methodical and organised way'. Usually the epithet 'scientific' also 
carries the sense of better', as in: 'I prefer to do it your way; it's more 
scientific. ' 
To describe something as 'scientific', therefore, in this sphere of 
everyday speech, is to suggest that it is of proven benefit, reliable or 
just that it is better than something else or than some other way of 
proceeding. It is important to acknowledge this view of science in the 
context of this discussion because it implies that science is held in high 
regard by the public and that scientists can speak with come authority 
in the public domain. Medicine is perceived as an activity that relies 
on science, and people's trust in their doctors is partly based on this 
perception. The 'view of the scientist' is frequently sought in 
discussion programmes on issues of importance to society, and it is 
done for many reasons, some of which are connected with the ways in 
which I have already characterised science: in terms of its method, its 
strict approach to evidence, and its detached aim of systematic 
understanding. In the public perception these qualifications entitle 
scientists to be seem as 'experts', and because of their allegedly 
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detached expertise they are often invited by governments and other 
bodies to give advice on matters such about which they have no 
special knowledge; the 'method' is held to be universally applicable. 
There is something to be said for this public perception. Certainly, 
scientists are no more entitled than the rest of us to comment on the 
principles of ethics, but in some contexts they may be better placed to 
comment on the application of these principles. For public policy and 
many areas of ethical debate nowadays require knowledge of a sort 
which only scientists have. This knowledge gives the scientist the 
ability to have a view on certain issues that are not accessible to most 
people. For instance, the issue of xenotransplantation involves the 
creation of genetically manipulated pigs whose organs might be used 
for transplantation into humans. There are clearly technical and 
practical points which only scientists can discuss in relation to this new 
technique, but the view of the scientist also needs to be sought 
regarding the ethics of such a procedure. The ethics of the technique 
are intimately connected with practical and technical issues such as the 
extent to which new viruses might be passed from the animal to the 
human recipients of organs and so into the human domain. Thus the 
scientist as expert cannot simply confine himself to providing 
information; he must be prepared to consider the effects of the new 
knowledge that he has brought to light. 
The example of xenotransplantation enables me to introduce the side 
to our perception of science which is less trusting. The first aspect of 
this concerns the assumption that scientists are concerned with the 
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detached understanding of the world. Science nowadays involves big 
money, which comes from governments, large foundations and 
pharmaceutical companies. There is a widespread suspicion that 
scientists can be corrupted by money as much as the rest of us. For 
example, pharmaceutical companies are anxious to make a return on 
their large investments and they therefore may be over-zealous in 
putting on the market products which are inadequately tested. There 
have been tragic examples of this, such as the thalidomide cases. 
Medicine is indeed especially liable to this undesirable aspects of 
science because of the competition among scientists to be first in the 
market with profit-making pharmaceuticals. 
A second and connected undesirable aspect of the scientific outlook 
concerns the fear that the impulse to control (1.4.2) nature may lead 
scientists to 'play God' and thus tamper with what they only 
imperfectly understand. For example, the scientists of the day assured 
us of the desirable consequences of developing a nuclear industry. 
They were totally wrong. Are their successors, therefore, to be 
believed in issues such as xenotransplantation, cloning, or genetic 
engineering? I shall not here take sides on such issues but note them 
as examples of doubts which make the general public suspicious of 'the 
scientific outlook'. 
A third aspect of science which is not thought to be wholly benign 
accepts the 'control' view of science and further suggests that scientific 
procedures, scientists themselves, and the scientific outlook, are cold, 
unimaginative, uncreative and boring. 
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This view can be found in the poet William Blake, who blamed 
Newton for the 'dark satanic Mills, 20 of the Industrial Revolution. 
Another version of the discussion can be seen in the controversy 
sparked off by the novelist and scientist CP Snow21 in his Rede Lecture 
in 1959. Snow's theory of the 'two cultures' of humanities and sciences 
derived from an educational tradition, particularly strong in England, 
which regarded education in the humanities as the education of a 
gentleman, fitting him to take his place in the governing class. Snow 
himself had been born to a lower middle class family in Leicester and 
his father worked as a clerk in a shoe factory. He attended the local 
grammar school and went on to study chemistry at Leicester 
University College and then at Cambridge. 
The 'Two Cultures', then, for Snow, reflected a class divide in English 
society. The upper classes educated at the elite public schools, with 
their emphasis on classical scholarship, having a social and cultural 
advantage over the gifted grammar school boy who excelled in physics 
or chemistry. Snow felt that such a situation held the county back from 
the modern age of technological advance because the most gifted 
minds were not being encouraged to study the sciences. He suggested 
that those educated in the humanities, whose minds and vision were 
supposed to have been broadened by the experience, could be as 
narrowly specialised as any scientist : 
'Once or twice I have been provoked and have asked the 
company how many of them could describe the Second Law of 
Thermodynamics. The response was cold: it was also negative. 
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Yet I was asking something which is about the scientific 
equivalent of : Have you read a work of Shakespeare's? '22 
Science and scientists are now held in greater esteem than at the time 
Snow was writing but resonances of his view still exist. The fact that a 
scientist such as Richard Dawkins has been appointed as Professor of 
the Public Understanding of Science suggests that science needs good 
communicators to talk and write about science in a way that helps the 
majority of people to understand it and become excited by its ideas. 
In fact the focus more recently has been on the similarities rather than 
on the differences in the intellectual culture of the arts and the sciences. 
The humanities in medicine movement in medical education (5.9) is 
part of this cultural shift but it is to be found in other areas too. 
Historians of science now emphasise the role of imagination, metaphor 
and analogy in scientific thinking. Creativity is seen as much a part of 
scientific discovery as of artistic endeavour, and sudden insights as 
important in scientific thinking as in art. Let us examine further the 
place of the imagination in scientific thinking. It seems a recent idea, 
but like so many 'recent ideas' it can be found in the Scottish 
Enlightenment, and it is in that context that I shall discuss it. It will 
emerge that the 'scientific outlook' is that of Enlightenment curiosity. 
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1.6 SCIENCE AND THE IMAGINATION : Adam Smith 
The idea that scientific thinking involves the imagination can be found 
in the Scottish Enlightenment, specifically in an essay by Adam Smith 
on the History of Astronomy23. The clue to Smith's intentions in this 
early essay is provided by the fuller title of his essay 'The principles 
which lead and direct philosophical inquiries illustrated by the history 
of astronomy'. The term 'philosophy' must, of course, be taken here in 
a wide sense to include the natural sciences, but the important point 
for my purposes is Smith's use of the phrase 'lead and direct' 
philosophical inquiries. He means that he is offering what we might 
now regard as an account of the psychology of scientific discovery - the 
motivation of the scientist. I have so far characterised science in terms 
of a set of procedures and in terms of its aims. We can now 
characterise it in terms of a particular sort of motivation, a curiosity 
which is analysed by Smith in a novel way. Smith's account enables 
me to make a bridge between the scientist and the artist via the work of 
imagination. 
Smith identifies three, what he calls 'sentiments', which he thinks 
explain the psychology of scientific discovery. They are 'wonder', 
'surprise', and 'admiration'. He explains their operations as follows: 
'What is new and singular, excites that sentiment which, in strict 
propriety, is called Wonder; what is unexpected, Surprise; and what 
is great or beautiful, Admiration'24. 
He has much interest to say about all three of these 'sentiments' which 
indeed overlap and support each other, but it is his discussion of 
40 
wonder which contains points of interest on scientific discovery and 
explanation. For purposes of this thesis his argument may be 
summarised as follows: 
The mind takes pleasure in observing resemblences between objects 
and consequently in arranging these resembling ideas into classes, 
technically called Genera and Species. The greater our knowledge, the 
more divisions and subdivisions we ascribe to genera and species. 
When something new turns up this generates wonder when we try to 
assign it to some familiar class. There is a second kind of wonder. The 
first kind is generated when we encounter unusual individual entities, 
and the second kind when we encounter uncommon successions on 
trains of entities. This second kind is also generated by interruptions 
of customary successions with which the imagination is familiar. This 
is where the imagination has a role, for it steps in to fill the gaps in 
these interruptions. The imagination is then enabled to 'flow 
smoothly' along apparently disjointed events. Philosophers (scientists) 
who have spent their lives studying connecting principles between 
objects will often be aware of intervals between objects which less 
informal or more careless observers will think are strictly conjoined. 
Philosophy is therefore the 'science of the connecting principles of 
nature'25. Chaotic events or irregularities disturb the imagination. 
'Philosophy (science), therefore may be regarded as one of those arts 
which address themselves to the imagination .... 126, 
Smith has mounted a powerful argument for the role of the 
imagination in scientific discovery. His views here are much 
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influenced by those of Hume. In his account of our belief in an 
external world Hume argues that gaps in our perceptions of the world 
are filled in by the work of the imagination, which gives our 
perceptions the illusion of a constancy and coherence they do not 
really have27. Smith is applying this Humean idea to scientific 
explanation. He is arguing that wonder is triggered when the smooth 
course of the imagination is disturbed by an unusual event or sequence 
of events. The imagination is 'soothed' when philosophy (or science) 
shows the unusual event to be part of a system or customary order, 
and so enables the imagination to resume an easy passage. When the 
imagination has discovered 'a more coherent, and therefore a more 
magnificent spectacle' our admiration is prompted, which is the third 
stage in scientific discovery. 
If I were writing a more general philosophy of science there would 
need to be a discussion of how we can reconcile the achievement of a 
'tranquil' imagination with the 'objectivity' of science. In the History 
of Astronomy28, he goes as far as suggesting 'the repose of the 
imagination is the ultimate end of philosophy', and he comments29 on 
the ease with which 'the learned give up the evidence of their senses to 
preserve the coherence of the ideas of their imagination'. There 
is an 
echo here of Galileo in' The Two Chief World Systems' when Salviati 
admires those 
'that have received and held it [the Copernican system] to be true, 
and with the sprightliness of their judgements offered such violence 
to their own senses, as that they have been able to prefer that which 
their reason dictated to them, to that which sensible experiences 
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represented most manifestly to the contrary... I cannot find any 
bounds for my admiration, how that reason was able in Aristarchus 
and Copernicus, to commit such a rape upon their Senses, as in 
despite thereof, to make herself mistress of their credulity'30. 
Galileo is here thinking of the coherence of mathematics, whereas 
Smith is thinking of the coherence of the imagination. The same 
problem arises for both, however, of how to reconcile the coherence of 
a system with the world of the senses. Fortunately I need not enter 
into this debate but can take from Smith the point that science is one of 
the arts that address themselves to the imagination, and what pleases 
the imagination is systematic understanding. 
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1.7 MEDICINE AND SCIENCE 
Granted that I have roughly characterised science from various 
standpoints, historical and logical, I can now turn to the question: 
How far is medicine scientific? Medicine, of course, has a clinical as 
well as a research side, and I shall discuss the clinical side to medicine 
in chapter 2. But let us now consider how far medical research can be 
considered scientific. It will be recalled that I began this chapter by 
noting that there are three areas of medical research: 
(a) the search for systematic understanding of the body in its 
normal workings and its pathology; 
(b) empirical observation of the behaviour of patients, doctors and 
their interaction; 
(c) randomised trials to establish the best treatments. 
Let us discuss them in order. 
1.7.1 Basic biology and pathology 
If we take (a) we have an easy answer: the search for systematic 
understanding of the normal and pathological workings of the body is 
obviously completely scientific. The doctors involved are 
straightforwardly doing science with all the means and methods of 
contemporary science. Thus, normal and pathological biochemistry, 
physiology, anatomy, and so on, provide the developing and 
systematic scientific knowledge base of medicine, using all the 
methods of scientific research with the aim of providing 
understanding. When we move to (b) and (c) however, we encounter 
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more difficulty in reaching an appropriate answer. Let us begin with 
(b), research into the behaviour of patients, doctors and their 
interaction in medicine. This is often called 'qualitative research'. 
1.7.2 Qualitative research 
There are really two questions involved in considering the scientific 
credentials of qualitative research. First, can qualitative research 
meaningfully use measurements and scales in the manner of 
quantitative research? Secondly, supposing we cannot meaningfully 
use scales and measurements does it follow that quantitative research 
is not scientific? It is important to stress that there are two questions 
here, for there is a tendency among medical researchers to assume that 
what cannot be quantified cannot count as 'real' science. But, as I have 
already suggested (1.2), an activity can be scientific without being 
quantitative. Let us therefore examine the first question. 
Should researchers involved in qualitative research use numbers to 
present their findings? There is an increasing focus on qualitative 
research in medicine31 and, whereas the results of such research used 
to appear only in sociological, educational and anthropological 
journals32, medical journals are beginning to publish some examples33. 
The problem is that doctors have been brought up (in a research sense) 
on the methods of quantitative research and these methods are given 
higher value than those of qualitative research by those who hold the 
purse strings of funding and promotion - the editorial boards of 
medical journals34. (So much for detached, scientific understanding! 
) 
There is, therefore, a tendency to force qualitative research into a 
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quantitative mould. For example, we find qualities like 'patient- 
centredness' being given a score of 1.4535 and doctor satisfaction 
measured as 8.9536. Are such measurements meaningful or helpfu137? 
In answering this question I shall focus on the uses of numbers and the 
establishment of scales, look at the implications numbers and scales 
have for qualitative research, and finally, suggest a more satisfactory 
interpretation of the findings of qualitative research. 
(a) Numbers and scales 
'Measurement has been defined as the correlation with numbers of 
entities which are not numbers' 38. The use of numbers and the 
mechanism of counting are essential first steps in understanding the 
nature of measurement. We use numbers in three distinct ways39. 
Firstly, as a method of identification or labelling, as in the numbering 
of football players on a field or in labelling diagrams. In this case the 
numbers have no relationship with each other and they are assigned in 
a totally arbitrary fashion. 
Secondly, numbers are used to indicate the position of something in a 
series. Examples here might be the numbering of theatre seats, or 
house numbers. The numbers indicate the relationship of one seat or 
house to the other and enable people to find them easily. A more 
complex example of the same use of numbers40 is that of the relative 
hardness of wood, glass and diamond. Diamond can cut glass but 
glass cannot cut diamond; glass can cut wood but wood cannot cut 
glass. We can, therefore, arrange these three objects in a series of 
increasing hardness with wood at the bottom and diamond at the top. 
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If we give wood the number 1, glass 2 and diamond 3, this tells us that 
wood is softer than glass which is in turn softer than diamond. This 
kind of arrangement in a series is appropriate for non-additive 
qualities like hardness and also applies to the kinds of things that 
qualitative research deals with such as patient satisfaction and quality 
of life. But the arrangement has a limitation: it does not tell us that 
diamond is three times as hard as wood because our series gives no 
indication of how much harder these objects are than each other. The 
important point is that when qualities are arranged in a series and 
identified with numbers, the use of those numbers to perform 
calculations like averages or percentages is meaningless, as the 
relationship between points 1 and 2 and between 5 and 6 in the series 
may be completely different. Distinctions between qualitative entities 
can very often only be expressed through descriptions like 'more and 
less' or 'better and worse' as they have no true numerical meaning. 
The third way in which numbers are used is to describe quantitative 
relationships between things. Examples here might be weights or 
distances or amounts of things. If we take one bag of sugar to weigh 1 
unit and balance a similar bag of sugar opposite it so that neither bag 
sinks, we can say that the second bag also weighs 1 unit. We can then 
take a bigger bag of sugar and balance it against the two smaller bags 
such that neither side sinks and say that the bigger bag weighs 2 units. 
In this way we can construct a scale of measurement for the bags of 
sugar. This use of numbers is appropriate for properties that are 
additive. It applies to the quantitative analysis of scientific research 
such as the measurement of blood pressure or blood levels of a 
drug or 
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cholesterol. Unlike the case of the series, the distances between the 
points on these scales are equal and, therefore, we can construct 
measurements of means with standard deviations and talk of scales 
and percentages with meaning. 
(b) Scales and qualitative research 
But what if the subject of the measurement is not an additive entity? 
For instance, can the degree of patient satisfaction with a doctor or of 
quality of life be described using a scale? Most qualitative research 
does not deal with qualities that are additive, so what are the problems 
of employing scales as a method of presenting its results? There are 
four main ones: 
1) Ensuring that it is the same quality that is being measured from the 
highest to the lowest points on the scale. 
2) Making the quality continuum explicit i. e. is it possible to 
distinguish between discrete points along it? 
3) Establishing 'the equality of differences'41 i. e. that each point on a 
scale is the same distance from another. 
4) The effect of the observer on the construction of the scale and the 
measurements taken by it. 
1) This problem can be illustrated by a study on doctors modes of 
dress42. The researchers acknowledged that they might not be 
measuring the patients' reactions to the pictures of doctors presented 
to them in the study but rather attitudes based on what the patients 
were used to in their own doctors. It is particularly when a respondent 
expresses an extreme view that the attitude under consideration may 
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turn into something different. In this example, extreme disapproval of 
a casual mode of dress may reflect a personal dislike of wearing jeans 
rather than any view as to what it is appropriate for a doctor to wear. 
2) The second problem is whether it is possible to distinguish between 
discrete degrees of a quality along its continuum. Unless this can be 
done it is impossible to use numbers in any way, even as labels, as each 
point has to be clearly distinguishable from the next. Likert4 
encountered this problem in his description of a scale for the 
measurement of attitudes. His method depended on the construction 
of a statement to which people of different points of view would 
respond differentially according to the strength of their view from 
'strongly approve' to 'strongly disapprove'. He gave an example of 
American attitudes toward Japan. A more appropriate example for the 
UK currently might be attitudes towards Europe. In a referendum on 
closer integration with Europe, a statement like 'Britain should follow 
Germany's lead and favour complete integration with Europe' is likely 
to produce a predominantly negative response. It is difficult to think 
of a statement which would accurately reflect the spread of opinion on 
this subject but suggesting that Britain should follow Germany's lead 
certainly would not. Likert scales are in common use in qualitative 
research44 and great care needs to be taken in the construction of the 
statements employed particularly if the researcher is constructing a 
scale of 4 or more points. 
3) This problem involves ensuring that the discrete points are at equal 
numerical distances from each other: 
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'We must be on guard against a common error. It is often believed 
that because we can assign numbers to different degrees of a 
quality, the different degrees will always bear to each other the 
same ratio as do the numbers we have assigned to them. This is a 
serious mistake, and arises because it is supposed that 
measurement requires nothing more than the assigning of 
numbers. ' 45 
From the preceding consideration of numbers and their use it seems 
that the distinction between the second use (that of numbers arranged 
in a series) and the third (that of numbers to make quantitative 
distinctions) has become disregarded in some qualitative research. As 
an example of this, as part of a study looking at quality of care in 
general practice in Australia, Winefield et al-46 measured doctor's 
satisfaction with a consultation using a visual analogue rating scale 
with points ranging from 0= completely unsatisfying, to 5= average 
in satisfaction, up to 10 = completely satisfying. The result of this 
analysis was expressed as a mean score of 8.95. This kind of method is 
valid in as much as it uses numbers in the first and second senses : 
both as labels to stand for certain doctor responses and as a method of 
placing responses in a series such that a score of 1 is considered less 
satisfying than a score of 2. However, this method does not establish a 
scale for the measurement of satisfaction as we cannot say that the 
amount of satisfaction between a score of 0 and 1 is the same as that 
distinguishing a score of 2 from that of 3. To express the scores as a 
mean presupposes the establishment of a scale and is therefore invalid. 
4) This problem deals with the effect of the researcher on the 
construction of the scale and its use in measurement. In quantitative 
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research, measurement and the use of scales is straightforward. The 
scales used are generally well established and are not dependent on 
the factor being researched. If we want to measure blood pressure, for 
instance, the mercury sphygmomanometer exists and all that need 
concern us is the precision of the reading taken by the observer. The 
measurement is objective as the instrument has not been devised by 
those carrying out the research. This is qualified, however, by the fact 
that in all measurement we do not just measure x but rather the 
situation which combines x and the effect of the measuring instrument 
y47. Thus with the case of blood pressure measurement we may not 
get a result which is the true blood pressure (x) but rather a reading 
(xy) which is different because of an error made by the observer or the 
measuring instrument. 
In qualitative research the margin for such error is much greater as the 
researcher is himself often one of the research instruments. Because 
qualitative research aims to 'study things in their natural settings'48 
methods of measurement may have to be devised specifically for the 
quality under consideration in the context in which it appears. As an 
example of this, Law and Britten49 use a method of measuring patient- 
centredness devised by Henbest and Stewart-510 to assess doctors' 
consulting styles. The measurement is based on scoring doctors on the 
basis of their response to a 'patient offer' i. e. anything the patient says 
which is of potential significance. If a doctor does not respond 
he 
scores 0; if he responds with a dosed question he scores 1; 
if he allows 
the patient further expression he scores 2; and if he actively 
facilitates 
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the patient's expression he scores 3. Audiotapes of the consultations 
were used for analysis. 
But in this study the researchers were the most significant factor in the 
resulting score xy (which combines the effect of the instrument, y, with 
what is measured, x) as they were the ones who were analysing the 
audiotaped consultations and deciding on scores. Thus the researchers 
using this tool would listen to everything the doctor said as a reflection 
of his patient-centredness, and silence would score 0. But, in the true 
situation, silence might reflect the fact that the doctor knew the patient 
very well and might not need to say anything or might need only to 
touch the patient's hand to encourage them to express their concerns 
more fully. Even if the researcher were directly observing the doctor- 
patient interaction he would be interpreting the doctor's response for 
the scoring system. Would he count a smile from the doctor as active 
facilitation of the patient's expression or not? The main point is that 
the measurement tool might distort what is being measured and may 
turn a positive response into something negative. 
There are, therefore, problems both with establishing that qualitative 
analysis is amenable to the use of scales at all, never mind whether 
numbers can be used in that analysis. Even when numbers are used 
in 
a series it is important to indicate their direction e. g. that 1 represents 
very satisfied and 5 very dissatisfied rather than the other way round. 
This is entirely at the discretion of the researcher and reflects 
how 
meaningless as numbers these labels are. Letters of the alphabet could 
just as easily be used except that they are limited to a series of 
26. 
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The conclusion of this discussion is that the results of qualitative 
research cannot satisfactorily be quantified. They cannot because of 
the nature of the subjects under consideration (i. e. subjects such as 
doctor or patient attitudes); because the research is context-specific (i. e. 
describes a particular hospital clinic or general practice); and because 
of the researcher influence on the measurement process. It follows 
from this conclusion that we cannot use the procedures of scientific 
induction to generalise these results; and if they cannot be generalised, 
how can they be of benefit to clinicians? All research aims at 
increasing our understanding, but for clinical research to be 
worthwhile it additionally needs to produce some lessons for wider 
clinical practice. Can qualitative research do this? This takes me to the 
second question: Granted that qualtitative research cannot use scales, 
is it scientific? 
(c) Generalisability and qualitative research :a route to 
understanding 
In considering the question whether qualitative research can be 
considered scientific even if it is not quantitative I shall refer back to 
my analysis of Robert Hooke's account of meteorology (1.2.1). 
It seems 
clear that qualitative research can satisfy some, but not all, of these 
criteria. Thus, it clearly involves observation, the recording of 
these 
observations, perhaps the use of 'instruments', such as video recorders, 
(even if not 'experimentation'), observation of the effects produced 
by 
the phenomenon under consideration (such as the effect of 
the doctor 
on the patient), the formation of hypotheses about causation, 
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observation over a period of time, and no doubt others. I have 
suggested that where qualitative research goes wrong is in its attempt 
to adapt itself to other aspects of science, such as measurement, with 
the reductivism that that entails. Thus, in order to try to generate 
measurement, 'patient-centredness' (for example) becomes reduced to, 
or defined in terms of, a few operations, such as 'making eye contact'. 
But, as we have seen, qualitative research cannot satisfy the 
measurement criterion. Can it satisfy the generalisability criterion? 
This is more important, since generalisability, as I have suggested 
(1.2.2) is perhaps a necessary, if not a sufficient, condition of the 
scientific. And it is certainly a necessary condition of qualitative 
research being useful to clinicians. 
The qualitative researcher cannot generalise by means of the usual 
procedures of scientific generalisation - induction from a range of 
relevantly similar instances. He cannot do this because, as we have 
seen, induction, in the clinical situation, requires the researcher to 
ignore the many complexities of human encounters and concentrate on 
only a few. How then, if at all, can the qualitative researcher 
generalise? The lessons of qualitative research for clinicians are 
derived from considering the plausibility of the particular situation in 
terms of their own and on finding parallels which are helpful. The 
question for the reader of this material is 'Are there any universal 
features in this situation which I recognise and can apply? ' 
Understanding in qualitative research is, therefore, more akin to the 
understanding gained from an art or, perhaps, philosophy than from a 
numerical science. This does not mean that it is an inferior kind of 
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understanding, but it does mean that it is different in that it is reached 
by a different route. It requires the active participation of the reader to 
identify with the situation and relate the findings to his own situation. 
Consider the following example from Sartre51. Sartre describes a man 
bending down to listen at a keyhole. He believes his wife is in the 
room with her lover. Suddenly he hears a step behind him, and 
immediately his attitude changes. To begin with he wanted to hear a 
conversation, but now he has become an object to someone else - an 
eavesdropper to be described and despised. Sartre uses the example to 
show how we cannot think of ourselves as separate from others. But 
we could also use it to show that moral emotions, such as shame, are 
experienced in a social context. The eavesdropper minds being caught, 
not for any utilitarian-type reasons, but because he must now think of 
himself as mean and sneaky. He despises such characteristics in others 
and now he must despise himself. This constitutes shame. 
I have used this example because it is similar to many in qualitative 
medical research. The route to understanding is through our 
identification with the situation to universal features of human 
emotions. There is an element of generalisation, but not by induction. 
The imposition of quantitative language obstructs this understanding 
by distorting the findings of qualitative research and making them 
obscure to the reader. Even if the approach of such research is 
narrative and descriptive of particular situations it is still aiming at 
providing understanding of general features of clinical situations. In 
presenting its results it might, therefore, do well to follow the example 
of philosophy and use words. Qualitative researchers take pride in the 
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fact that their approach sheds new light on clinical situations. They 
should not hide this light under a numerical bushel but illuminate it 
with language which reflects the new kind of understanding they wish 
to convey. 
In sum, then, is qualitative research scientific? I have claimed that the 
activities of science make up a large family. Qualitative research has 
some of the family characteristics, but it gives generalised 
understanding by a different route. I shall now move to the third idea 
of medical research - clinical trials - and examine their scientific 
credentials. 
1.7.3 Clinical trials 
Awareness in medical circles that much medical research on 
treatments did not meet the strong criteria of proof demanded by the 
natural sciences led investigators to seek statistical techniques which 
would establish degrees of confidence for the conclusions of empirical 
studies. The idea is a simple one. If a form of treatment is of uncertain 
value, or if there is doubt about which of two treatments is the better, 
patients are randomised to one or other, and the outcome is assessed 
by statistical methods. There are refinements called 'double blind' 
studies in which neither the patient nor the doctor administering the 
treatment know who has been given the drug and who the inert 
substance. There are further refinements called 'cross-over studies' in 
which following a period with drug A the patient is switched to 
drug 
B. Cross-over studies can also be double-blind. My concern 
here 
however is not with the detailed technicalities of clinical trials 
but with 
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the question of their scientific status. It must also be stressed that 
settling the question of the scientific status of clinical trials does not in 
itself settle the question of the effectiveness of treatments in a clinical 
examination with a patient. A drug which a trial has pronounced 
efficacious might not be effective with a given patient. Indeed, a drug 
which a trial has declared to be non-efficacious might still be effective 
with a given patient in a clinical examination. This issue I shall discuss 
in the next chapter and concentrate for the moment on the scientific 
status of clinical trials. 
There is no doubt that the randomised controlled trail (RCT) is widely 
regarded as one of the most important developments in medical 
research in the last fifty years and it has been applied widely to the 
study of treatments in almost every area of medical practice. It is 
thought to provide the basis for 'evidence-based medicine' and as such 
it is regarded in medical research as the 'gold standard'. And it 
certainly satisfies some of the criteria for science. Thus it involves 
observation, the recording of observations, observation of the effects 
produced by the phenomenon under consideration (such as the effect 
of a drug on a disease), perhaps the formation of hypotheses about 
causation, and, certainly, observation over a period of time. Unlike 
qualitative research it can undoubtedly use numbers since it is 
avowedly reductivist as it deals just with, for example, drugs and 
diseases, and discounts the human factors. But purely as science it 
suffers from a large defect. In discussing the nature of science I 
suggested that scientific endeavour is directed at systematic 
understanding. It is systematic understanding which, as Smith says 
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(1.6) 'soothes the imagination'. But what the RCT offers is at best a 
statistical probability that a treatment will work. I say 'at best' for it 
has been argued that even beginning a study changes the outcome of 
the condition studied, probably because of the greater care and interest 
shown by the research team52. What we find in the RCT is science in 
the Baconian sense of empirical studies of what might 'work' in a 
statistically significant set of cases. As we have seen, however, the 
activities which might be regarded as 'scientific' make up a large 
family. In terms of the family metaphor the RCT is a cousin! 
While it might be a 'gold standard' in estimating the efficacy of 
treatments the RCT is hardly a gold standard in science. It is at the 
'natural history' end of science in that it is recording correlations 
without purporting to offer any understanding of why they are 
correlated. But true science, as Smith says, seeks the connecting 
principles of nature, rather than what seems to work in some cases. 
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1.8 IS MEDICAL RESEARCH SCIENTIFIC? 
I began by distinguishing three different sorts of medical research: (a) 
into the normal and pathological workings of the body; (b) into the 
doctor-patient interaction (qualitative research); (c) the RCT. 
It emerged that (a) is clearly scientific whereas (b) and (c) are much 
more doubtfully so. What are the basic differences between (a), and (b) 
and (c)? There are two basic points of differences which explain why 
(a) is true science whereas (b) and (c) are on the fringes, are cousins of 
science. 
The first is that science by its very nature is reductionist. The scientist 
must isolate the phenomena to be investigated. Galileo or Newton, for 
example, concentrate on the primary or measurable qualities of matter, 
or employ idealisations such as 'frictionless plane'. The basic medical 
sciences - biochemistry etc. - are similarly reductionist. They can 
therefore work effectively as sciences. But (b) is concerned with actual 
human behaviour and the reductionist attempt here - in the use of 
scales, for example - is bound to fail. Research of this kind is based on 
holistic assumptions and the use of reductionist quantitative methods 
can produce only distorted results or half truths. Turning now to (c), 
the RCT, we find that it too attempts to use reductionist quantitative 
methods. The methods are reductionist in that they are abstracting 
from the complexities of actual clinical encounters. For example, they 
totally ignore the greatest asset of medical practice - the doctor-patient 
59 
relationship. Once again, half-truths are all that emerge, and moreover 
half-truths without any systematic basis. 
The second reason why (b) and (c), but not (a), are not fully scientific is 
that (a), like true science, is driven by concerns internal to the 
investigations, whereas (b) and (c) are driven by goals external to the 
investigation, such as the search for efficacious treatments. In the 
words of Bacon: 'Truth therefore and utility are here the very same 
thing. '-53 But such an attitude is not that of the scientist searching for 
the systematic understanding provided by the 'connecting principles 
of nature. ' 
60 
1.9 CONCLUSIONS 
1) Science can be characterised in terms of a method, a certain use of 
evidence, and an aim. 
2) The method is complex but involves observation, hypothesis 
formation, and further experiments. Evidence has a particular logical 
place in scientific method. 
3) The aim of science is primarily to achieve a particular sort of 
systematic understanding, although there is also an empirical, 
Baconian tradition which sees the aim of science as utility. 
4) Science involves the imagination, which is stimulated by 
irregularities and satisfied by wider systems. 
5) Medical research involves (a) basic biology and pathology, (b) 
qualitative research, (c) RCTs. Central scientific demands are fulfilled 
in (a), but (b) and (c) are in different ways on the periphery of science. 
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CHAPTER 2 
THE CLINIC 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
I have argued that if we adopt a broad interpretation of 'science' we 
can assert that all medical research is in some sense scientific, or 
evidence-based, although not necessarily quantitative. It follows from 
this that the research base of clinical practice is scientific in a broad 
sense. It does not follow, however, that clinical practice itself is, or 
indeed ought to be, fully scientific or evidence-based. If medical 
research is 'science' my question in this chapter is: To what extent is a 
clinical consultation simply a matter of applying that science? It will 
emerge that there is much more to the consultation, or to good clinical 
practice, than simply applying science, or applying the evidence, to a 
given patient. My discussion will be concerned with the extent and 
nature of the'much more'. 
Basically the difference between medical research and clinical practice 
is this: medical research is concerned with providing generalised, 
systematic understanding, or at least with discovering statistically 
significant correlations, whereas clinical practice is concerned with 
establishing the diagnosis, prognosis and treatment of individual 
human begins who happen to have illnesses, diseases, injuries or other 
maladies. The question then arises: How far can the inherent 
reductivism of scientific research be adapted to the holism of the 
individual consultation? More simply, I am asking how far 
does 
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evidence-based medicine fit in with the central activities of clinical 
practice during consultations? What is the balance between evidence 
and humane judgement? 
63 
2.2 CLINICAL JUDGEMENT 
The doctor who has listened to a patient's account of what is wrong 
and is faced with research evidence of treatments will, in the end, 
make a judgement about the best course to follow for the patient. 
What are the components in this clinical judgement? The good doctor, 
the one (as we shall see in chapter 3) who has a 'humane attitude', will 
see the need: to individualise the generalised evidence; to listen to the 
patient's stories about the origins of their problems; to interpret these 
stories and gain insight in to the root of the problems; and to obtain 
consent for any proposed treatment. I shall show in chapter 3 how all 
these requirements for a good consultation relate to humane 
understanding and judgement. 
But in this chapter I shall consider how generalised evidence is 
individualised; how 'anecdotes' or stories are relevant to the clinician, 
but require interpretation; and what consent means to the good 
clinician. These are the components of clinical judgement. They can 
best be illustrated in an example of a consultation. 
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2.3 A CLINICAL EXAMPLE 
Consultations may be classified in different ways: behaviour orientated 
models emphsise the doctor's activities, 54 55 whereas task-orientated 
models suggest a series of predefined activities to be completed56. I 
will use the task based approach of Pendleton57 -a model applicable to 
hospital and general practice - to assess the kinds of evidence used by 
doctors at various stages during the consultation. My fictitious patient 
is Mrs Mackay, a 70-year-old widow who suffers from osteoarthitis 
and non-insulin-dependent diabetes (NIDDM). 
Mrs Mackay has been recently widowed and now frequently attends 
her general practitioner's surgery. Following the Pendleton model, the 
doctor's first task is to explore Mrs Mackay's ideas and concerns about 
her symptoms and to discover what she expects the outcome of the 
consultation to be. On this occasion Mrs Mackay complains of 
dizziness and appears to be very anxious about this symptom. The 
important evidence during this stage of the consultation is the patient's 
story and her associated behaviour58. Exploration of Mrs Mackay's 
concerns, ideas and expectations allows the doctor to discover what 
conclusion the patient has drawn about her symptoms. Thus the 
doctor can tap into the patients' health beliefs and the sources of these 
beliefs. These sources can be diverse and include anecdotal evidence 
from family, friends, family traditions, television programmes, and 
magazine and newspaper articles. Mrs Mackay believes that dizziness 
means that her blood pressure may be high; her experience with 
her 
husband (who had hypertension and died from a stroke) tells her that 
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she is at risk of imminent death or disability, and she is therefore 
anxious. 
The doctor's second task is to consider the reason for attendance in 
sufficient detail to reach a diagnosis before moving on to review any 
other difficulties and risk factors. Scientific evidence has a greater role 
here than in the preliminary discussion with the patient. Mrs Mackay's 
blood pressure is, indeed, high (170/100 mmHg) and this is the third 
time it has been raised. Has there been any renal damage associated 
with her diabetes? Are there any other underlying factors, such as 
alcohol abuse or depression? The doctor then reviews Mrs Mackay's 
glaecemic control and discovers that at the most recent measurement 
of glycosylated haemoglobin (HbAlc, a measure of blood sugar levels 
over the preceding 3 months) the concentration was raised. 
The doctor's third task is to chose an appropriate action for the 
problem. Here the doctor must consider the evidence on the specific 
clinical problem (in this case hypertension) and that relating to the 
individual patient. According to the rules of evidence-based medicine 
Mrs Mackay needs treatment and one option for a woman of her age is 
a thiazide diuretic59. Mrs Mackay is at risk of stroke but she also has 
NIDDM and is taking an oral hypoglycaemic agent; her diabetes has 
been poorly controlled since her husband's death . Should the 
doctor 
put Mrs Mackay at further risk by prescribing another medication that 
might interfere with her glycaemic control? Mrs Mackay has 
osteoarthitis and poor mobility; will increased diuresis exacerbate 
her 
problems? On the other hand, Mrs Mackay believes that high 
blood 
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pressure leads to stroke, and from what the doctor knows of this 
patient, any additional anxiety during her bereavement might make it 
difficult for her to cope. The decision to use the evidence in the context 
of the consultation is a matter for clinical judgement; the doctor must 
think about the patient's multiple pathology and drug treatments, and, 
most importantly, whether any new treatment is acceptable to the 
patient herself. 
The doctor's fourth task is to ensure mutual understanding between 
doctor and patient and shared acceptance of the selected further action 
or treatment. The doctor must, therefore, move towards the patient's 
own unscientific view. 
The final task is for the doctor to establish and maintain a therapeutic 
relationship with the patient. Such a relationship is tremendously 
beneficial for the patient; indeed the placebo effect of the 'drug doctor' 
cannot be easily assessed by an evidence-based approach. 
From the example of Mrs Mackay we can analyse what evidence is 
available during the consultation. The primary, and most important, 
source of evidence for clinical decision making is the information that 
Mrs Mackay communicates verbally and non-verbally. The doctor's 
pre-existing knowledge of the patient is supplemented by medical 
records - available information includes not only the formal medical 
history and examination, but results of investigations. 
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The information-processing model of decision-making (see appendix 
2.1) shows how the different features of a patient's illness - history, 
examination and other findings - are converted by the doctor into 
useful information. In the doctor's 'working space' this information is 
filtered by the various sources of medical experience that have 
influenced the doctor. The capacity of the working space is limited by 
the number of items that can successfully be integrated. Johnstone and 
colleagues60 have shown that this capacity varies from three to eight 
items. This finding is supported by medical studies that show that the 
successful management of clinical cases depends on only a few critical 
factors61. When scientific evidence is not immediately available to the 
doctor from memory, computer screen, or paper, the additional time 
needed to search for this information may cause overcrowding in the 
working space and reduce performance. 
The most important perception filter is the doctor's undergraduate 
studies. The knowledge, skills and attitudes of doctors reflect the 
medical orthodoxy at the time of their qualification. This wisdom 
diminishes after the final exams62 and may not be updated with new 
information. In addition, much of the evidence taught in postgraduate 
courses is of limited value to the practitioners at whom it is directed63. 
Many doctors read the available medical literature for up to four hours 
per week64 but even the most dedicated practitioner cannot critically 
appraise and assimilate the deluge of evidence published on a 
daily or 
weekly basis. Furthermore, much of the evidence is hard to 
find, or is 
outdated, or simply wrong65. To each of these formal types of 
evidence might be added clinical experience - which may 
be direct or 
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indirect - from cases discussed with colleagues and reviews in case- 
series, clinical trials, or individual case-studies. 
Current theories about how professional integrate this diverse 
evidence into the routines of their daily practice suggest that doctors 
become more expert in the use of evidence in consultations by 
remembering the illness scripts of previous patients66. This theory 
explains how clinical experience and the ability to learn from those 
experiences can modify clinical expertise and practice. Knowledge of 
different case scenarios leads to a more rapidly accessed store of illness 
scripts in the doctor's working space. Information from many sources 
is compared with that for the patient in the consultation and the 
enabling conditions, predisposing factors, boundary conditions, faults 
and consequences of the case are compared with those stored in the 
doctor's long-term memory. The doctor uses this comparison to make 
a diagnosis and assess the outlook for the patient. When Mrs Mackay's 
illness script (see appendix 2.2) deviates from those with which the 
doctor is familiar the resulting uncertainty may lead to a decision to 
seek further evidence or refer the patient to a colleague whom the 
doctor believes has greater experience of this type of problem. 
The analysis of this fictional consultation does not give prominence to 
the practice of evidence-based medicine. Rather, the doctor seems to 
apply a sliding scale of importance to the evidence from different 
sources that depends on the specific illness and the patient. 
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Scientific evidence should come from the most valid and reliable 
source, which is usually up-to-date, peer reviewed papers. New rapid 
means of information delivery should provide the doctor with just 
enough information for them to make a judgement appropriate to each 
patient in the limited time available during consultations. However, 
the evidence itself is no substitute for clinical judgement; evidence 
must still be interpreted and applied to he individual patient. For 
example, in autumn 1995, there was controversy about the combined 
oral contraceptive pi1167 : doctors objected because they had been given 
the conclusions derived from the studies concerned before the studies 
themselves were published and available for scrutiny. This meant that 
the full details were not provided for them to judge whether the data 
applied to individual patients. 
Furthermore, an evidence-based approach views the evidence from 
randomised controlled trials as the most valid. However, in the 
consultation the doctor deals with an individual patient. The results of 
randomised controlled trials that involve large numbers of participants 
may not be applicable to a specific case68. As I argued in 1.7.3, 
randomised controlled trials produce an oversimplified and artificial 
environment which may bear little resemblance to day-to-day reality. 
Indeed, even when the evidence is good, it does not necessarily have to 
be applied. Other important factors, not least of which is that the 
patient may not wish to take the treatment, need to be considered. 
Evidence-based medicine constructs a hierarchy69 with randomised 
controlled trails and the top and evidence from clinical experience or 
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shared stories about other doctors' patients at the bottom. The above 
analysis of consultation tasks suggests that at times experimental, and 
at times anecdotal evidence will be the most important part of 
understanding the patient's condition and implementing treatment 
through a good doctor-patient relationship (see appendix 2.3). The 
decision about what kind of evidence is the most important is a matter 
for clinical judgement and is part of an interpreted and individualised 
approach to medical practice. 
Evidence-based medicine can benefit medical practice because it will 
help ensure that all patients have access to the most up-to-date and 
well-validated evidence through their doctors. However, patients are 
not clones and doctor are not automatons. All patients differ subtly in 
their presentation of illness, in their understanding and acceptance of 
medical advice, and in their response to treatment. Doctors need to 
know the latest research but should apply new advances with 
judgement and an awareness of the unique circumstances of the 
individual patient's case. 
Twenty years ago Feinstein wrote: 
'Until the methods of science are made satisfactory for all the 
important distinctions of human phenomena, our best approach to 
many problems in therapy will be to rely on the judgements of 
thoughtful people who are familiar with the total realities of 
human 
ailments. '70 
Information technology has helped to make evidence available from a 
variety of sources during the consultation. Science, however, is 
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unlikely ever to be able to make all the necessary distinctions required 
to answer all the questions that patients bring to their doctors. 
Medicine will always require thoughtful doctors who are able to filter 
the evidence appropriate to each patient through an interpreted and 
individualised approach. Let us consider further the nature of 
individualised evidence. 
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2.4 INDIVIDUALISED EVIDENCE 
2.4.1 The detective model 
Scientists are not the only professionals to be interested in evidence. 
Detectives, for example, are interested in evidence. As we have seen 
(1.3.1), the role of the detective, as suggested by Sherlock Holmes, is to 
amass all the material relating to a case and then formulate some 
hypothesis as to its solution. I have argued that Holmes has a different 
view of the relation between evidence and hypothesis from that of the 
scientist, but there is another important difference, relevant to my 
present clinical concerns, between the scientific and the detective 
model of evidence. 
Let us imagine that the Duke is found murdered in the library. The 
investigating detective takes statements from many people - other 
family members, maids, gardeners and the butler. These statements 
are the data concerning the case. The detective then formulates the 
hypothesis that it was the Duchess's lover who committed the crime. 
The information relating to the lover's involvement then turns into 
evidence because it relates to a particular hypothesis in the case. 
However, the detective then turns up a convincing piece of counter- 
evidence, an alibi for the lover. A new hypothesis must then be 
formulated - that the culprit was in fact the butler. And so the process 
goes on. 
This 'detective model' of evidence is similar to the scientific model 
in 
important respects - the collection of data, the observations, 
the chance 
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discoveries, followed by the formulation of hypotheses which 
transform some of this information into evidence and suggest how 
other evidence (for or against the hypotheses) might be found. But it is 
unlike the scientific model in at least this important respect. It is not 
logically possible to generalise. The evidence is relevant to one and 
only one situation. Both the scientific and the detective models have 
truth as their goal, but in the one case it is general truth, and in the 
other it is truth specific to a situation. This is an important difference, 
and it is one which highlights the need for insight. Moreover, the 
nature of the insight involved seems not unlike that in the scientific 
model, for it requires the sifting and evaluation of information and 
findings and the relating of these to hypotheses. Once again, this sort 
of insight requires technical knowledge. 
2.4.2 Medical evidence 
Let us now look at the application of these models to the medical 
context. Does the use of evidence and judgement in medicine have 
more in common with the work of a detective or with that of a 
scientist? It might seem that medicine uses both models. On the one 
hand, the work of clinical research involves rigorous application of the 
science model to clinical problems. The aim of research studies is to 
establish truths about clinical diagnosis and treatment which will be 
true for all common situations. It might also seem that, on the other 
hand, if we look at the work of clinical practice, the work of the 
individual doctor in the surgery or clinic, this has more in common 
with the work of the detective. The taking of a clinical history parallels 
the taking of statements of witnesses to a crime and the examination 
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process is like the rigorous examination of the crime scene. The doctor 
is here amassing unstructured data which he will then use to suggest a 
diagnosis (the hypothesis) and will attempt to establish the truth of 
that diagnosis by further examination (through X Rays, laboratory 
testing of blood samples etc. ). These two kinds of activity are quite 
different but they have this in common: both are concerned with 
discussing truth, the generalised truth of science or the specific truth of 
diagnosis, and both involve a similar sort of technical insight. 
Clinical practice, however, has two aspects to it: diagnosis (and for 
present purposes we can include prognosis under this heading) and 
treatment. Now, of course, the proponents of evidence-based medicine 
will correctly say that it is precisely at the point of treatment that 
scientific evidence is relevant, that it is a matter of scientific truth that 
some treatments are more effective than others. But the clinician is not 
concerned with treatments in the abstract. The clinician is concerned 
with treating this specific patient, and the treating of patients (as 
distinct from 'evidence-based treatments') requires the clinician to be 
influenced by many factors other than truth, such as the consent of this 
patient, the meaning of the disease for this patient, how important the 
side effects are for this patient, whether this patient has heard of the 
treatment, the family supports, and perhaps even the cost. These 
factors have nothing to do with truth, whether general or specific. This 
point about the aim of clinical treatment leads me to propose a third 
model for evidence as it is used in medicine. This model involves a 
different sort of insight which is peculiar to clinical treatment. 
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2.4.3 A model of evidence in clinical medicine 
This third model I will call the 'treatment' model of evidence. Kathryn 
Montgomery Hunter described the patient as 
'provid[ing] the text that medicine must read and make sense of 
and explain'71. 
She focuses on the importance of the individual patient as the primary 
source of evidence that the doctor requires to assess in the light of the 
presenting complaint. The process does not stop there, as it might in 
the context of detection or science, as the doctor must then initiate 
treatment appropriate not only to the specific condition but also to the 
specific patient. Doctors must, of course, have in their minds a 
knowledge of evidence-based treatments, but this part of the process 
also involves an assessment of other sorts of question : will the 
evidence relating to this patient suggest that they will be able to 
comply with treatment? Is it clear that the patient understands their 
condition and trusts the doctor's conclusion sufficiently for the benefits 
of the placebo effect to come into play? Is the treatment appropriate 
for the social situation of this patient? 
For instance, evidence-based medicine might suggest that in mild to 
moderate acne a topical antibiotic preparation is as effective as a course 
of oral antibiotics. But consider the case of Susie, a 17 year old who 
has recently started on the combined oral contraceptive pill and 
attends her doctor with acne, compared with that of Liz, a 21 year old 
presenting with the same problem, who is about to get married and 
is 
on a three monthly depot progesterone injection for contraception. 
Both have mild to moderate acne but Liz may wish to keep 
her face 
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clear of medications on her forthcoming honeymoon and Susie needs 
to avoid oral antibiotics which might interfere with her pill. In this 
case, therefore, social circumstances might dictate that Susie gets the 
application and Liz gets the tablets. However, if Susie declares that a 
friend of hers got antibiotic tablets and his acne disappeared 'like 
magic', the wise doctor would comply with the patient's desire and 
make use of the additional benefits that the patient's belief in the 
treatment might convey. 
In the context of this model we now see the paramount importance 
and peculiar nature of the insights of clinical judgement. We have seen 
how insight is relevant to assessing relevance, weight and drawing 
conclusions (chapter 1), but insight comes into its own when we deal 
with the range of complex factors in the clinical situation. This is a 
different sort of insight, and requires different abilities. The 
judgements of the scientist and the detective are technical; that of the 
clinician is based on what Aristotle calls phronesis or 'practical 
wisdom' 72 . It is certainly true that medicine is in some respects a 
techne ,a skill-based activity73, whose practice requires the exercise of 
specific skills relating to diagnosis and treatment (see 3.2). It is in this 
sense that the insights of medicine are like the technical ones of science 
and detective work and relate to conclusions that are either true or 
false. But medicine involves more than this; it involves a 'capacity to 
act with regard to the things that are good or bad for man. '74. When 
doctors have to come to a decision about treatments for individual 
patients - in other words, have to make judgements relating to 'the 
things that are good or bad for man' - this is not the same as making 
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judgements about what is or is not the case. The insights of the 
consultation have more to do with what is or is not appropriate for this 
patient, with this condition, and at this time. 
2.4.4 Provisional conclusion 
There are several sorts of evidence each with its own correlative sort of 
insight or judgement. In the case of the medical scientist the evidence 
comes from, say, randomised controlled trials (1.7.3), which suggest 
the percentage success or failure of treatments75. The correlative 
judgement is technical and is directed at generalised truth. It is often 
said that clinical treatment applies this scientific evidence to individual 
patients76. This is certainly part of the picture; that part in which 
diagnostics is like detective work. The correlative insights of the 
clinician are in this respect like those of the detective and aim at 
individualised truth about a given patient. But the other part of the 
clinical picture concerns treatment. Evidence about what constitutes 
the best treatment for a given patient involves a wide range of 
imponderables, but especially a patient's own (perhaps irrational) 
perspective. The correlative insight in this case can be only partly 
technical (i. e. based on evidence-based treatments) because it must tap 
into the belief system of the patient, and, indeed, of the doctor. These 
insights do not aim at truth but at effective treatment. Hence, the 
judgements or insights of the good clinician must be more than 
technical; they must show practical wisdom. 
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2.5 ANECDOTES 
In the scientific, evidence-based atmosphere of contemporary medicine 
there is a tendency for doctors to believe that they can ignore the 
patient and concentrate on the disease, which they believe can be 
identified scientifically. The practice of ignoring the patient and 
concentrating on the disease is certainly ethically objectionable, but my 
concern here is that it is also neglecting an important source of 
information about the patient - the patient's own story. The patient 
may be telling the doctor what is wrong, but this kind of clinical 
evidence is often dismissed as 'anecdotal', where that term means that 
it is not worth bothering about. But I shall try to show in this section 
that anecdotes have an important function in the consultation, if not in 
the laboratory, and must be taken seriously by the good doctor. 
2.5.1 What are anecdotes? 
There appear to be two senses in which the word 'anecdote' is used. 
The first sense can be found in the sentence, 'And I would like to tell 
you an anecdote about this', and the second in, 'That's purely 
anecdotal. ' The first sentence indicates the major sense of the word. 
The speaker is about to tell a short story illustrating a point he is 
wanting to make in a form which is more dramatic than merely stating 
the point. This introduction will frequently be followed by, 'I 
remember when I.. ' or, 'I knew a man once who.. ' and the account may 
be fictional or non-fictional. In the medical context, anecdotes are 
largely non-fictional but in other contexts, such as in the world of 
stand-up comedy, they are often made up or may be reality 
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embellished for effect. Many of the warning stories told to children are 
anecdotes of this latter type. For instance a mother might tell her child: 
'I remember a little girl who once played too near the river and she fell 
in and was never found'. This anecdote briefly but dramatically 
illustrates the dangers of playing near the river. It may well be true 
that the mother knew a child who fell into the river but her death and 
disappearance are more likely to be embellishments calculated to make 
the story stick in her child's mind. 
Another fruitful source of anecdotes is the obituary pages of the 
newspapers. Here is an extract from one of an English painter who 
died recently: 
'.. though he had his moments of ready conviviality he never really 
belonged to the art world. Possibly his personal background had 
something to do with this. He was born into a working class family 
in Lancashire... It is recorded that when his father asked him what 
he thought he wanted to do for a living, and he answered that he 
wanted to be a painter, his father was very happy, assuming that 
what he wanted to paint was houses. '77 
The obituary differs from biography in that it must give a brief account 
of the person's life with some (often rather flattering) reference to their 
character. Anecdotes are often included as memorable stories about 
the person's life which also, as here, serve to illustrate or account for a 
trait of character. Here the painter's humble origins are told and the 
anecdote about his father's mistake serves to illustrate that those 
origins and upbringing were sufficiently strong to make him less 
inclined to join in with the parties and glamour of the art world. 
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The second sentence, 'That's purely anecdotal' gives a related but 
different sense of the word to the first. 'Anecdotal' information or 
evidence is information derived purely from anecdote and (as is 
usually implied) is not to be relied upon. It is not reliable because of 
the features which distinguish the anecdote: that it is a short, dramatic 
account told for effect and liable to be embellished. The word 
'anecdotage' has occasionally been used78 to describe the activity of 
telling or making use of anecdote and its derogatory meaning is made 
all too clear by its relationship with 'dotage'. In medicine in particular, 
the term 'anecdotal' has developed a pejorative meaning, particularly 
so in recent times when doctors have been much concerned with 
evidence-based medicine. It is this recent emphasis which has been 
put on the scientific evidence base of medicine which has led many 
authors to reassert the importance of other information including 
stories79 and anecdotes80 as part of that evidence-base. But, as we shall 
see in the following sections, anecdotes are an important source of 
treatments, diagnoses, and even therapy. Let us begin with doctor- 
doctor anecdotes a source of treatments. 
2.5.2 Doctor-doctor anecdotes 
Anecdotes are told in all situations, formal and informal, where 
doctors get together. One good but trivial reason for this is that 
everyone enjoys a story. Stories enliven dull conference proceedings 
and serious medical meetings. The anecdotes told by doctors at these 
formal meetings can be lighthearted and aimed at lightening the 
atmosphere. More usually the anecdote is told from the doctors own 
experience for a good reason and the telling of anecdotes is so much a 
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part of communication between doctors that the teller may not even be 
consciously aware of that reason. Katherine Mongomery Hunter in 
her book Doctor's Stories underlines this point. Her book amounts to 
an anthropological study of 'doctors in the wild' and she sees the 
telling of anecdotes as instinctive medical behaviour. She characterises 
the ideal environment for anecdote-telling in this way: 
'In general, it seems that the smaller and more regular the group 
and the more its members are engaged in the same clinical 
activities, the more anecdotes will be told. ' 81 
The kind of setting described here is most likely to be a ward round or 
hospital unit or general practice case conference. But anecdotes are 
also told in formal settings such as at conferences, hospital meetings 
and in written form in journals. Usually the story has an illustrative 
function. At a conference presentation, alongside the scientific data on 
a new therapy, for example, a case may be cited as an example of how 
well the therapy worked. The cited case is usually one in which the 
therapy worked particularly well, or alternatively, a case in which the 
therapy was a complete failure. Anecdotes are generally dramatic 
stories and do not recount the commonplace, so these stories serve to 
illustrate the best and the worst of the therapy and the audience are 
given the scientific evidence to assess as well. Anecdotes, in this 
setting, have a role in drawing the doctor's attention to the promise 
and pitfalls of new treatments when they are proposed. 
In the discussion which follows a conference or case conference 
presentation, the audience will often use anecdotes to provide counter- 
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examples to what has been presented: 'Your patient may have 
responded in that way but I tried that in a patient of mine once and she 
nearly died'. Because anecdotes by their nature are memorable, one 
told by a speaker may stimulate the memory of another in a doctor in 
the audience and will produce a discussion on the usefulness of a 
therapy under a different set of circumstances in another patient. 
These examples point to the value of anecdotes in continuing medical 
education as they provide real examples and counter-examples on 
which practising doctors can hone and test their medical knowledge 
and keep it up to date. Such anecdote swapping also enables doctors 
to test their clinical judgement against that of their peers and sharpen 
it. But anecdotes are also in frequent use in undergraduate medical 
education. Clinical teaching in the wards goes on around the bed of a 
patient with a particular illness and clinical signs. Frequently the 
clinician who is doing the teaching will make reference by anecdote to 
other similar cases which they have come across for comparison. 
Besides this, the teacher will also put forward hypothetical situations 
such as, ' What if this patient had had an MI? How would this change 
your management? ' These scenarios we might regard as hypothetical 
anecdotes and they serve to extend the educational value of the single 
case. 
Anecdotes are often told to students about the great medical figures of 
the past often to illustrate the importance of some very basic medical 
truth. One such example is a story told of the great Sir James 
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Mackenzie, a general practitioner and pioneer in the field of cardiology 
in the early part of this century : 
'Mackenzie was making a weekend visit to his university city of 
Edinburgh. A surgeon invited him to give his opinion on the 
circulatory condition of a woman in a ward at the Infirmary, 
awaiting cholecystectomy. She was found to have anomalous heart 
sounds. This had aroused doubt in the surgeon's mind about the 
wisdom of operating. The news of Mackenzie's visit had spread. A 
crowd of staff and students gathered in the ward. He talked to her 
about her home. It was on the top floor of a house in the Lawn 
Market. Did she shop for her family of six? Of course, who else? 
And carry it up the stairs? Indeed, yes. And how many times a 
day did she climb those stairs? Countless times. And did she find 
them trying? Why should she. Mackenzie turned to the surgeon 
and told him to operate with confidence so far as the function of the 
heart was concerned. '82 
This anecdote would reinforce the important medical maxim : 'Listen 
to the patient: they are giving you the diagnosis'. 
As well as having a role in the education of current and future doctors, 
anecdotes help in the induction of doctors into the etiquette of the 
profession. Hospital residents, for instance, will seek advice from their 
predecessor on the preferred procedures in a new ward. Advice is 
frequently given in the form of an anecdote: 'Make sure you call the 
registrar the first time you do a lumbar puncture. I didn't and he tore 
strips off me for not checking with him first. ' 
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Such professionalising anecdotes are often of the warning type, 'make 
sure you do this in case... ' or ' don't do that because... ', but anecdotes 
can also provide a much needed support function. Medicine is not 
very good as a profession at providing formal support for practitioners 
when they have made mistakes or misjudgements. Case conferences 
and ward or practice meetings may provide this help often in the form 
of a supportive anecdote. A junior partner in our practice was upset at 
having missed a case of tuberculosis in a young slim patient with a 
cough. The senior partner responded: 'It is easily done. I did the same 
thing with a woman whom I thought was anorexic and then she 
suddenly coughed up blood and had to be rushed into hospital! ' 
'We've all done it' is an expression frequently heard when doctors 
admit their mistakes to their colleagues and what follows is an account 
of the other doctor's mistake and reassurance that it can happen to us 
all. These supportive accounts do not just amount to crying on one 
another's shoulders, they usually lead to a shared learning experience. 
In the case of the TB misdiagnosis, the partners agreed to 'think TB' 
when dealing with persistent chest problems. 
All the above functions of the anecdote occur through oral doctor- 
doctor communication. The written anecdote in the form of a single 
case report or 'A memorable patient' section as in the BMJ may serve 
an important function in stimulating investigation leading to new 
knowledge. Single case reports in the journals are often about 
puzzling cases which do not quite fit the prevailing scientific 
knowledge and it is such anomalies which serve to stimulate further 
research and discovery in medicine, particularly when doctors 
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working in the same field find that they are picking up similar 
anomalies and a series of cases start to emerge. One famous example 
cited by Dr Montgomery Hunter was the outbreak of phocomelia 
subsequently found to be associated with the antiemetic, thalidomide, 
when used in pregnancy. A more recent example is the concern over 
the possible dangers of silicone breast implants which have been raised 
by numerous anecdotal reports83. The anecdotes are not a substitute 
for systematic scientific research but they can point the research in the 
right direction in the first place. 
We can see, therefore that doctor-doctor anecdotes can have a number 
of important functions. They draw attention to new medical 
treatments and diagnoses, they help hone medical knowledge and 
judgement, they have an important function in the education of 
current and future doctors and they assist the process of induction into 
the ways of the profession, and finally, they may help to point research 
in a fruitful direction. They, therefore, have an important bearing on 
evidence, and are factors in judgement. 
2.5.3 Patient-doctor anecdotes 
In the general practice setting in particular, the patient's account of 
their problem is undifferentiated and unmedicalised because they have 
not yet had their story reinterpreted by a doctor. For instance, angina 
is not yet 'A tight pain in my chest which I get with exertion'; it is still 
described in this way: 
'The reason I am here, doctor, is that last week I was walking to the 
shops with my wife and we came back with a lot of shopping and 
86 
had to climb up the hill to the house because the bus broke down. 
As we reached the top of the hill I suddenly got this pain in my 
chest which made me stop and gasp for breath. ' 
So anecdotes are often the way in which patients will explain their visit 
to the doctor in the first place. 
Anecdotes are also used by patients to illustrate how the particular 
symptoms are affecting their lives at that time. This is a recent 
exchange I had with a patient who is particularly keen on the game of 
bowls: 
RJM: How are the knees just now? Are the new painkillers 
working better? 
MM: Oh no, its just as bad doctor, and with me Lady President of 
the bowling green this season too. 
RJM: How are you getting on with the bowling? 
MM: Oh, I'm not able to play just now. The last time I had a match 
I tried to deliver a bowl and I couldn't get up again! Some of the 
men had to lift me up off the green. It gave everyone a good laugh 
but I haven't been able to play since. 
This kind of patient anecdote is important because it reflects the 
individual's experience of the problem and gives the doctor a clear idea 
of how function is affected. For MM, mild osteoarthritis of the knees 
was having a major impact on her lifestyle and merited physiotherapy 
and an orthopoedic surgeon's opinion. For another elderly woman, 
whose lifestyle was not so active, the condition might not have 
prompted any action. The anecdote reminds us that what the patient is 
interested in is their ability to function, not the severity or otherwise of 
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the pathology. Doctors will often say reassuringly to their patients 
'You'll be glad to hear that the test result is normal', only to be greeted 
with, 'So why am I having these problems. ' Patients want to be 
restored to normal function or at least to have an explanation for why 
they cannot function normally. 
Patients' illustrative anecdotes can also be revealing of their 
understanding or misunderstanding of a suspected illness. A patient 
who had a urostomy scar that had developed a herniation told me: 
'But my Uncle James had his hernias operated on down here 
[indicating her groin area]. I thought it was only men that had 
hernias. Mind you my sister has one up here inside [indicating the 
epigastric area] and she has problems eating with it. ' 
This series of anecdotes reveals the patient's (reasonable) confusion 
over the idea of a hernia and how it can exist in several different 
places. Paying attention to patient anecdote allows doctors the chance 
to clarify areas of misunderstanding and become aware of how the 
patient perceives their illness and their own ability to do something 
about it. 
Even the way the way in which a patient orders events in her story can 
be highly significant. Compare two presentations of breast cancer: 
'About a month ago I fell against the banisters and it was just after 
that that I felt the lump' ; 
'I don't usually examine myself but about a month ago I fell and 
hurt my chest and when I was rubbing on a pain reliever I felt the 
lump'. 
88 
The first patient clearly feels that there is some connection between her 
injury and the development of the cancer whereas the second sees the 
injury as fortuitous as it allowed her the opportunity of discovering the 
lump earlier. If the doctor ignores these narrative devices the patient 
can be left confused and disorientated with many questions left 
unanswered. Alertness to the patient's story allows the doctor access 
to a deeper understanding of the patient beyond the purely scientific 
and pathological84, and for that reason it is every bit as relevant to 
diagnosis and treatment as scientific evidence. 
2.5.4 Patient-patient anecdotes 
As we have seen above, anecdote is often the way in which patients 
will relay to doctors the impact of their symptoms on their lives. But it 
is not just in the doctor's surgery where anecdotes are the means of lay 
communication on medical matters. Patients will share their own and 
their relatives' experience of illness and medical treatment through 
anecdote in the home, at work and in the pub. These stories, it has 
been suggested by sociologists, may be one of the major means by 
which people decide whether or not they should visit the doctor with 
their problem. 
A visit to the GP, or even more to the hospital clinic, is an important 
event which in its turn will be conveyed by anecdote to family and 
friends. This is an important point for doctors to remember as it is at 
this stage that the understanding which the doctor thinks he or she has 
shared with the patient about their problem and its solution may go 
awry. The story of the visit is told and the listeners will comment on 
it, 
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drawing upon their own experience and knowledge which is in turn 
often informed by anecdote. The scene might go something like this: 
Patient : The doctor told me I had high blood pressure and I've to 
start taking these tablets. 
Relative : Are you sure? I know Mr MacDonald down the road has 
got high blood pressure but he is twice the size of you and smokes 
like a chimney. He told me he had been getting terrible headaches 
and his doctor told him it was his blood pressure and he had to 
start cutting down on his smoking. Perhaps you should just try 
cutting down a bit too. 
Patient : Yes. I don't feel unwell at all. I'll wait and see. 
This kind of situation may contribute to compliance problems with 
some treatments. 
Doctors must, therefore, be aware of the anecdote-sharing that goes on 
at home and in other contexts of patients' lives. Doctors need to be 
clear of what prompted them to consult by asking patients for, and 
listening to, their account, and doctors then need to check on patients' 
understanding and compliance with any agreed treatment on 
subsequent visits. 
2.5.5 Anecdotes as therapy 
Allowing patients the chance to tell their story to its end can be an 
important part of the therapeutic process. This gives them the 
opportunity to order and clarify the experience of the illness in their 
own minds and helps towards understanding it. It is surprising how 
difficult it is to listen properly to a patient's story to its conclusion. But 
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it is important to do so because if the doctor interrupts his comments 
are often completely ignored by the patient who wishes to finish his 
own narrative. As Peter Hoeg's heroine comments in his book 'Miss 
Smilla's Feeling For Snow' 
'Very few people know how to listen. Their haste pulls them out of 
the conversation, or they try internally to improve the situation, or 
they're preparing what their next speech will be when you shut up 
and it's their turn to take the stage. '85 
In summary, knowledge obtained through scientific endeavour in 
medicine is being vaunted as superior to knowledge obtained in other 
ways. However, learning from stories and anecdotes and being alert to 
their use by patients are essential to good medicine. This kind of 
knowledge enables us to deal with patients as an individuals and to 
respect their uniqueness as persons. As George Eliot in her novel 
'Middlemarch' said of Dr Lydgate: 
'He cared not only for "cases", but for John and Elizabeth, especially 
Elizabeth. ' 86 
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2.6 INTERPRETATION 
As we have seen, the diagnosis or prognosis relating to a specific 
patient derives from : 
(a) evidence, properly so-called but based on the'detective' model; 
(b) information deriving from the patient's own stories or anecdotes. 
Likewise, the doctor's recommended treatment derives from: 
(a) evidence-based scientific research; 
(b) anecdotes from other doctors in similar situations. 
All this, however, must pass through the filter of the doctor's own 
judgement. In other words, it must be interpreted. But what is 
interpretation? I wish in this section to consider what interpretation is, 
and how it contributes to clinical insight and judgement. I shall draw 
on some of the ideas found in hermeneutics. 
2.6.1 What is interpretation? 
One of our commonest uses of the word is related to the expression 
'How do you interpret what he said, wrote, did? ' Here, the speaker is 
asking for the meaning that you (the observer) ascribe to what was 
said, written or done. Inherent in the question is the implication that 
your interpretation might be different from mine or from anyone else's. 
The reason it is different is that your point of view or perspective on 
the subject might be different from mine or that of other people. An 
example might be if you are holidaying on a beach and see someone 
waving from the sea, you may well wave back, because your 
perspective on the situation is that everyone is on holiday and 
is 
behaving in a relaxed and friendly way. The life-guard who 
is 
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scanning the sea for problems has a different point on view and may 
interpret the wave not as a friendly gesture but as a cry for help and 
rush in to rescue the bather. Gesture, then, is open to interpretation in 
different ways and that interpretation depends on the point of view of 
the observer, either in a literal sense - according to the position of the 
observer - or in a psychological sense - according to the feelings the 
observer has with regard to the situation. 
This notion of point of view or perspective was introduced by one of 
the early writers in hermeneutics, Johann Martin Chladenius, in 
relation to historical method87. He introduces the notion in this way: 
'We shall designate the term viewpoint to refer to those conditions 
governed by our mind, body and entire person which make or 
cause us to conceive of something in one way and not in another. 
Because the positioning of our eyes - and especially their distance 
from the object perceived - causes us to receive one particular 
image and not another, there is consequently a reason why we 
should come to know something in one particular way and not 
another in all our perceptions; and this is determined by the 
viewpoint. '88 
Chladenius takes a historical example to illustrate his point. He 
outlines the different descriptions that three spectators of a battle 
might make if they view the conflict from three different vantage 
points, one on a hill near the right flank, one on a rise near the 
left 
flank and the third, from behind the battle. The descriptions that each 
will give will be different, but all will be true according to the 
perception of the observer. 
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Certainly, all the observers may be truly reporting their perception but 
will they all be correct? It is important to ask this question here 
because in order for interpretation to contribute to the process of 
understanding in any subject area (and I am here thinking particularly 
of the medical context) it must be possible to separate correct, or at 
least plausible, interpretations from those that are incorrect, or 
implausible. We cannot just say 'it all depends on the point of view', or 
'it's just a matter of what you think'. So, to return to Chladenius's 
example of the three observers of a battle, it is possible to say that one 
or more of the views of the battle that they report might be incorrect 
even though, to them, from their vantage points, their accounts seem 
accurate. For example, one of the observers might see a section of the 
opposing army move away from the battlefield and conclude that they 
were running away. What may in fact be happening is that the section 
is moving off in order to circle and advance again on a different flank. 
The report of that observer will, therefore, be entirely incorrect and, to 
his side, dangerous. The criminal justice system is based on the 
process of presenting two opposing interpretations of the evidence in a 
case to a jury and asking them to decide which is correct - the 
interpretation which indicates the innocence of the defendant or that 
which points to his guilt. 
We therefore have examples from history and the law where it is 
possible to say whether the interpretation of something is correct or 
incorrect. In both these areas the correct account of events is there to 
be discovered because the events have already taken place; in other 
words, the correct interpretation of the events is knowable, even though 
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it is not, and may not be, known by those who are trying to find it out. 
Interpretation is necessary because, in history, information is 
incomplete and patchy or, as in the law, defendants cannot be assumed 
to be telling the truth about the events. 
In the context of science, we might also say that interpretations of 
phenomena can be correct or incorrect. Scientific enquiries focus on 
things that are not yet known but are assumed to be knowable, and 
knowledge of them depends on there being an appropriate experiment 
to uncover this. In order to frame such experiments, scientists will put 
forward interpretations of the phenomenon. These interpretations (as 
we have seen in 1.2.1) are called hypotheses which will then, if 
possible, be subject to experiments to test their validity. The point, for 
the present argument, is that interpretations in this context may be 
correct or incorrect, but the answer is not known - and may never be 
known - by the interpreter. In order, then, for scientific 
interpretations to have some validity and for them to be taken 
seriously as possible explanations of phenomena, we depend on being 
able to say whether they are plausible or not. Nicolaus Copernicus, in 
postulating a Sun-centred system of astronomy in the 16th century, 
was not in a position to say whether his view was correct or not. He 
could say that this interpretation fitted the available facts better then 
the old Earth-centred idea and was therefore a more plausible 
interpretation. 
So far, then, we can say that interpretations of things in some contexts 
or subject matters can be correct or incorrect, or that they can be more 
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or less plausible. There may be a further category in that it may be 
possible in other contexts or subject matters to have a number of 
different valid interpretations of something. To return to Chladenius's 
notion of point of view, is it possible to say that everyone's point of 
view on a subject might be correct or, at least, as valid as anyone else's? 
Chladenius takes a further historical example in his discussion: 
'A rebellion is perceived one way by a loyal subject, a rebel 
perceives it another way ,a foreigner or a person from court will 
perceive it still another way, and all of these perceptions will differ 
from a citizen or farmer, even if they know nothing about it other 
than that which seems plausible. '89 
It is not possible to say here that any one of these interpretations of the 
uprising are correct. Each one is valid depending on the group which 
the individual espouses. An example that would apply to our modern 
world would be the situation in Northern Ireland. From the point of 
view of the Nationalist community, Britain is an occupying power and 
it is therefore valid to use armed force against an army of occupation, 
and those that do so are freedom fighters. To the Unionist community, 
Northern Ireland is part of the UK and the Nationalist activists are to 
be seen as terrorists and criminals. Either view could be seen as correct 
depending on the community to which you belong. 
These examples would suggest that we can have situations where 
different interpretations of events or subjects can have equal validity 
and are not necessarily correct or incorrect. Politics gives many 
examples of this but literature and fine art may be the main areas 
where it is most commonly said that a number of different 
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interpretations of a work may be equally plausible. One of the reasons 
that the plays of Shakespeare continue to fascinate theatre directors is 
that they can be played in many different ways. For instance, Othello 
can be seen as a play about a jealous husband, or about the trusting 
gullibility of the simple soldier, or about racial hatred. The Merchant of 
Venice can be played as a light comedy or as a comedy verging on 
tragedy, if the role of Shylock is given prominence by the director. We 
cannot say that any one of these readings of the plays is the correct 
one. They are all plausible as long as the text will support them. We 
cannot even appeal to authorial intention to support the most plausible 
reading, as Shakespeare does not stamp his presence on the plays. 
Artists may or may not chose to allow their own views of a work to 
surface. This may be particularly so of highly abstract art where the 
artist paints something and leaves it to the viewer to make up his own 
mind about what the painting means. 
This is not to say that anything goes in literature and art. 
Interpretations must be supported by a sensitive reading of the text 
which will involve understanding of nuances and analogies employed 
by the author. The poem Felix Randal by Gerard Manley Hopkins 
contains this verse: 
'Sickness broke him. Impatient, he cursed at first, but mended 
Being anointed and all; though a heavenlier heart began some 
Months earlier, since I had our sweet reprieve and ransom 
Tendered to him. Ah well, God rest him all road ever he 
offended! '90 
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The poem can be seen as an account by Hopkins of this man Felix 
Randal whom Hopkins ministered to as a priest in his last illness. But 
the poet's use of the Lancashire dialect in this verse brings Felix's voice 
to our ears and the poem becomes a vivid picture of this big, burly 
farrier at first railing against his illness and then accepting it with 
Northern fatalism. If our ears were not attuned to this dialect or if the 
style change was not pointed out to us, we would lose much of what 
was intended in the poem and our reading of it would be incorrect. 
In summary, interpretations of things can be correct or incorrect, more 
or less plausible; and it is possible to have a number of valid or 
plausible interpretations of the same thing. An individual's 
interpretation is guided by his own viewpoint. The correctness or 
plausibility of that interpretation will depend on how far that 
viewpoint is obscured by lack of knowledge or understanding of the 
subject. 
Is it important to be aware of the status of an interpretation of 
something in terms of its correctness or plausibility when we come to 
consider the bearing of interpretation on understanding? 
Understanding something implies that some kind of conclusion has 
been reached about the subject; understanding is an arrival at a point 
when puzzlement about the subject has been removed. Understanding 
can, therefore, be reached by coming to a conclusion reached by the 
process of interpretation. In this context knowing whether, at the end 
of the day, an interpretation is correct or incorrect, or plausible or 
implausible may be important in relation to whether that 
98 
interpretation helps you to understand the subject better or not. In the 
play The Merchant of Venice, if our interpretation of the play is focused 
on Shylock as the main character, then the discomfort associated with 
his part in the play's action might lead us to see that play as tragedy 
rather than comedy. This would be to misunderstand the play because 
the play has an essentially comic structure which rules out a pervasive 
tragic interpretation. On the other hand, understanding may develop 
as a result of expounding and analysing the plausibility of various 
interpretations of a subject. In this context, even incorrect or 
implausible interpretations can contribute to our understanding of a 
subject. Returning to the above example, the process of interpreting 
the play through the eyes of Shylock helps us to understand certain 
themes in the play which are not apparent otherwise. This 
interpretation may not be correct in terms of understanding the play as 
a whole but it helps to elucidate certain aspects of it. 
Interpretation is, therefore, related to understanding. But what exactly 
is the relationship? There is no one conceptually correct answer to this. 
We can say either that interpretation is a process which leads to 
understanding, or we can say that interpretation just is understanding 
in a context of puzzlement. 
An example the idea of interpretation leading to understanding might 
be of the finding on an archeological dig of a piece of carved flint lying 
amongst other such implements and animal remains. The 
archaeologist can see that the piece of flint has a blunt end and a 
broad 
sharp end and its position implies that it might have been used 
in the 
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process of cutting up meat. He concludes that he has found a flint axe 
head. This conclusion has come about entirely by interpretation of the 
shape of the implement, the position it was found on the dig and by 
comparison with other such finds. The axe head is then taken to a 
museum and is put on view as 'flint axe head'. Does the viewer just 
understand that this is what the artefact is without going through any 
interpretative process? It may be that some interpretative activity is 
required by the viewer as well before he can conclude that this is an 
axe head. That activity might be almost subconscious but it is 
necessary for the viewer to compare this object with axes as he knows 
them before he can see that this object is plausible as an axe. 
As an example of the second idea of the relationship between 
interpretation and understanding, consider the situation in which we 
are not sure of the import of what someone is saying. In such a 
situation we engage in a process of interpretation. To confirm our 
interpretation we might ask, 'Do I understand you correctly...? ' In 
other words, interpretation just is understanding in the context of a 
certain sort of puzzlement. Indeed, another of the important 
originators of hermeneutics, Friedrich Schleiermacher, made no clear 
distinction between them and saw hermeneutics as the 'art of 
understanding'91. 
From the point of view of this thesis it is unimportant which line is 
taken. The important point is that interpretation is closely related to 
understanding, however that relationship is to be understood. 
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2.6.2 Interpretation and the clinic 
My account of the nature and scope of interpretation should make it 
possible to understand the central role it has in the clinic. Whether we 
are thinking of the diagnosis, prognosis, or treatment, it is clear that the 
doctor's decisions must be based on his interpretation of the evidence, 
including the patient's own anecdotes, as it relates to the individual 
case. That interpretation either constitutes or leads to his 
understanding of the case. It is my contention that interpretations are 
not in themeselves in any sense evidence, but they are that without 
which evidence is blind and useless. It therefore follows that 
interpretation is a necessary component of clinical judgement. Before 
we can judge what the diagnosis is or the treatment ought to be we 
must have interpreted the signs, symptoms and anecdotes of the 
patient. 
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2.7 CONSENT 
The doctor's best efforts at diagnosis and treatment may receive a 
conclusive block in the clinic if the patient refuses the recommended 
treatment. A patient is, therefore, fully entitled to refuse the best 
evidence-based medicine, and may accept (because of patient-patient 
anecdote) a second or third best treatment. It is, therefore, important 
to recognise that in the clinical setting the onward march of evidence- 
based medicine may be halted by the patient's refusal. Let us examine 
the meanings of the term 'consent'. 
2.7.1 Consent as 'agreeing to' 
The weakest sense of 'consent' is 'agreeing to' or 'accepting'. If we take 
an analogy from consent in political philosophy, then a ruler like 
Elizabeth I of England ruled by consent in that she was popular and 
the people accepted or agreed with her policies of war with the 
Spanish or persecution of the Catholics. But her right to act in this way 
did not depend on their agreement: if they had not agreed, then it 
would not have mattered. This is the weakest sense of consent. In 
medicine it might be illustrated in contexts in which the doctor says: 'I 
am proposing to do x and y' or, 'I have just done x or y. Is that okay? ' 
And the patient says weakly, 'Yes, thank you doctor'. This strand of 
the consent doctrine does not confer rights on the patient. 
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2.7.2 Consent as 'authorising 
A strong sense of consent is 'authorising'. A might authorise B to do x 
and y on his behalf. In this case B's right to do x and y necessarily 
depends on A's authorisation. B is delegated to do x and y and the 
main responsibility for the doing of x and y rests with A. For example, 
I might instruct or authorise my agent to bid for me in an auction. This 
is too strong a sense of consent to be assimilated into the main tradition 
in medical ethics. It has the serious disadvantage in medicine of 
undermining professional autonomy: the doctor may feel that what I 
authorise is futile, and in any case it is up to him to make the treatment 
decisions (although, as we shall see, the patient can legitimately refuse 
treatment). 
It should be noted that the use of the term 'directive', as in 'advance 
directive', may encourage patients to see themselves as authorising the 
doctor to act as their agent. This has already happened in the USA. In 
a study of the literature Paris et. al. 92 note that doctors will almost 
always continue treatment if requested by patients or relatives, even if 
they regard it as futile. They do this because they believe that patient 
autonomy carries with it the right to whatever treatment the patient 
requests. Moreover, this view is supported by US ethicists. For 
example, Veatch and Spicer93 maintain that a physician is obliged to 
supply requested treatment even if the request 'deviates intolerably' 
from established standards or is in terms of the doctor's judgement 
'grossly inappropriate'. 
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In reply to the US position we must remember that the principle of 
respect for autonomy applies not only to the patient but to the doctor; 
and if, in the doctor's opinion, the requested treatment is 'grossly 
inappropriate' then the doctor has no duty to provide it; indeed he/she 
has a duty not to provide it. The position has in fact been supported in 
the UK by the Court of Appeal. In a case in which a physician had 
indicated that he would not concur with a family's request to give a 
dying patient ventilatory treatment if that became necessary to sustain 
the patient's life, Lord Justice Donaldson stated that 
'courts should not require a medical practitioner ... to adopt a 
course of treatment which in the bona fide clinical judgement of the 
practitioner was contraindicated. '94 
Lord Justice Balcome went further and wrote that he 
'could conceive of no situation where it would be proper to order a 
doctor to treat a patient in a manner contrary to his or her clinical 
judgement. '95 
In other words, the Court of Appeal is here supporting the professional 
autonomy of the doctor. 
But whatever the legal situation in the UK there are three points to be 
made. Firstly, that the American writers of Paris et. al., dismiss the 
judgements of the Court of Appeal as expressing English social class 
interests - where lawyers support the doctors96. They predict that this 
will change. Secondly, it is in fact the case that many doctors, and 
many more nurses, believe that they are obliged to do what the 
patients and relatives request, especially at the end of life. Thirdly, the 
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Patient's Charter encourages this, what we may call 'consumer 
autonomy', approach to medicine. 
Nevertheless, contrary to our US colleagues there is good reason for 
maintaining the asymmetry whereby the patient may legitimately 
refuse a treatment or authorise, as distinct from agree to, the positive 
giving of a treatment. The reason is that the doctor is the expert on the 
patient's medical good - hence only the doctor can authorise treatment. 
But the patient is the expert on his/her own total good. In the light of 
this knowledge of an overall or total good, the patient is entitled to 
refuse treatment which might well be in his/her narrower medical 
good. 
2.7.3 Consent as 'shared decision-making' 
A third sense of consent is 'shared decision-making'. Shared decision- 
making has two elements. Firstly, patient preferences and values are 
discussed by the doctor in the light of the doctor's treatment proposals 
or they could be mentioned in advance in a document. This type of 
discussion is necessary but not sufficient for what I am calling joint or 
shared decision-making. The second necessary condition is that this 
discussion results in the activating of a socially or often a legally 
sanctioned procedure. We can call this procedure the giving or 
refusing of permission. 
These two conditions are together necessary and sufficient for this 
sense of consent. There are a number of important points to note about 
this form of consent. Firstly, permission is given by both patient and 
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doctor; each may permit the treatment or not. Secondly, 'permission' is 
a normative term. It is not like 'agreeing' or 'accepting' which are non- 
normative. I can accept a drink or agree to go to the cinema without 
any question of rights. But to give permission is to confer a right. Thus 
the patient gives or refuses the doctor a right to intervene, and the 
doctor gives the patient a right to have or not have the treatment in 
question. Thirdly, the norms in question must be socially and, in the 
end, legally, sanctioned or legitimised by public policy. In other 
words, the parties must know and agree about procedures, and society 
more generally must know and agree. 
Shared decision-making seems the most satisfactory model for consent 
in the clinic. The patient can be protected against paternalistic 
decisions deriving from doctors' or relatives' views of their total good. 
They can be protected because they can refuse permission through 
socially and/or legally sanctioned procedures. On the other hand, the 
doctor's professional autonomy is also respected in that he too is 
giving permission through socially sanctioned procedures. Moreover, 
responsibility is shared. In the first strand of the consent doctrine - 
agreeing or accepting - the main responsibility remains with the 
doctor. In the second - authorising - the main responsibility remains 
with the authoriser. But in the third , the responsibility 
is shared by 
patient, doctor and by society, which has sanctioned the procedures 
through its public policy. 
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2.8 CONCLUSIONS 
1) Clinical consultation and practice is not simply a matter of applying 
scientific evidence to individual patients. 
2) Scientific evidence provides a broad base for practice but evidence 
must also be individualised on the detective model. 
3) Anecdotes are also a useful source of information on diagnosis and 
treatment. 
4) Evidence and anecdote must be interpreted, and it is through 
interpretation that the doctor can show insight into the particular case. 
5) Treatment decisions should be shared. 
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CHAPTER 3 
THE HUMANE DOCTOR 
3.1 INTRODUCTION : Dr John Gregory 
I have tried to show how the scientific evidence-base of medicine must 
be modified and balanced in clinical practice by a range of other 
factors. The topic for this chapter concerns the qualities, dispositions 
or nature which a doctor must have in order to manage a clinical 
consultation along the lines indicated in chapter 2. 
An excellent pointer to these qualities is provided by Dr John Gregory 
in his lecture on The Duties and Qualifications of a Physician'. 
Gregory writes: 
'In the possession of this subject, I shall, in the first place, consider, 
what kind of genius, understanding and temper naturally fit a man 
for being a physician. - In the second place, what are the moral 
qualities to be expected of him in the exercise of his profession, viz. 
the obligation to humanity, patience, attention, discretion, secrecy, 
and honour, which he lies under to his patients. - In the third, place, 
I shall take notice of the decorums and attentions peculiarly 
incumbent on him as a physician and which tend most effectually 
to support the dignity of the profession; as likewise the general 
propriety of his manners, his behaviour to his patients, to his 
brethren, and to apothecaries. - In the fourth place, I shall 
particularly describe that course of education which is necessary for 
qualifying a physician to practice with success and reputation; and 
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shall, at the same time, mention those ornamental qualifications 
expected from the physician as a gentleman of a liberal education, 
and without which it is difficult to support the honour and rank of 
the profession. '97 
I shall deal with the education of the physician in chapter 5, and it may 
be permissible to divide Gregory's other points into two, which he 
himself refers to as 'the exertion of genius'and the 'exercise of 
humanity'98. Let us consider 'the exertion of genius'. 
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3.2 KNOWLEDGE AND SKILLS 
Gregory gives a surprisingly up-to-date account of 'the exertion of 
genius', by which he means the knowledge-base or evidence-base of 
medicine. 'Perhaps no profession requires so comprehensive a mind 
as medicine'. Indeed, Gregory explicitly acknowledges the importance 
of basing medical knowledge on evidence. He writes: 
'Among the infinite variety of facts and theories with which his [the 
physician's] memory has been filled in the course of a liberal 
education, it is his business to make a judicious separation between 
those founded in nature and experience, and those which owe their 
birth to ignorance, fraud, or the capricious systems of a heated and 
deluded imagination. He will likewise find it necessary to 
distinguish between important facts, and such as, though they may 
be founded in truth, are notwithstanding trivial or utterly useless to 
the main ends of his profession. Supposing all these difficulties 
surmounted, he will find it no easy matter to apply his knowledge 
to practice. '99 
In this passage Gregory is asserting the importance of establishing a 
secure evidence-base (he distinguishes 'nature and experience' from 
'ignorance and fraud'), of distinguishing 'important facts' from 'trivial' 
ones, and of being able to 'apply his [the physician's] knowledge to 
practice' (or in the clinic). In all this, Gregory is stating with admirable 
brevity the points I have laboured to express in chapters 1 and 2. 
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Before I go on (3.4) to consider Gregory's views on'the exercise of 
humanity' I should like to examine an aspect of clinical practice which 
Gregory does not stress, perhaps because it would seem to him to be 
more characteristic of the lowlier occupation of the surgeon which he 
does not discuss. I refer to the exercise of skills. 
The central role given to acquiring skills can be seen in the 'aims and 
objectives' of courses in medical faculties. They stress that the 
outcomes of such courses must be such that the student will be able to 
do various things rather than know various facts (see 5.8). Indeed, 
'transferable skills' has become the catch-phrase of educational theory 
more generally. There are probably two reasons for this. One was the 
attempt during the Thatcher years to move education in a practical 
'utilitarian' direction, and the second is the huge influence of Gilbert 
Ryle's The Concept of Mind in which Ryle attempts to argue that 
possessing knowledge is basically a matter of knowing how to do 
various things. I shall examine Ryle's arguments here'00. 
I have been maintaining (chapter 1) that scientific understanding is a 
matter of acquiring systematic knowledge that certain facts are the 
case and are related in certain ways. In other words, my claim is that, 
when we speak of understanding why something is the case, how a 
trick is done, what a person is saying, and so on, what these senses of 
'understand' have in common is that they are all related to the 
'knowing that' family. 
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On the other hand, in The Concept of Mind, Ryle argues that the various 
senses of 'understand' belong to the 'knowing how' family. Ryle 
discusses that sense of understanding which is roughly equivalent to 
following what someone is saying or doing, and he argues that 
understanding, in this specific sense, is a 'part of knowing how' 
because the 'knowledge that is required for understanding intelligent 
performances of a specific kind is some degree of competence in 
performances of that kind. ' Now it may well be that Ryle does not 
intend to generalise from the specific sense he discusses to the concept 
as a whole, but there is certainly a temptation to do so since it is 
natural to assume that, if a concept has different senses, more or less 
systematic connections will hold among them101 and a family 
connection with 'knowing how' ensures respectability. 
Unfortunately, however, a close relationship with 'knowing how' is not 
easy to establish for the more general senses of understanding why, 
how and so on. Imagine the case of a person who inquires why salt is 
scattered on the pavement in icy weather and is told that salt lowers 
the temperature at which water will freeze. If the person then 
understands, it is plausible to claim that this is because he has been 
given information which enables him to connect the matter with his 
existing knowledge. It is true, of course, that he now knows how to 
account for the scattering of salt, but this is only to say that he is able to 
make use of what he has been told and believes to be the case. 
Similarly, if the conjuror explains where he put the penny that 
disappeared, we understand because, having been told, we know that 
the penny went up his sleeve. It may be argued that we also 
know 
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how to do the trick. But what does 'knowing how to' mean in this 
case? It cannot amount to being able to do the trick since a person does 
not necessarily acquire the ability to do sleight-of-hand just from being 
shown how to do the trick, and if 'knowing how to' involves no more 
than knowing how the trick is done, it is a knowing that which is 
involved. 
Analysis of these general senses of 'understanding' seems to suggest, 
then, that the concept belongs to the knowing that family. Moreover, 
Ryle's specific sense can also be claimed as a relative. The ability to 
follow what a person is saying is indeed a skill acquired by imitation 
and practice. But this plausible piece of learning theory must not be 
allowed to displace the epistemological contention that the skill 
depends on a person's knowledge. Indeed, facility in the exercise of 
this basic skill varies directly in proportion to a person's knowledge. 
To follow (or conduct) a conversation about servicing a motor-car 
engine a person must have knowledge of engines and the more he 
knows of them the better he will follow. And this has general 
application to all communication. To use language with 
understanding it is necessary to possess concepts, and the possession 
of concepts, however it may govern our skills, is itself basically a 
function of our knowledge that. Similarly, our ability to understand 
what someone is doing when he plays trump depends on the extent to 
which we possess the relevant concepts, or, in other words, on our 
knowledge of the terms, rules and strategies of the game. Hence, it is 
at least arguable that Ryle's specific sense of 'understand' is akin to the 
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more general senses, since it too seems logically dependent on our 
knowledge that. 
Of course, when we play a game, or understand language, we are not 
necessarily rehearsing facts in our head! Knowledge that or 
understanding is most often 'dispositional'. In the sense that we just 
display it 'without thinking'. But it is still a display of systematic 
knowledge. The same is true of many so-called 'skills' in medicine. 
What the medical student or junior doctor may need to rehearse in her 
head is done by the experienced without thought. But it is a display of 
underlying understanding. 
There is however an element of 'know how' or skill which is not 
reducible to 'know that'. Tying a surgical knot, for example, or giving 
an injection to a baby, are a matter of what might be termed 'motor 
skills', and they are not reducible to 'knowledge that'. Even here, 
however, the question of when, how much, for how long, to exercise 
these motor skills must be governed by the doctor's systematic 
understanding of the patient's problem. 
The 'genius' of the doctor then involves a scientific evidence-base of 
systematic 'knowledge that' which gives rise to skills and governs 
skills. 
Obviously many of these skills are those of diagnosis, prognosis and 
medical and surgical treatment. But it is important to discuss a set of 
114 
skills which are much stressed as essential to the medical 'genius' - 
communication skills. 
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3.3 COMMUNICATION SKILLS 
The importance of 'communication skills' is commonly thought, in 
medical literature at least, to be a discovery of the period 1960-90. It 
was alleged, with some justification, that doctors were deficient in such 
skills, and that it is of great importance for patient care that doctors 
should acquire 'communication skills'. Indeed, the medical stress on 
communication skills is part of a wider concern found in management 
studies, and politics. This emphasis has tended to eclipse the 
importance of what is being communicated. For example, apologists 
for an unprecedented defect of a Conservative Government in 1997 
tended to say 'We just didn't get our message across! ' - as if it were a 
failure in communication rather than in policy which led to the defeat. 
Nevertheless, communication skills are important in general, and 
specifically in the clinic. 
3.3.1 Rhetoric 
It is, however, a serious error to think that the importance of 
communication skills is a discovery of the period 1960-90. The 
importance of such skills was noted by Plato (Gorgias ) and by Aristotle 
(Rhetoric ), and by many other writers in the ancient world. The Greek 
and Roman writers called such skills 'rhetoric' and saw them as both 
dangerous and as having a vital place in the education of a public or 
professional occupation. The importance of rhetoric was again 
emphasised in the Scottish Enlightenment. For example, 
George 
Campbell in The Philosophy of Rhetoric argues as follows: 
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'In speaking there is always some end proposed, or some effects 
which the speaker intends to produce in the hearer. The word 
eloquence in its greatest latitude denotes, "That art or talent by 
which the discourse is adapted to its end". 
All the ends of speaking are reducible to four; every speech being 
intended to enlighten the understanding, to please the imagination, 
to move the passions, or to influence the will. 
Any one discourse admits only one of these ends as the principal. 
Nevertheless, in discoursing on a subject, many things may be 
introduced, which are more immediately and apparently directed 
to some of the other ends of speaking, and not to that which is the 
chief intent of the whole. But then these other and immediate ends 
are in effect but means, and must be rendered conducive to that 
which is the primary intention. Accordingly, the propriety or the 
impropriety of the introduction of such secondary ends, will always 
be transferred from their subserviency or want of subserviency to 
that end, which is, in respect of them, the ultimate. For example, a 
discourse addressed to the understanding, and calculated to 
illustrate or evince some point purely speculative, may borrow aid 
from the imagination, and admit metaphor and comparison, but 
not the bolder and more striking figures, as that called vision or 
fiction, prosopopoeia, and the like, which are not so much intended 
to elucidate a subject, as to excite admiration. Still less will it admit 
an address to the passions, which, as it never fails to disturb the 
operation of the intellectual faculty, must be regarded by every 
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intelligent hearer as foreign at least, if not insidious. It is obvious, 
that either of these, far from being subservient to the main design, 
would distract the attention from it. ' 102 
The points which George Campbell is making in this passage are very 
apt for any discussion of communication skills. It is indeed a 
contestable issue as to whether the principal 'end' of the doctor's 
discourse in the consultation should be 'to enlighten the 
understanding' of the patient, or 'to influence the will'. And, of course, 
it might be a matter for ethical debate as to whether it is legitimate for 
the doctor 'to influence the will' by 'moving the passions'. For 
example, if the doctor is convinced of the dire nature of the disease and 
the fatal consequences of not taking the tablets is it legitimate to try to 
affect the will through passions such as fear? We need not here pause 
on difficult ethical cases, but simply note that in the anti-paternalist 
ethos of the present day it would be unacceptable in general for the 
doctor to concentrate entirely on influencing the will. Communication 
skills should in the main be directed at creating the enlightenment of 
the understanding, thus leaving space for the patient to make choices. 
3.3.2 Communication as explaining 
The term 'rhetoric' has bad associations in contemporary discourse. 
But the same kinds of point can be made via an analysis of explaining. 
Since explaining is obviously an activity of the first importance there 
have naturally been many studies of its nature. These have usually 
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been from the point of view of a special subject matter, such as science 
or history. I propose to discuss the concept from a different point of 
view, as a means of human communication, or a kind of pedagogy. I 
shall argue for the strong thesis that the concept is seen in truer 
perspective from this point of view than from that of science or history. 
Let us begin by contrasting the points of view in more detail. 
The advantage of approaching the concept of explanation from a 
special subject matter, particularly science, is that the concept is 
discussed in contexts in which explanatory problems are outstanding, 
but the danger is that the peculiarities of explanation in a special field 
are regarded as fundamental features of the concept in general. Thus, 
the prestige and explanatory triumphs of science have led to the 
widespread view that scientific explanations provide paradigm cases: 
we are encouraged to think that the true or correct explanation is 
always there waiting to be found. Yet it is not clear how the scientific 
paradigm applies either to our everyday activities of explaining our 
point of view, how to get from the airport to the hotel, the best way to 
prune roses. Or to the more technical matters of explaining the nature 
of sonata-form, the meaning of an obscure poem or play, or the nature 
of a certain theological concept. But such activities are reflected in the 
dictionary meanings of 'explain', such as 'to smooth out', 'to give 
details of' or 'to make plain or intelligible'. And I wish to argue that it 
is the activities reflected in the dictionary meanings which give us the 
root form of the concept, and that the scientific stress on 'the correct 
explanation' involves a derivative use. To put my thesis in a different 
way, I shall argue that the concept of explanation is seen in truer 
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perspective as a gerund 'explaining', a process of getting something 
across to a person in a definite context, than as a substantive 
'explanation', something which has an existence of its own 
independent of a specific person and context. Certainly, it is the 
activity of explaining which is relevant to the analysis of 
communication skills. 
It is clear that a person will not ask for an explanation of something 
(granted he is not in the privileged position of a tutor) unless he is 
puzzled by it or in some way lacks understanding of it. But people 
may be puzzled in different ways and degrees about the same thing 
and the different background knowledge of questioners and the 
contexts of their requests will demand different answers. In different 
cases, moreover, a person may have more or less success in explaining 
his views. Explaining to the individual needs and interests of his 
hearers; an explanation for Jones may not be an explanation for Smith. 
Hence, if, when Jones has requested and been offered an explanation, 
he has still no grasp of the matter, we shall normally withdraw our 
claim to have explained the matter to him: we shall rather say that we 
have tried but failed to explain the matter to him. This suggests that 
there is a conceptual connection between explaining a matter to a 
person and making it plain and intelligible to him; so much, indeed, is 
suggested by the etymology of 'explain'. 
If this brief analysis of the concept of explanation is on the right lines, 
explaining may be characterised as an activity aimed at producing the 
conceptually fitting response. 'Now it is plain to me, now I can 
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understand it. ' (Of course, whether the person in fact understands it is 
another matter. ) It is being suggested, that is, that explaining should 
be seen as a form of teaching, that form of teaching which is concerned 
with creating understanding rather than merely with imparting 
information. We may expect, therefore, that, like teaching, 
explanations will vary in style according to variations in many factors 
such as the knowledge, ability and interest of the listener. Where the 
'pupils' are of a certain standard intelligence with standard interest, 
and there is an accepted body of knowledge on the subject, there may 
be a standard 'lesson' which has been found to satisfy. It is in such 
contexts that we tend to speak of 'the explanation'. But such 
explanations can exist ready-made only because at one time they have 
been designed to fit certain standard requirements. That is why made- 
to-measure explanations give the root form of the concept. 
To have communications skills, then, is to have the capacity to make 
and to measure explanations to fit the needs of the patient. The fault of 
the doctor lacking such skills is the fault of someone who thinks that 
there is one correct explanation and that his job is simply to deliver it. 
But the doctor with such skills is like a skilled keyboard player creating 
variations on a simple bass line. The bass line is the ground of medical 
fact but the good doctor is able to make something of this in a way 
which, in the words of George Campbell, enlightens the 
understanding, pleases the imagination, moves the passions, and 
influences the will of the patient. The good or humane doctor is 
therefore like a creative artist in the exercise of communication skills. 
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3.4 THE HUMANE ATTITUDE : Dr John Gregory 
I can now return to the second general headings under which Dr. John 
Gregory discusses the duties of the physician. He calls it 'the exercise 
of humanity'. Gregory writes: 
'In the second place, medicine presents a no less extensive field for 
the exercise of humanity. A physician has numberless 
opportunities of giving that relief to distress, which is not to be 
purchased by the wealth of India. This, to a benevolent mind, must 
be one of the greatest pleasures. But besides the good which a 
physician has it often in his power to do, in consequence of skill in 
his profession, there are many occasions that call for his assistance 
as a man, as a man who feels for the misfortunes of his fellow- 
creatures. In this respect he has many opportunities of displaying 
patient, good-nature, generosity, compassion, and all the gentler 
virtues that do honour to human nature. ' 103 
It is clear that by 'the exercise of humanity' Gregory means the exercise 
of moral virtues. He writes: 
'I come now to mention the moral qualities peculiarly required in 
the character of a physician. The chief of these is humanity; that 
sensibility of heart which makes us feel for the distresses of our 
fellow-creatures, and which of consequence incites us in the most 
powerful manner to relieve them. Sympathy produces an anxious 
attention to a thousand little circumstances that may tend to relieve 
the patient; an attention which money can never purchase; hence 
the inexpressible comfort of having a friend for a physician. 
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Sympathy naturally engages the affection and confidence of a 
patient, which in many cases is of the utmost consequence to his 
recover. ' 104 
He goes on to note other qualities which should be possessed by the 
humane physician. 
'There is a species of good-humour different from the sympathy I 
have been speaking of, which is likewise amiable in a physician. It 
consists in a certain gentleness and flexibility, which makes him 
suffer with patience, and even apparent cheerfulness, the many 
contradictions and disappointments he is subjected to in his 
practice. If he is rigid and too minute in his directions about 
regimen, he may be assured they will not be strictly followed; and 
if he is severe in his manners, the deviations from his rules will as 
certainly be concealed from him. ' 105 
Three points are worth stressing in Gregory's account of the humane 
physician. First, the qualities he mentions are virtues or good 
dispositions. In the field of medical ethics there has been an explosion 
of what is called 'virtue theory'. The view is that 'ethics' requires 
doctors to have a range of virtues. It is clear however that Gregory 
was aware in the 18th century of the importance of virtues to the 
humane physician. 
Secondly, the virtues mentioned by Gregory are not all 'moral' virtues 
in the narrow sense. He realised that there is more to the humane 
attitude than what would now be called 'ethics'. Thus, he mentions 
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'good-nature', 'gentleness', 'flexibility' and 'apparent cheerfulness'. 
Gregory is surely correct in this. There is more to the humane attitude 
than what is narrowly ethical. Thirdly, Gregory does also see the 
importance of a framework of ethical rules or principles (as they would 
now be called). In 2.7 I stressed the important rule that doctors must 
obtain informed consent for treatments. Gregory mentions others. He 
writes: 
'A physician, by the nature of his profession, has many 
opportunities of knowing the private characters and concerns of the 
families in which he is employed. Besides what he may learn from 
his own observation, he is often admitted to the confidence of 
those, who perhaps think they owe their life to his care. He sees 
people in the most disadvantageous circumstances, very different 
from those in which the world views them; - oppressed with pain, 
sickness, and low spirits. In these humiliating situations, instead of 
wonted cheerfulness, evenness of temper, and vigour of mind, he 
meets with peevishness, impatience, and timidity. Hence it appears 
how much the characters of individuals, and the credit of families 
may sometimes depend on the discretion, secrecy, and honour of a 
physician. Secrecy is particularly requisite where women are 
concerned. Independent of the peculiar tenderness with which a 
woman's character should be treated, there are certain 
circumstances of health, which, though in no respect connected 
with her reputation, every woman, from the natural delicacy of her 
sex, is anxious to conceal; and, in some cases, the concealment of 
these circumstances may be of consequence to her health, her 
interest, and to her happiness. ' 106 
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Here he is concerned with the rule of keeping confidentiality which, of 
course, goes back to the Hippocratic Oath. He clearly distinguishes the 
deontological or imperatival nature of the rule from the more flexible 
display of the humane attitude. As he says: 
'Independent of the peculiar tenderness with which a woman's 
character should be treated ...... there are certain circumstances of 
health ...... every woman..... is anxious to conceal... '. 
In sum, then, there is much to be said in favour of retaining Gregory's 
distinction between the 'genius' of the profession and its 'humanity'. 
Under the first heading we can place the scientific evidence base, the 
clinical and the communications skills I have claimed are essential to 
the good doctor, and under the second heading we can include moral 
and non-moral virtues plus the narrower sphere of ethical principles. 
The doctor who has both sets of qualities can adapt the evidence-base 
of medicine to the clinical situation. 
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3.5 MEDICAL AFFECTATION 
There is a danger to which any doctor writing about the nature of 
medical practice may succumb, and that is offering an elevated account 
of it which is easy for outsiders to ridicule. Once again, Gregory is 
aware of the danger. He writes: 
'Physicians, considered as a body of men, who live by medicine as a 
profession, have an interest separate and distinct from the honour 
of the science. In pursuit of this interest, some have acted with 
candour, with honour, with the ingenious and liberal manners of 
gentlemen. Conspicuous of their own worth, they disdained every 
artifice, and depended for success on their real merit. But such 
men are not the most numerous in any profession. Some impelled 
by necessity, some stimulated by vanity, and others anxious to 
conceal ignorance. have had recourse to various mean and 
unworthy acts to raise their importance among the ignorant, who 
are always the most numerous part of mankind. Some of these arts 
have been an affectation of mystery in all their writings and 
conversations relating to their profession; an affectation of 
knowledge, inscrutable to all, except the adepts in the science; an 
air of perfect confidence in their own skill and abilities; and a 
demeanour solemn, contemptuous, and highly expressive of self- 
sufficiency. These arts, however well they might succeed with the 
rest of mankind, could not escape the censure of the more judicious, 
nor elude the ridicule of men of wit and humour. The stage, in 
particular, has used freedom with the professors of the salutary art; 
but it is evident, that most of the satire is levelled against the 
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particular notions, or manners of individuals, and not against the 
science itself. '107 
One manifestation of the 'affectation of mystery' which is currently 
apparent is the obsession with 'core values' which has gripped medical 
schools. The matter is sufficiently a threat to a truly humane attitude 
to be worth examining in some detail. The problem has arisen because 
doctors have recently been grappling with their changing role in 
society. To this end the first summit meeting of the profession since 
1961108 was held in November 1993 and its consultation document 
'Core Values for the Medical Profession in the 21st Century'109 was 
produced. This document is sufficiently important to merit 
considerable reflection and comment. 
In addressing the issue of core values doctors have been responding to 
influences inside and outside the profession. Within the profession 
there has been evidence of low morale, dissatisfaction with work and 
fear of litigation. This has largely been brought about by political and 
social changes outside medicine. The idealism which still exists in the 
profession has been undermined by the introduction by the 
government of a market-place within the NHS. This has encouraged 
some doctors to see money as their main motivating force and has 
alienated others. In addition, after almost fifty years of 'free' health 
care patients' expectations have risen and high quality health care is 
now seen as a right110 not as something to be accepted with gratitude. 
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The profession has responded to these forces recently in three main 
ways. Firstly, it has begun a radical rethink of the education of future 
doctors111 and some hitherto fiercely conservative medical curricula 
are being swept aside in favour of a new structure incorporating 
problem-based learning theory and self-directed study112. (I shall 
discuss this in chapter 5. ) Secondly, doctors have begun to look more 
carefully at what they actually do and at the evidence for doing it, and 
clinical audit and evidence-based medicine113 are becoming the buzz 
ideas of the time. Thirdly, there has been an attempt to look more 
philosophically at what being a doctor means in today's society and at 
what the profession stands for. It was this third area that the summit 
was convened to address although any convincing answer to it would 
have to incorporate a consideration of issues one and two. 
The main weakness in the document stems from the question that the 
conference set itself: 'What are the core values for the Medical 
Profession in the 21st century? '. This has encouraged the production of 
a list of good activities and attributes which might be associated with 
the practice of medicine but are not inherent to it or defining of it. A 
better question might have been 'What is the good doctor good at? '114 
thus rooting the question firmly in what a doctor does. An example of 
the vagueness attached to the document's broad central question is the 
list of 'basic and ancient virtues' which are given as 'commitment, 
caring, compassion, integrity, competence, spirit of enquiry, 
confidentiality, responsibility and advocacy'. These read like a list of 
good things which, we might hope, would be associated with any 
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upright citizen of the land, not just a member of the medical 
profession. 
Indeed, there is another serious disadvantage attached to the 
document's moralistic use of terms such as 'virtues' and 'values'. These 
terms (largely used in logically incorrect ways) give the impression of 
an attempt to retain the high moral ground which, as we shall see, has 
been the basis for the damaging gap between doctors' and patients' 
expectations. The final list of eleven'core values' suffers from the same 
fault as the 'ancient virtues'; it is non-specific and moralistic. 
Startlingly absent is any clear statement of exactly what a doctor's 
responsibility to his patients is. Any discussion of core values in 
medicine at the present time should surely start with the question of 
what this responsibility amounts to and what its boundaries are. The 
doctor cannot be all things to all men. The therapeutic relationship 
between doctor and patient involves responsibilities on both sides. 
The doctor cannot take the tablets or stop smoking for the patient and 
if the patient decides not to carry out the doctor's advice it may be 
because he does not value health as highly as other priorities in his life. 
Doctors must accept this. 
Why does the profession so readily adopt the moral high ground, and 
why, indeed, is it encouraged in this by the public? The answer 
is 
partly ethical and partly historical. Ethically, regard for the profession 
and its members has arisen out of the need for patients to look up to 
those who have such power over them in the form of medical 
knowledge and skill and who also have their tacit approval to perform 
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intimate examinations in the exercise of this skill. Historically, this 
aura surrounding medicine has its origins in the rising status of 
medicine in the nineteenth century115. Moreover, it has recently 
strengthened because doctors are very successful self-publicists. 
Medicine, it seems, now has an answer to all of life's problems. If you 
are unhappy take prozac; if you are bereaved go to your GP because 
he's now trained in bereavement counselling; if you want a baby at the 
age of sixty there is even a doctor who will help you with that. It is 
now common practice for a GP to be summoned on an emergency visit 
to help with some family crisis which has suddenly blown up and will 
just as suddenly blow down. This image is not just to do with what 
doctors know and do as this is quickly superseded by new knowledge 
(it has been said that medical knowledge has a half-life of five 
years116). Clearly, patients require of their doctors that they treat 
illness but they now expect more. Doctors are seen as the responsible 
members of a community to whom people might go for marital advice, 
job references or for the signing of passport photographs. They are 
expected, therefore, to be honest and trustworthy. Great doctors 
attract great 'lay' honours; presidents of the main medical colleges 
usually collect knighthoods. Conversely, if a doctor behaves badly in 
his personal life the public can be very censorious1 7; 'bad' doctors are 
seen as in some way destabilising society and the public will come 
down very hard on them. 
Do doctors want to perpetuate this situation? If so, it will mean an 
ever increasing extension of the role of medicine such that eventually it 
will become so diffuse as to be almost meaningless. The recent 
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controversy over night work in General Practice is an example of this 
stretching of the role of the doctor to breaking point118. In terms of 
medical education, the current hope is to reduce the number of 
different areas of study a student has to master. But if we are to 
contemplate an extended role for medicine there would need to be 
room, in effect, to squeeze in a social work course, not to mention the 
mastery of alternative medical therapies. It seems more realistic for 
doctors to stick to practising medicine. And to stress the importance of 
developing the idea of evidence-based medicine is quite compatible 
with simultaneously stressing that medicine should be practised in a 
humane and compassionate manner. Being humane and 
compassionate, indeed having the 'basic and ancient virtues', may 
govern the manner of medical practice, but the content must rest on the 
bedrock of evidence-based medicine. 
Of course, the profession has only deduced from patients' demands 
that they might wish an extended role from their doctors. We have not 
really asked them what they think. The 'Core Values' summit missed a 
great opportunity by not consulting the public for their views. It may 
be that the document was designed to stimulate debate inside and 
outside the profession but with such a navel-gazing start this is 
extremely unlikely. In view of the fact that the stimulus for the debate 
came largely from the changing relationship between doctors and 
patients the latter should have been included at the defining stage. In 
addition, it seems incredible that nurses and other members of the 
health-care team were not invited to contribute. Nurses in particular 
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often have a clearer view of what it is that patients have found wanting 
in their doctors and their contribution is essential. 
The sad truth is that while the medical profession still has a respected 
place in society, and many doctors wish to give it an extended role, 
medicine is not a panacea. Paradoxically, it is the respect which the 
profession enjoys, and the fanning of patients' expectations through 
the patients' charter, which is now leading to an erosion of its position. 
For medicine will not always work. Yes, medicine is magic when it 
comes to transplanting hearts, treating diabetes or even controlling 
blood pressure and reducing the risk of stroke. But when it comes to 
helping with the problems of daily living, doctors are no better than 
the next person and they have no greater expertise. Patients will come 
down hard on doctors when the magic is seen to fail, especially if 
patients are expected to defer to the purveyor of that magic as 
someone who represents trustworthiness, integrity and stability in 
their world. It is this gap between expectation and reality that the 
'Core Values' document should have addressed. That it failed to do so 
is one of the reasons it has not succeeded in galvanising the profession. 
If the profession continues to search within itself for definition it will 
fail. Certainly, the stimulus for debate on this issue has come partly 
from doctors who have held themselves up to be a kind of 'Everyman' 
doctor -a paragon of all the virtues, medical and personal. But just as 
important are the expectations of patients who have responded in the 
past to doctors' overweening self-publicity by expecting more and 
more perfect health care. It is time that doctors stepped down from 
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the pedestal and got together with patients and other health 
professionals to tell it the way it is: doctors can't please all of the people 
all of the time, and sometimes they will fail. 
Finally, at the risk of lowering the high moral tone of the 'Core Values' 
document, it should be remembered that most doctors have (and ought 
to have) commitments to other things outside medicine like family119 
or even leisure activities. It should not be considered morally 
reprehensible if doctors as persons value these things as much, or even 
more, than their profession. Thus, while the ethical, and more 
generally the humane, aspects of medical practice are of the first 
importance, it is also important for doctors to keep a sense of 
proportion about themselves and their wider role in society. Other 
occupations, from plumbers to philosophers, have a role and they too 
have their own values and humanity. 
I have so far analysed the humane judgement of the good doctor into 
several components. I have tried to show that the good doctor is 
involved in the process of interpretation and has ethical sensitivity, 
both of which involve different kinds of understanding. I must now 
turn to the final component of humane judgement, namely, insight. 
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3.6 THE INSIGHTFUL DOCTOR 
I have used the term 'insight' as an umbrella term to cover some of the 
various non-evidence-based judgements of the doctor. In 
consolidating this account of the humane doctor - the one who has the 
qualities necessary to adapt the evidence-base of medicine to the 
particular patient -I shall analyse the idea of 'insight' and claim that 
the humane doctor makes insightful judgements. It will be part of the 
task of chapter 5 to consider how far the education of the doctor can 
cultivate the capacity for insightful judgements. 
3.6.1 What is insight? 
There are two main ways of looking at this concept. Firstly, an insight 
may be thought of as a perception which comes to someone suddenly - 
'a flash of insight' - and leads to a deeper understanding of something. 
Secondly, insightfulness can be seen as a tendency in a person to be 
able to see under the surface of something to its deeper meaning. I 
wish to consider these two aspects of the concept in turn. 
3.6.2 The flash of insight 
Most of us will at some time have experienced this sudden flash of 
insight when a problem we have perhaps been thinking over for a 
while suddenly becomes clear. These sudden leaps in understanding 
are not usually the product of hard, concentrated puzzling over the 
subject; they often occur when we do not expect them, as Beveridge 
writes: 
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'These sudden, large progressions occur not uncommonly when 
one is not thinking of anything in particular, or even when one is 
mildly occupied with something different, and in these 
circumstances they are often startling. ' 120 
Koestler calls these progressions the'eureka process'121 after the story 
of Archimedes with his crown in the bath. Beveridge also quotes from 
the descriptions of scientists whose ground-breaking discoveries have 
flashed upon them at unexpected moments. The theory of 
evolutionary change came to A. R. Wallace as he lay ill with fever in 
1858 and was re-reading Malthus' Principles of Population. In this 
essay Malthus described the checks on human population increase and 
mentioned that these checks tended to eliminate the least fit. Wallace's 
mind started to ponder over a similar situation in the animal world: 
'Vaguely thinking over the enormous and constant destruction this 
implied, it then occurred to me to ask the question, "Why do some 
die and some live? " and the answer was clearly that on the whole 
the best fitted live... Then it suddenly flashed upon me that this self- 
acting process would improve the race.. . the 
fittest would survive. 
Then at once I seemed to see the whole effect of this. ' 122 
These examples suggest that this kind of insight is the product of a 
mind primed and prepared for understanding after a process of 
striving for an answer. The answer then comes in a sudden flash often 
at a time when the mind is focusing on something else and the flash is 
accompanied by a rush of emotional excitement at the discovery of 
new ideas. These accounts relate largely to the creative work of 
scientists discovering new truths about the world, but is this kind of 
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insight applicable to a more everyday situation such as the discoveries 
of a school pupil? 
If we consider the elements of this kind of insight - the mind primed to 
receive understanding, the sudden flash, and the excitement associated 
with grasping new knowledge - they are all present in the case of the 
school pupil. It may not be the case that all new understanding comes 
about in this way but a schoolchild may experience this if - in the same 
way as the scientist - he has grappled with the problem of 
understanding something for a while. Unlike the scientist, the pupil's 
flash of insight is not a creative one in that the understanding it 
produces in him is not new understanding for others, just for him. The 
'eureka process', therefore can be seen as a subset of this kind of insight 
in that it is creative and leads to new knowledge. 
I will return to the question of how such sudden flashes of insight 
come about later (3.6.4) after discussing the second kind of insight we 
commonly experience, which I will call 'insightfulness'. 
3.6.3 Insightfulness 
By this I mean the tendency of a person to be able to perceive a deeper 
meaning under the surface of things. When we describe someone as 
'insightful' we regard them as sensitive, perceptive and alert to the 
unexpressed emotions behind what someone says. The insightful 
person has highly tuned antennae for the unstated and is alert to 
nuances of meaning which others might miss. Those who experience 
the kinds of insights I have just discussed may well be insightful 
in this 
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sense, but not necessarily so. Most of us will at some time experience 
sudden clicks of understanding but not all of us will be perceptive in 
the way that brings instinctive knowledge of something or - more 
usually - someone. In the clinical situation, I would be insightful if I 
realised that the patient in front of me really wanted to talk about her 
concerns about her daughter's drug use rather than the back pain she 
has officially presented with. 
Insight or insightfulness concerns the process of understanding and is 
not meant to suggest that what is understood is of a fundamental 
nature. Detectives can have insights about their cases and doctors can 
be insightful in their dealings with their patients, as in the above 
example. This does not mean that they come across fundamental 
truths about their cases or patients, just that they approach the 
evidence or person in front of them in a sensitive and perceptive way; 
and that they are alert for any clues, whether these come via their 
reason, senses or instinct. Insightfulness is one reservoir which 
supplies sound judgement. 
3.6.4 How does insight come about? 
In this section I wish to look at two similar theories of how insights 
come about. Firstly, I will look at the Gestalt theory of thought and 
secondly, describe Arthur Koestler's work on 'bisociative' processes. 
(a) The Gestalt theory of thought 
This theory was developed in the early part of this century 
in 
opposition to the atomistic theory of perception developed 
by the 
137 
British empiricists. Their contention was that thoughts could be 
separated out into their constitutive parts (atoms) and coexist with 
other thoughts without being changed by them. According to Gestalt 
theoryl23 thinking is a unitary process, not divisible into constituent 
parts, and each thought process is unique because of the particular 
circumstances involved. A thought starts with a stimulation from a 
particular situation and certain stresses are set up because of this 
perception which leads to a re-ordering of the initial perception. This 
is known as 'seeing the problem' or 'formulating the problem', and 
from this thought process the solution appears. The idea is of a 
seamless process whereby the stresses inherent to the problem are seen 
as bringing about its resolution. 
An example of this process is given by both Kohler and Koffka124 in 
the form of a detour experiment. A little girl of just over one year, and 
just able to walk unaided, is set within a low sided blind alley. An 
attractive object is placed on the other side of the partition so that she 
can see it but not reach it. She pushes against the partition in an 
attempt to get at the object but fails. She then looks around at the alley 
and begins to laugh with joy as she runs out of it, round the corner of 
the partition to get the object. In terms of Gestalt theory, the little girl's 
initial perception of the alley is as a problem preventing her from 
reaching what she wants. As she considers the problem it is suddenly 
seen in a new light : as the passageway leading to the object and the 
solution to the problem. 
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The sudden realisation was described by Kohler as 'insight'. In Gestalt 
theory this meant the process of change in the perceptual structure of 
something because it is perceived in the light of something else. In this 
case, the blind alley, when perceived in relation to the desired object, 
becomes a passageway to the object. Humphrey clarifies the Gestalt 
position on insight in this way: 
' It is not, according to the contemporary Gestalt theory, that insight 
effects the reorganisation of the problem-as-seen. It is, rather, that 
the reorganisation is effected under stress of the contradictions, 
opposing features, intrinsic in the problem, and that Insight is the 
name given to the characteristic experience. ' 125 
Thus, insight is seen as the process of understanding something by 
reorganising your perception of it : often by seeing it in a different 
light. 
(b) Bisociation 
Arthur Koestler would describe the above thought process as 
'bisociative' 126 and distinguishes it from the more mundane 
'associative' process. 'Associative' thought processes are, simply, the 
processes by which one idea leads to another. Such processes are 
habitual, mechanical and, repetitive and do not demand concentration 
in the thinker. The thoughts by association with each other are not 
changed but remain as they are. No new thoughts are created and the 
patterns can be used again and again. Examples of such thinking 
might be that required to drive a car or ride a bike. Humphrey quotes 
Adamson's description of associative thinking where he 
draws 
parallels with the theory of atomism : 
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'Carried to its full extent, this conception might fairly be called that 
of physical atomism ; for on the whole in its two fundamental 
features it presents a strong resemblance to the physical doctrine of 
atoms : in the first place the elements are simple and retain their 
original character; and in the second place the combination which 
occurs among them is represented as being of the general nature 
called mechanical. ' 127 
'Bisociative' thinking, by contrast, is creative and changes the thoughts 
involved into a new thought because of their dual association. 
Koestler describes Bisociation as a 
'term referring to any mental occurrence simultaneously associated 
with two habitually incompatible contexts. 1128 
He goes on to clarify this by pointing out that bisociation is not the 
same thing as double meaning, as double meaning occurs when the 
two meanings exist side by side in the some context. In bisociation, the 
words or thoughts coexist in their separate contexts at the same time. 
It might be difficult to imagine giving our attention to two 
independent subjects or two separate contexts at the same time but 
Koestler says that this comes about by thought 'oscillating' the 
bisociated concept between its two contexts. In this way the concept is 
consciously present in both contexts at the same time. 
It appears obvious that once the bisociative process has occurred and 
two previously independent concepts are linked they then cease to be 
independent. A revolutionary discovery is only revolutionary once; a 
joke is only effective the first time it is told. Such thoughts will, 
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therefore, become associative as the separateness of the original 
thoughts begins to wear away and the connection becomes obliterated 
into a single smooth process. 
One of the most important aspects of Koestler's description of this 
process is that he relates it both to scientific discovery and to the way 
in which works of art and humour are perceived by us129. He takes the 
example of puns to illustrate bisociation at work : 
'One of the courtiers of Louis XV, well known for his wit, boasted 
that he could make a pun on any subject. "Then make one on me, " 
said Louis. "The king is not a subject, Sire, " replied the courtier. ' 
And again, taking some examples from Freud, 
'Two Jews met in a bathing establishment. "Have you taken a 
bath? " asked one. "Why? " replied the other. "Is one missing? " '130 
The first example illustrates well the idea of thought 'oscillating' 
between the two different contexts. We have to hold both 'subject', as 
the subject of a joke, and 'subject' as the subject of a monarch, in our 
mind at once to appreciate the pun. 
Koestler also points out that the process of metaphor in poetry or prose 
also involves bisociation131. The first lines of Shakespeare's Sonnet 33 
illustrate this: 
'Full many a golden morning I have seen 
Flatter the mountain tops with sovereign eye' 132 
The idea of flattery is not usually applied to sunshine touching the 
mountain tops and making then glow and so we are brought up short 
by the bisociation of flattery as obsequiousness and flattery as sunlight. 
141 
The metaphor is fundamental to the whole poem as the 'golden 
morning' is compared to a lover who flatters the poet with her 
presence. just as the flattering morning can withdraw its sunny touch 
and bestow dark clouds, so the lover can withdraw from the poet 
leaving him in darkness. 
In a chapter entitled The Eureka Process' 133 Koestler attempts to draw 
parallels between the 'wit' of puns and witticisms and the 'wit' of 
creative ingenuity, as in scientific discovery. He says that the main 
part of our enjoyment of puns is of intellectual satisfaction - that we are 
clever enough to appreciate the bisociative process and perform it in 
our own minds. If we return to some of the examples of scientific 
discovery through insights that I referred to earlier in this section - 
Archimedes and the crown and Wallace and natural selection - these 
occurred in minds primed with an intellectual stress -a desire to 
discover the truth about what they were studying. It is under this 
stress that the bisociation occurs, or, in terms of Gestalt psychology, 
that the process of insight occurs, and brings about a solution to the 
problem and, thus, intellectual satisfaction. In Archimedes' case the 
bisociation or insight connected the displacement of water in his bath 
by the volume of his own body with the problem of measuring the 
volume of the crown. In the case of Wallace, the bisociative or 
insightful flash occurred when his mind wandered onto an essay 
which he had read years before and which suddenly connected with 
the problem he was trying to work out. 
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According to these two approaches to the way in which insights come 
about there is a conjunction between two hitherto unconnected 
concepts or thoughts. This may occur in situations of intellectual 
stress, where the person has been thinking about the problem for a 
while (as in the case of the scientists), or when someone is faced with 
an immediate puzzle and requires creative thought to solve it (as in the 
case of the little girl in the blind alley). When the conjunction occurs, 
the thoughts or concepts change to become a single new one and a 
creative process has occurred. In the clinic, the doctor might be faced 
with the diagnostic puzzle of an elderly man who is just complaining 
of being a little tired. On further questioning, the doctor finds that his 
patient has recently lost weight and, on examining him, that he has the 
clinical sign of finger clubbing. These two apparently unconnected 
signs of weight loss and swollen fingers will combine in the doctor's 
mind and lead him to consider the diagnosis of lung cancer. The 
insight involved in this process of putting together apparently 
unassociated signs and symptoms in order to reach a possible 
diagnosis is a major part of the good doctor's task and requires both 
technical knowledge and skills as well as a humane and sensitive 
approach to what the patient is saying. 
3.6.5 How does insight relate to understanding? 
This seems a less obvious question to ask than 'How does explanation 
relate to understanding? '. As I have already discussed (3.3.2) 
explanation relates to understanding in that it creates understanding in 
the hearer. It does not seem correct to say that insight does the same 
thing although, as we have seen, insight can be seen as a process which 
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brings together two unconnected thoughts to create a new thought. 
Insight seems to have a closer connection with understanding in that 
we can say that insight is a kind of understanding. This then raises the 
question of what kind of understanding it is. Are all cases of insight 
re-describable as cases of understanding? 
In answering this question it is helpful to recall the connection which 
exists between interpretation and understanding. I discussing that 
connection (2.6.1) I maintained that we can say either that 
interpretation leads to understanding or just is understanding in a 
context of puzzlement. The same is true of insight. Insight, or the 
bringing together of two apparently unconnected thoughts or 
perceptions, can be seen as leading to understanding or as constituting 
one mode of it. 
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3.7 HUMANE JUDGEMENT AND THE HUMANE ATTITUDE 
I have suggested that the concepts of interpretation and insight lead to, 
or constitute, understanding. It is not that there are two conceptual 
layers here: there is one conceptual layer which is describable in 
different language in different contexts. It is this understanding which 
is the basis for humane judgement. 
Ethical sensitivity is also involved in humane judgement, but in a 
different way. It governs judgement rather than constitutes its basis. 
But for simplicity, I shall regard all three as the components of humane 
judgement, which in turn is an expression of the attitude of the 
humane doctor (see diagrammatic summary p. vi). 
It might be objected that I have too many conceptual layers here; that if 
I speak of humane judgement I do not also need to speak of a humane 
attitude. This objection can be answered by drawing the distinction 
between a disposition and episodes in which it is expressed. For 
example, someone may have a courageous disposition and this will be 
shown in courageous actions. In a similar way, I wish to maintain that 
the humane attitude is shown in humane judgement. There are not 
really two different things here, but one thing described in different 
contexts. 
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3.8 CONCLUSIONS 
1) The good doctor has both 'genius' or scientific knowledge and skills 
and communication skills, and 'humanity'. 
2) The doctor's 'humanity' is wider than what is usually considered 
'ethical', although the latter is included. 
3) It is important that doctors do not exaggerate the importance of 
their role in society. 
4) 'Insight' or 'being insightful' are complex ideas which are none-the- 
less integral to the clinical situation. 
5) Being insightful can be added to the ability to interpret, as forms of 
understanding. 
6) If we add ethical sensitivity to the above we have the essential 
components of humane judgement, which is an expression of the 
humane attitude. 
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CHAPTER 4 
THE PUBLIC DOMAIN 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
I have so far concentrated on the complex ways in which the evidence 
base of medicine is modified in clinical practice. Thus patient 
anecdotes and patient consent or refusal of given treatments affect the 
options available in a clinical situation. Moreover, the doctor's 
scientific attitude is modified by his ability to interpret and to have 
insights about the individual patient. But, as distinct from clinical 
practice, there is another domain of medicine with its own distinctive 
evidence-base and its own need for judgements of a different sort - this 
is the domain of public health medicine, formerly called 'community 
medicine'. 
The domain of public health medicine is an important one. Indeed, it 
is widely recognised that the huge improvements in the health and 
longevity of the Europeans and North Americans this century are 
much more due to improvements brought about by public health 
medicine than they are by clinical medicine. The contemporary 
emphasis on expensive, high-tech medicine has in fact affected the 
general health in only marginal ways. In discussing the evidence-base 
of public health medicine separately from that of clinical medicine, 
therefore, I am not to be taken as seeing it as an unimportant appendix 
to clinical medicine (although Government expenditure in the area 
seemed to endorse the 'unimportant appendix' point of view); rather I 
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am discussing it separately because of the different way in which the 
insights affect the evidence. I shall begin by considering the nature of 
public health medicine. 
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4.2 PUBLIC HEALTH MEDICINE AND ITS EVIDENCE-BASE 
Let us begin by accepting the World Health Organisation (WHO) 
definition of the term 'public health'134, used also in the UK in the 
Acheson report: 
'Public health is the science and art of preventing disease, 
prolonging life and promoting health through organised efforts of 
society. '135 
This definition suggests that evidence problems can arise in public 
health over preventing disease and promoting health. 'Prolonging life', 
if it is not achieved by preventing disease or promoting health, is a 
matter for clinical medicine and will not be discussed separately in this 
chapter. Issues may also arise over 'the organised efforts of society' 
and over what it means to say that public health is both a science and 
an art. I shall conduct my discussion, then, under these headings and 
try to encompass a representative selection of issues, including some 
with international implications. 
But let us first examine the evidence-base of public health medicine. It 
will quickly emerge why policies based on that evidence rely more on 
insight and judgement than do judgements in clinical practice. In 
particular, moral and political considerations are of the first 
importance in shaping the evidence on which public health medicine is 
based. 
Public health medicine is based on the science of epidemiology, which 
many public health specialists see as the ultimate triumph of evidence- 
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based medicine. But epidemiology is a difficult and uncertain 
discipline. It is thought to be justified in the public arena as a source of 
objective information for all those who have vested interests in 
outcomes and natural histories of diseases and their treatments. Yet 
the language of its science is neither easy to approach nor easy to 
understand, and its findings are couched often in terms which seem 
equivocal. Risks and benefits are qualified and couched in 
probabilistic terms. Nevertheless, these conclusions are to be used to 
define 'best practice', cost benefit algorithms, 'right action', informed 
consent or choice, political choice and action, community health 
decisions and even health advocacy programmes. The conclusions are 
drawn from numerical data, and gain their status from the status 
accorded to objective data. 
Yet many of its practitioners are uneasy about the way that 
epidemiology is conceived, practised and used. In a mock indictment 
of the science, Shy has attempted to restate the mission of 
epidemiology: 
'By essentially assuming that risk factors for disease in individuals 
can be summed to understand the causes of disease in populations, 
academic epidemiology has limited itself to a narrow biomedical 
perspective, thereby committing the biomedical fallacy of inferring 
that disease in populations can be understood by studying risk 
factors for disease in individuals. Epidemiology should be 
redefined as a study of the distribution and societal determinants of 
the health of populations. This definition provided a stronger 
link 
to the primary mission of public health and places an appropriate 
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emphasis on the social, economic, environmental and cultural 
determinants of population health. '136 
Like all components of the health endeavour, epidemiology is 
inescapably moral in all its purposes. Because it intends to guide 
health care decisions at many levels, epidemiology shares the moral 
purpose of all health related activity. It seeks to determine what it is 
best for health care workers to do, where 'best' is in some way defined 
by societal values assigned to the primary good of health. By helping 
to determine 'best practice', epidemiology clearly asserts its vision of 
itself as one of the most important ways of bringing a computational 
dimension to the essential morality of public policy. Therein lies both 
its strength and its weakness, for it must, by its very nature, operate in 
an uneasy hinterland between the plains of objective evaluation and 
the poorly charted mountains of community values. This is the core of 
the problem to be examined in this chapter, the problem of assigning 
meaning to epidemiological studies. 
I shall examine the various ways in which the evidence-base of the 
sub-divisions of public health medicine (as defined by the WHO) are 
affected by the insights, especially the moral and political insights, of 
those using epidemiological studies. To bring out this connection 
between epidemiology and ethical judgement, I shall quote at some 
length the opening section of the chapter by Calman and Downie 
in 
The Oxford Textbook of Public Health 137. This brings out the complex 
way in which figures are inextricably bound up with the authors' 
ethical judgements. In other words, the allegedly neutral, objective 
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evidence of epidemiology can be meaningful if but only if it is part of a 
moral framework. The authors wrote as follows: 
' Levels of health, measured in almost any way vary considerably 
from country to country. The collection of accurate statistics and 
their analysis is the responsibility of the WHO and other 
international organisations. They show the extent of the problems; 
for example: 
16 million adults with HIV infection by the year 2000 
8 million clinical cases of tuberculosis each year -a third of he 
world's population infected 
300 million people with mental illness 
2 million deaths from malaria, 270 - 450 million cases 
300 million Hepatitis B cases 
250 million cases of sexually transmitted diseases. 
In the UK the infant mortality figures for 1991 were 7 per 1000 live 
births. In other countries figures in the same year of 140 to 160 
deaths per 1000 live births were recorded. Life expectancy at birth 
varies for almost 80 in the richest to around 40 years in the poorest 
countries. These are huge variations and the economic cost of this 
burden of disease, ill health and disability, is considerable. In 1991 
the USA spent 2800 dollars per person on medical care, compared 
with 2-40 dollars per capita in the poorest countries. 
As developing countries progress, and health and lifespan improve, 
the problems of ageing populations become clearer. Changes in 
lifestyles which are occurring increase the chances of coronary 
heart disease, and increases in smoking increase the chances of 
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developing lung cancer and other smoking related diseases. Thus 
the health problems faced now by the developed countries are 
likely to be those of the future for the developing ones. The 
increasing urbanisation of the population can only increase the 
problems listed above unless there is a planned way of ensuring 
that effective public health policies are introduced. The rise in the 
elderly population is occurring worldwide. 
Turning now more specially to Europe we find that over the last 
few years a considerable amount of data has been collected on 
health in Europe. The information used here comes from the 
Report by WHO Regional Office in 1994. The European Region 
ranges from Portugal to Russia, from Iceland to Turkey, and 
includes the countries of Central and Eastern Europe (CCEE) and 
the Newly Independent States (NIS) such as Kazakistan, Belarus 
and the Baltic States. The number of countries in the European 
Region of WHO has risen from 31 to 50 in the last few years. 
Certain general factors are relevant. In 1992, no less than 8 
countries were affected by war, with the consequences of conflict 
such as violent death, disruption of he infrastructure and 
migrations of several million people. In countries of eastern Europe 
in particular, there has been an economic recession which has had a 
major impact on health statistics. The migration of large numbers 
of the population has been associated with poverty, homelessness, 
and poor living conditions. Violence has always been obvious 
in 
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many countries. What have been the implications of these changes 
on the health of he people of Europe? 
Life expectancy in the countries of the European Union continues to 
rise and is around 72 for males on average. This is in contrast to a 
number of countries in the NIS in which life expectancy has 
actually fallen. While this is a crude indicator of health it 
demonstrates how rapidly changes in social, economic and 
environmental circumstances can have an effect. Infant mortality in 
Europe ranges from 5- 10 per 1000 live births in most Nordic and 
western European countries, to over 40 in come central Asian 
Republics. Generally the figures show an improvement, but in 
some CCEE and NIS countries there has been a slight increase. 
Maternal mortality is similarly distributed, and is again declining 
overall. 
There are considerable variations in cardiovascular mortality across 
the Region. What is particularly disturbing is that between 1985 
and 1992, while many countries showed a decline in mortality (the 
UK by 5 deaths per 100,000), others showed considerable increase. 
the lessons of prevention will need to be learned all over again in 
the CCEE and NIS. In a similar way, age standardised death rates 
from cancer in the 0- 64 age group are decreasing the EU and 
Nordic countries but increasing in the CCEE and NIS. Higher 
smoking rates explain some of these figures. 
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Communicable diseases remain a major health problem. Polio, 
diphtheria and cholera all have seen a resurgence. Immunisation 
rates are generally high but in the NIS protection against, for 
example, diphtheria is inadequate. The health service 
infrastructure in some countries is such that it is difficult to 
implement vaccination programmes. Tuberculosis is increasing, 
partly due to migration of very large numbers of people. By August 
1994, there has been a cumulative total of 116,000 cased of AIDS 
reported in the Region. Encouragingly, the annual incidence shows 
signs of slowing down thanks to the huge preventive efforts over 
the last 10 years. 
Turning to women's health we find that maternal mortality in high 
where abortion remains the principal method of contraception. 
there is also concern about the cigarette smoking rates in women, 
and the mortality of women from lung cancer continues to rise. 
Finally in this snapshot of figures, the number of elderly people in 
the Region continues to rise and they are a particularly vulnerable 
group. Mental health problems are also a cause for concern. 
The picture, therefore, is a mixture of good news and bad news, 
with substantial lessons to be learned. Many of these lessons are 
ethical, and it is to these that we now turn. The next section will 
give an account of the main principles and concepts in terms of 
which health care ethics is discussed, and will related some of the 
health data just introduced to these principles. ' 
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This extensive quote is, of course, interesting in its own right, but for 
my purposes it brings out clearly that numerical evidence and 
judgement make up a 'seamless garment'. For example, the following 
are a few of the phrases in which fact and judgement are married: 
'burden of disease', 'poverty, homelessness, and poor housing 
conditions', 'violence', 'the figures show an improvement', 'protection 
against diphtheria is inadequate', 'there is also concern that... ', 
'vulnerable group', 'a mixture of good news and bad news'. The 
authors are indeed explicit that many of the lessons are ethical. The 
point I wish to make, however, is not the obvious one that, granted the 
figures, we can make ethical judgements. My point is that the very 
selection and compilation of these figures, as distinct from other 
figures, indicated a prior ethical judgement. The decision to carry out 
epidemiological studies in certain areas and to compare the figures 
compiled with other areas of the world or with other historical periods 
is itself an ethical decision. The 'evidence' is there because the ethical 
insight has first been there. 
Epidemiologists are sometimes blinded to the evaluative nature of 
their discipline by their use of the term 'health inequality'. Thus, many 
of the epidemiological studies behind the Calman and Downie extract 
would be regarded and taught as 'health inequalities', as if all of them 
were inequalities of sizes of mountain. In other words, 
epidemiological studies frequently blur the differences between 
equality or inequality on the one hand and equity or inequity on the 
other. Let us examine this distinction in the context of public health. 
156 
The distinction can best be described by looking at those factors which 
can influence health and health care. It is possible to divide 
inequalities into those which are unavoidable, and hence where 
questions of equity do not arise, and those which might be avoided 
and thus raise issues of equity. Let us look at some examples138. In 
discussing the examples we must always remember that what is 
'unavoidable' at one point in history becomes 'avoidable' at another. 
First, natural or biological variations such as age, sex, and race and 
genetic background could be considered as factors which cannot be 
changed and thus any inequalities related to them are unavoidable. 
For example, older men have a higher incidence of heart disease than 
younger men, a clear example of an inequality. But no one would 
consider this related to inequity, except to the extent that we have 
neglected risk factor reduction in the elderly139. 
Secondly, lifestyle and behaviour, if freely chosen, can result in 
inequalities in health. As an example, cigarette smokers have a higher 
incidence of lung cancer than non-smokers. This is an inequality, but 
to the extent that it is created by choice, it is not inequitable. Indeed, 
selective uptake of health promotional initiatives, for example, by 
middle class groups, could even increase inequalities in health, but 
could not be considered as unfair, unless it could be established that 
health promotion is selectively targeted on these groups. 
Thirdly, lifestyle and behaviour, if not freely chosen, and which results 
in poor health, is likely to be considered as avoidable by society and 
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thus unfair. A behaviour chosen through a lack of resources, housing 
conditions, overcrowding, dangerous working conditions, exposure to 
environmental hazards, or lack of adequate public health response, 
would be an example of this. Disabled people often suffer unfairness 
(inequity) which compounds their already unequal health. 
Fourthly, inadequate access to health care or other public services 
might be inequitable if the cause were avoidable. For example, 
financial considerations which resulted in a failure to use transport 
might be one such factor. Another might be lack of access to 
information about services due to learning or language problems, or 
the information not being available. This lack, or inequity, could lead 
to inequalities of access because of the restriction of choice and 
opportunity. 
In summary of this discussion of the principle of justice we can say that 
those examples bring out that equity is about fairness and justice and 
implies that everyone should have an opportunity to attain his or her 
full potential for health. Inequalities exist in health and health care. 
Some of these are unavoidable, and thus could not be considered 
unfair or inequitable. Others are avoidable. It is this latter group in 
which the inequalities are inequitable, to which further attention might 
be addressed. 
But for the purposes of my argument, the point is that evidence and 
ethical judgement are intertwined in public health medicine, and the 
failure of epidemiologists to notice this can give rise to confusions of 
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policy. There is indeed an aspect of public health medicine which 
makes its ethical base of the first importance. Let us examine this by 
comparing public health medicine with clinical medicine from the 
ethical standpoint. 
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4.3 PUBLIC HEALTH ETHICS AND HEALTH CARE ETHICS 
The clinician is typically in a one-to-one relationship with a patient 
who has requested an interview because of a felt problem. The clinical 
imperative is therefore that something must be done including the 
giving of advice. The public health specialist on the other hand does 
not have a specific patient with whom he is in a special relationship, 
and has received no request from a patient. It could be said that the 
public health specialist responds to a collective cry from individuals in 
a community when some medical problem occurs which affects a large 
number of people in a locality. One recent example is the outbreak of 
Eschericia coli 0157 in Wishaw in central Scotland. But here, again, 
there is no continuing relationship between the specialist and the 
affected group of individuals and therefore no opportunity for those 
individuals to express their views on the public health response. The 
public health specialist therefore is (a) making a judgement about what 
it is in people's interest to have, whether they have requested it or not, 
and (b) dealing with populations, groups or societies rather than 
individuals. The ethical consequence of these features are that public 
health generates problems concerned with issues such as paternalism 
and individual rights, which are broadly (i. e. non-party) political in 
their implications. It follows that for any specific intervention 
(legislation for clean water, a programme of immunisation, restriction 
on smoking in public places or whatever), the necessary precondition 
of implementation is that it will improve the health of the public - and 
this improvement must be objectively demonstrable14. According to 
this approach, effectiveness must be established by scientific means, 
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such that all rational and competent judges can agree on the facts141. 
The most common technique for establishing effectiveness of this kind 
is through the discipline of epidemiology, in which clear and certain 
conclusions may not always be obtainable, as we have already seen. 
The conclusion, then, is that ethical judgements are of vital importance 
to public health medicine. Let us now move on to another aspect of 
the WHO definition of public health medicine and consider 
'prevention'. 
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4.4 PREVENTION 
There is sometimes confusion between prevention, which is the 
abolition or reduction in the incidence of the disease; avoidance, which 
is keeping clear of risk factors; and protection, which may limit the 
spread of disease, say by vaccination or immunisation. For example, 
public health policy may encourage the prevention of malaria by 
swamp-clearing programmes and thus aim at the elimination of the 
source of the disease; or travellers may avoid catching the disease by 
avoiding certain geographical areas; or they may be protected against 
it by being given tablets. All these practices are loosely called 
'prevention'. Of course, the categories will sometimes overlap. For 
instance, immunisation or vaccination programmes, which are really 
protection programmes, may lead to a reduction in the incidence of a 
disease, or even to its elimination, as in the case of smallpox. But this 
overlap does not always occur. The compulsory wearing of seatbelts is 
often regarded as a preventive measure. But it does not prevent 
accidents; only good driving and safer roads and vehicles do that. It 
gives a measure of protection against accidents142. 
It might seem that there is no need to provide any ethical justification 
for prevention: it is self-evidently a good thing. While this may be 
true, the general public and governments do not always act as if it 
were so. From the point of view of government it seems that much 
more money goes in the direction of health care than of prevention, 
and from the point of view of the public there is often an attitude of 
scepticism towards many preventive measures, and even more 
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towards what is now called 'health promotion'. Prevention as a 
general policy therefore requires some justification. There is an 
economical justification, that prevention is usually cheaper than care; 
medical justification, that some diseases are probably not completely 
curable so their occurrence should be prevented; and an ethical 
justification, that prevention avoids the pain, misery and grief of 
disease. It is also possible to include the economic and medical 
justifications in a wide sense of 'ethical justification'. As we shall see, 
however, this general ethical justification of prevention does not 
always apply to specific areas of prevention, and even when it does 
there are those who argue that the benefits of prevention can be 
outweighed in some cases by the ethical costs. Let us look at some 
examples. 
Take the fluoridation of local water supplies. From the 1930s it was 
noted that there was a correlation between levels of fluoride in the 
drinking water and levels of dental caries. This suggested a preventive 
policy of introducing fluoride where the level was low. There were 
objections, on the grounds of undesirable side-effects, such as Downs 
Syndrome and, more recently, cancer. But a Working Party in 
Britain143 found no evidence for such claims, and other scientific 
groups have reached the same conclusion. The ethical objection 
remains, however, that adding fluoride to the water supply can count 
as compulsory medication, and as such it is a violation of individual 
rights as laid down in the UN Declaration of Human Rights. Rights, of 
course, are not inalienable and can be overridden when the survival of 
the public requires it. But it is doubtful if the prevention of dental 
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caries can count as a justification for ignoring rights. Note that there is 
really no solution to this dispute. One position or the other must be 
overruled144. 
The issue of vaccination for rubella raises rather different issues. The 
vaccine for rubella works by providing a benefit to the children of 
those to whom it is given. Now the vaccine can be given to girls only 
or to both girls and boys. If it is given to girls only there is little effect 
on the transmission or eradication of the disease. A 'girls only' policy 
is therefore a 'protection' rather than a 'prevention' measure. If on the 
other hand the vaccine is given to both girls and boys, and if the 
uptake is over 90 percent, we have a preventive measure which will 
eventually lead to the eradication of the disease. But if the second 
policy is followed and the uptake is low, say about 60 percent, then we 
have a situation which is harmful to the children of the unvaccinated 
young female population, for they will be much less likely to develop 
natural immunity. The ethical issues, then, are these. If we (the public) 
want the benefits of prevention then we must also put up with a 
degree of compulsion to ensure a high uptake. If compulsion is 
ethically or politically unacceptable then the best policy, to avoid harm, 
is to offer protection to those at risk. Again there is no ethically correct 
answer; a choice must be made145. 
4.4.1 Screening 
Another public health activity which falls in general terms into the 
category of prevention is that of screening. Screening can be defined in 
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various ways, but a simple definition is provided by Stone and 
Stewart146 : 
'Screening is a preventive activity which seeks to identify an 
unsuspected disease or pre-disease condition for which an effective 
intervention is available'. 
Screening is currently a fashionable medical activity. The demand for 
it is being encouraged by governments and by certain patients' 
organisations. 
Politically it seems desirable because there is a belief that prevention 
saves money, and successive governments have therefore set up 
various screening programmes. A national screening programme for 
cervical cancer was set up in the UK in 1964, and a programme for 
breast cancer was established in 1988 for women aged 50-64 years. The 
establishment of such programmes has been enthusiastically 
supported by various women's groups. Indeed, such is the current 
demand for screening that Shickle and Chadwick147 in a discussion of 
the ethics of screening ask whether 'screeningitis' is an incurable 
disease. If it were, no doubt there would be demand for a screening 
programme! 
It is possible to screen for many conditions, but screening programmes 
must satisfy ethical criteria. First, they must satisfy the informed 
consent criterion for any sort of medical intervention. Second, since 
screening initiatives tend to be profession-driven rather than 
individual-driven, there is an additional responsibility for the 
professional to justify the intervention which may not have been 
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requested. Third, some screening procedures carry health risks, and 
all of then are likely to be accompanied by discomfort, anxiety, and 
inconvenience for symptomless individuals. Fourth, any screening 
programme carries with it the risks of the false positive or the false 
negative. Thus screening requires as much ethical justification as other 
medical interventions. Moreover, since screening programmes can be 
expensive in the aggregate, they require evaluation. Once again, 
therefore, the ethical principles of justice and utility must be used in 
the justification of screening programmes. 
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4.5 HEALTH PROMOTION 
The Acheson Report definition of public health makes it clear that 
public health medicine must not only prevent disease but promote 
health. The literature of the new public health, and especially health 
promotion, tends nowadays to have a complex view of the concept of 
health and to distinguish various elements within it. 
The first of those is often called 'negative health', or the absence of ill- 
health. 111-health itself is a complex notion comprising disease, illness, 
handicap, injury and other related ideas. These overlapping concepts 
can be linked if they are seen on the model of abnormal, unwanted or 
incapacitating states of a biological system. 
The second idea of 'positive health' has appeared more recently in 
published reports. The origins of this idea are in the definition of 
health to be found in the preamble to the Constitution of the WHO. 
'Health is a state of complete physical, mental and 
social well-being, and not merely the absence of 
disease or infirmity'148. 
It follows from this definition that 'well-being' is an important 
ingredient in positive health. 
A third idea in the concept of health is that of 'fitness'. Fitness in its 
most obvious sense refers to the state of someone's heart and lungs. 
To be fit in this sense is to have a place on a scale ranging from being 
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able to climb stairs or run for a bus without getting out of breath to 
being able to run a marathon or climb Mount Everest. Fitness can also 
be used in a related but broader sense, which we might call the 
'sociological' as opposed to the 'heart and lungs' sense. In the 
sociological sense of fitness a person is fit for some occupation or job. 
This means that people have the necessary health to enable them to 
perform the job or ask adequately without, for example, too many days 
off work. 
The WHO definition refers to the 'mental and social' as well as to the 
physical. Nevertheless, the mental and social components of health are 
the poor relations of the health services and do not receive adequate 
attention. It is certainly true that mental health is most often taken to 
be the absence of mental ill-health. The idea of positive mental health 
or mental well-being is an obscure one, and perhaps it is ethically 
dangerous if it implies that eccentricity and single-mindedness are to 
be discouraged and the balanced and conformist personality 
encouraged. 
The idea of 'social well-being' is in fact just as obscure as that of mental 
well-being, although at first sight it does not seem to be a difficult 
notion. What does it mean? In one sense 'social well-being' refers to 
the skills and other abilities which enable us to form friendships and 
relate to other people in conversation and through the many different 
sorts of contact which are part of ordinary social life. Sometimes these 
are called 'lifeskills', and the possession of them helps to create a sense 
of 'self-esteem' which is currently a fashionable concept in the 
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literature of health education. Clearly, like fitness, social well-being in 
this sense can be graded on a scale from negative to positive . It is a 
property of individuals and refers to their ability to cope in a social 
context - hence 'social well-being' is an appropriate term. 
Can we link the absence of ill-health and the presence of well-being in 
a single concept of health in the manner of the WHO definition? This 
is not a rarefied question because it affects the legitimate scope of 
health education. If well-being is a component in the concept of health, 
then clearly health education has a much wider remit than it would 
otherwise have. 
One important factor influencing this question is that ill-health and 
well-being cannot be related to each other as opposite poles on a linear 
scale. This approach has been tried by some theorists but it is not 
satisfactory, for it is logically possible (and not in fact uncommon) for 
someone to have poor physical health but a high state of well-being - 
as in the case of a terminal patient in a hospice who is supported by 
caring staff and loving friends - or a good state of physical health 
but 
poor well-being - as in the case of someone who has no 
diseases or 
illnesses but lacks friends, a job, interests. 
The fact that health (the absence of ill-health) and well-being cannot be 
related on a linear scale must raise the question of whether they are in 
fact two components of a single concept. It can be argued that they are 
aspects of a single concept149. But it may be preferable and less 
confusing conceptually to think of them as two overlapping concepts 
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rather than as a single concept with two dimensions. Thus the feeling 
of well-being that a person has after an invigorating swim can fairly be 
described as a 'glow of health', but the well-being or satisfaction that a 
person has after writing a chapter in a book, listening to a piece of 
music, or just playing an enjoyable game is less obviously related to 
concepts of health, and more obviously related to concepts such as 
'enjoyment' and 'happiness'. Again, the well-being that is created by 
moving someone to better housing is more obviously related to 
concepts of 'welfare' than to that of health. The conclusion is that, 
while the concepts of health and well being overlap, they are distinct 
and cannot be combined into one concept. The point is succinctly put 
by Kenneth Boyd: 
'Disease is a medical category, while health is a moral category. '150 
But whether we think of health as a single multi-faceted concept, or as 
a narrower concept which overlaps with related concepts such as well- 
being and fitness, we must still examine two charges sometimes 
levelled at health promotional activities - that they are unethical in that 
they are 'imperialistic', and 'commercialise' health. 
4.5.1 Imperialism 
Those making the charge of health imperialism might argue that what 
in health promotion terms is 'positive health' is really just a name for a 
range of states which are as easily or better seen in other ways. For 
example, 'well being' is just another name for happiness, and there are 
no professional skills which can reliably assist us to attain happiness. 
Again, the idea of 'fitness' might be said to be a technical one, relative 
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to specific ends, such as playing in the Premier League, but not one 
with an important bearing on health. The charge of health imperialism 
can be directed also at mental health. Mental illness may satisfy some 
of the criteria for illness (although even that has been disputed), but 
positive mental health might be said by critics to be a concept which 
attempts to annex the territory of the well-adjusted to that of the 
healthy. For example, mental illnesses, such as depressions or 
obsessions, are incapacitating in a manner similar to that of physical 
illness, but to stress positive mental health might be seen as simply 
making a value judgement in favour of the conventional or the well- 
balanced as opposed to the eccentric. 
In reply to this sort of objection it is helpful to introduce the concept of 
health alliances. There are certain activities which are indisputably 
health promotion, but there are many others with which health 
promotion can form alliances. If health and health promotion can be 
seen in this logically and practically flexible way, then the charge of 
imperialism can be avoided. 
4.5.2 Commercialism 
The second ethical objection to health promotion is that it attempts to 
bypass autonomy and to sell health like a commodity. In this it might 
be said to resemble the advertisements for unhealthy products which it 
is opposing151. 
In reply to this argument we might question the premise that 
autonomy is something which everyone in fact possesses. People can 
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be victims of all sorts of social processes and be lacking in power. For 
example, as the advertising of tobacco and alcohol becomes 
progressively more difficult in some countries, so the manufacturers 
have turned their attention to the developing world, and the huge 
markets which are opening up. As the countries become more 
affluent, so the consumption of such products increase with 
consequential long term adverse health effects. Another example 
concerns breast milk substitutes. All health authorities are clear about 
the value of breast feeding for the mother and the baby. However 
considerable pressure was brought to bear on mothers in developing 
countries to use breast milk substitutes. Not only would this be more 
expensive, but the health benefits of breast feeding would be lost. 
International action was required to deal with this issue. The WHO 
resolved that states ensure that there be no free or subsidised 
substitute, which would affect breast feeding practice. This may seem 
to be merely a political compromise, but it may nevertheless be an 
effective way of implementing an ethically defensible position. 
In view of the political and commercial power of the anti-health forces 
in society, health must be presented in as attractive a way as possible 
or health education will fail totally. If health educators confine 
themselves strictly to the rational, critical approach to education, then 
it is preferable to depict health education as an element within a larger 
health promotion movement concerned with health advocacy, 
legislative change, fiscal reform, and the mobilisation of community 
interests, as well as education narrowly conceived. 
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The tension between the ethical requirement to be person-respecting in 
methods and the practical necessity to be effective is addressed from 
an interesting point of view in the literature of self-help groups. The 
growth of self-care groups concerned with every conceivable malady 
and involving both the sufferers and their relatives has been a notable 
development during the last decade. These movements avoid the 
charge of paternalism commonly still made against every branch of 
health care, including health education. Apart from ethical 
considerations, self-care movements seem to be effective within their 
limits, although they may benefit from a professional health educator 
to advise and facilitate. Advising and facilitating is indeed an 
important role for health education. 
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4.6 'THE ORGANISED EFFORTS OF SOCIETY' 
Public health medicine, according to the Acheson Report definition, 
must obtain its results 'through the organised efforts of society'. How 
are we to interpret this, and what ethical issues arise from our 
interpretation? Is it just a metaphor to speak of 'society' bringing about 
health? One obvious answer to this question is that to speak of 
'society' bringing about health is a roundabout way of referring to our 
elected political representatives. I shall therefore begin by looking at 
the role of the state in health care, concentrating on health legislation. 
4.6.1 Legislation and prevention 
First, a person's right to exercise autonomy may be legitimately 
curtailed by health legislation when he or she is suffering from certain 
sorts of infectious disease or mental illness such that the interests or 
health of others are liable to be harmed. There is no difficulty about 
the acceptance of this restriction in general terms. The problems arise 
over the more detailed application. For example, a topical question 
concerns the nature and extent of the restrictions which should be 
placed on sufferers from AIDS, or the extent of justifiable 
investigations or reporting of those who may be HIV-positive152. 
Again, it is controversial how far those who are mentally ill should be 
detained against their will, or what sort of treatment they should have 
if they are detained. 
Pressure for legislation is generated as more become known about how 
diseases are transmitted. For example, the dangers of 'passive 
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smoking' are now appreciated, and other sorts of environmental 
pollution are now known to cause or exacerbate diseases such as 
asthma. There is therefore a case for curbing the freedom of both 
individuals and corporate bodies, such as industries, in the name of the 
autonomy of other individuals. This issue is, of course, a source of 
much political debate. Some countries have banned smoking in many 
public places, and various 'watch-dogs' keep a close eye on the 
consequences of the operation of the nuclear power industry. 
Although there can be political debate about applications of the 
'preventing harm to others' idea, the general principle is clear and 
acceptable. 
These problems become more acute when we consider the 
international dimension of health. In a developed country like the 
United Kingdom international aspects have several implications. The 
first relates to communicable disease, and with the ease of transport 
now the possibility of transmission to different populations becomes 
ever easier. Movement for business, leisure, or migration of 
populations is occurring on a scale as never before. The great plague, 
cholera and influenza epidemics of the past, and AIDS, tuberculosis 
and malaria in the present, show just how vulnerable the world is to 
such infections. The introduction of quarantine in Italy and France, in 
the 14th century, was one of the earliest attempts to control infections, 
and there is still ethical justification for certain sorts of boundary 
control for health reasons. 
The need for international legislation is apparent also if we consider 
environmental issues, the most recent and serious of which was the 
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radioactive release in Chernobyl. But environmental problems 
regularly cross international boundaries as the effects of acid rain and 
global warming make clear. The need to ensure that there is an 
environmental impact assessment of economic growth has been set out 
in a series of programmes of 'sustainable development'. 
4.6.2 Legislation and health promotion 
Has the state any justification for using fiscal policy for passing 
legislation to promote positive health or well-being? A strong 
argument for maintaining that a government does have a duty to 
promote positive health can be found in the preamble to the 
Constitution of WHO153, which asserts that there is a right to positive 
health. In ambitious terms it states: 
'The enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of health is one of 
the fundamental rights of every human being without distinction of 
race, religion, political belief, economic or social condition. ' 
If this is a fundamental right, then presumably there is a correlative 
duty laid upon governments to implement it. In other words, 
acceptance of the WHO Constitution commits states to health and 
welfare policies. How far such policies can be implemented no doubt 
turns on the wealth of the country, but there can be no doubt that 
wealthy Western nations are committed to implementing fiscal and 
legislative policies to enhance positive health. 
To argue that there is a duty on governments to promote health for its 
own sake still leaves some questions unanswered. Supposing there is 
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such a duty, can it be implemented other than at the expense of 
individual autonomy? 
It is easy to slip into the error of regarding all legislation on the model 
of the criminal law - as restrictive prohibition backed by sanction. But 
this is an oversimplified way of looking at some health legislation. For 
example, legislation may require public bodies to make provision for 
the disabled. This is more aptly seen as positive creation of new 
opportunities than as negative prohibition. There are legal 
requirements on factory owners to restrict unpleasant pollutants, and 
on car manufacturers to ensure certain safety standards. Indeed, there 
is an enormous range of health legislation with a positive slant. 
Whereas this may diminish the freedom of some groups in society, it 
certainly extends the freedom of the majority and improves their 
quality of lifer. 
If we think of autonomy in this way, then health legislation is not 
removing our individual autonomy but rather enhancing it. In 
improving the general quality of life, legislation can add to our 
autonomy. This is obviously the case if we consider the example of 
provision for the disabled, but it is true also of anti-pollution 
legislation and many other types of health legislation. 
4.6.3 Legislation and citizenship 
So far in this section we have been concerned with the role of the state 
and health legislation. But there is much more to the 'organised efforts 
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of society' than legislation. Let us state the five principles which the 
WHO155 sees as the basis of health promotion: 
1. Health promotion involves the population as a whole in the context 
of their everyday life, rather than focusing on people at risk for specific 
diseases. 
2. Health promotion is directed towards action on the causes or 
determinants of health. 
3. Health promotion combines diverse, but complementary methods 
or approaches, including communication, education, legislation, fiscal 
measures, organisational change, community development and 
spontaneous local activities against health hazards. 
4. Health promotion aims particularly at effective and concrete public 
participation. 
5. While health promotion is basically an activity in the health and 
social fields, and not a medical service, health professionals - 
particularly in primary health care - have an important role in 
nurturing and enabling promotion. 
How are we to interpret phrases such as'concrete public 
participation'? What is the ethical importance of this approach? 
One way of making sense of this idea is to think of society not in terms 
of the individuals who make it up, but in terms of the institutions, 
practices, customs, political arrangements, and social class 
relationships which give structure to the society. From this point of 
view, people are related to each other by the structures of their society, 
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and indeed part of their identity is created by these social structures. 
We could then evaluate a society in terms of the way in which its social 
structures tend to produce health in the people who belong to that 
society. Just as we sometimes praise the 'atmosphere' in a school or 
hospital as one of well-being, so the social structures of an entire 
society might be said to make for or detract from health or well-being. 
Some theorists with firm attachments to individualism might prefer to 
interpret what I have said as referring to health determinants rather 
than health itself. For example, they might agree that a society with 
marked social class gradients and corresponding gradients in the 
distribution of ill-health is one with a tendency to create ill-health in 
individuals. Thus, in terms of this approach, if we speak of an 
'unhealthy society' we are simply speaking metaphorically about the 
determinants, such as poor housing and diet and so on, that have 
helped to produce poor health states in individuals. Other thinkers 
might be prepared to extend language and to maintain that it is not a 
metaphor to characterise social relationships and structures as being 
themselves unhealthy. It is perhaps self-indulgent to pursue this 
theoretical question here, but it is certainly one way of making sense of 
the phrase 'the organised efforts of society', in the Acheson Report' 56, 
or 'effective and concrete public participation', as the WHO principle 
puts it157. 
One context in which these phrases may have more practical meaning 
is that of rationing. There now seems to be a movement - 
famously 
initiated in the State of Oregonl58 - to involve the public 
in decisions 
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about rationing health care resources. One example of this is the use of 
'citizens juries' in the Cambridge and Huntingdon Health Authority159. 
In a pilot scheme a group of local people were recruited and met for 
four days to consider how priorities for rationing health care should be 
set and how far the public should be involved in these decisions. The 
discussions were mainly on matters of process but the project indicated 
a willingness amongst the public to be involved in matters of priority 
setting. 
To the extent that there is exclusive emphasis on the state delivery of 
health care to individuals, there is the invitation to see health as a 
commodity to be supplied by the state. The same is true if we think 
of health as a commodity bought by private health insurance. But 
health is not in any sense a commodity. Health and well-being are in 
the end a set of relationships among citizens and the involvement of 
citizens in decisions about rationing is a good example. As 
Beauchamp16o wrote: 
'Collective goods are ultimately a set of relationships among 
the citizens of a community, relationships in which the 
community as a whole participates to obtain desired benefits. 
These collective goods include aggregate states of welfare or 
well-being, including declining rates of disease and 
premature deaths; efforts to limit the resources society 
devotes to personal health services; shared and common 
access to a good like medical care to foster the sense of 
community and membership in the group itself. And 
finally, 
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there are those highly important collective goods, shared or 
common beliefs and values. ' 
It is clear that we can add a legal system to Beauchamp's list, and 
in particular one designed to stimulate social responsibility. 
Indeed, it is plausible to suggest that the increasing government 
intervention on drunk-driving issues has encouraged a greater 
social awareness about the dangers of alcohol more generally, and 
thus a greater sense of community and individual responsibility. 
In a similar way, legislation designed to assist disabled or 
handicapped persons can also increase a sense of community 
responsibility for those groups. In other words, in so far as health 
legislation and other governmental health policies are directed at 
increasing community awareness, as distinct from being directed 
at the good of specific individuals, it is not paternalistic. 
A health alliance which has been shown to be helpful in 
developing community awareness is that between health 
promotion services and community arts. Several projects have 
taken place and have had favourable evaluations. For example, 
the Bristol Area Specialist Health Promotion Service report on 
these projects - photography, the visual arts and dramal61. Again, 
Bromley by Bow have on-going community arts and health 
projects162. The central message from these and similar projects is 
that disease and ill health cannot be eradicated by narrowly 
medical means; they must be tackled in a community context with 
the approval of the community. In other words, medicine needs 
181 
health alliances, and the arts are a vital and ethically acceptable 
ally. The ancient Greeks recognised this when they made Apollo 
god of both medicine and the arts. 
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4.7 CONCLUSIONS 
1) The evidence-base for public health medicine is epidemiology. 
2) Judgement, especially ethical and political judgement, is essential 
not only for implementing policies based on epidemiology but also for 
deciding what studies are important to carry out. 
3) Ethical judgement is equally integral in the prevention of disease, 
health promotion, and ensuring the organised efforts of society. 
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CHAPTER 5 
THE LECTURE ROOM 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
This thesis has so far attempted to describe the knowledge, skills and 
attributes required for someone to be regarded as a 'good doctor'. It is 
clear that the doctor needs to understand his patient through a 
scientific knowledge of how the body works and appreciate how 
scientific research can help him make decisions about how best to treat 
a patient. But I have also discussed the ways in which this evidence- 
base must be modified in the clinic; a 'humane' doctor is required with 
the understanding (the interpretative ability and insights) governed by 
ethical sensitivity, to apply, in the particular clinical situation, scientific 
evidence and skills. The good doctor needs both techne and phronesis. 
It follows that what makes a good doctor good cannot be reduced to a 
catalogue of knowledge and skills that can be learnt. The good doctor 
must also develop a sensitivity in his dealings with patients which is 
based on a knowledge of himself and his own values and imaginative 
insight into the problems and contexts of patients' lives. The good 
doctor must then be able to assimilate all this scientific knowledge of 
disease and treatments with the understanding of the individual 
patient and to exercise judgement as to what might be of benefit to this 
patient with this particular problem at this point in their lives. This 
chapter is concerned with whether, and how, this capacity for humane 
judgement or insight can be learned. 
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It is a lot to expect from the average student who emerges from 
medical school at the age of 22 or 23 to start working as a house officer. 
It is also a lot to expect from the university which has prepared them 
for this role. In fact, we might raise the question as to why medicine is 
a subject which is studied at university at all. Medicine can be seen as 
a very practical job and the knowledge and skills required to practise 
can be attained primarily by apprenticeship. In this sense the process 
of becoming a doctor might be regarded as like that of becoming a 
plumber or a car mechanic. There is a certain amount of factual 
information to be learned but most of the job is learned at the side of 
someone who is already skilled at it. However, in chapters 2-3, I 
suggested that there is more to the job of being a doctor than 
knowledge and skills. Is this extra dimension also to be acquired by 
apprenticeship, and if not, how can we make sense of the process of 
developing young people as doctors in educational terms? 
In this chapter I will begin by discussing the distinction between 
education and training and putting forward a justification for why 
medicine should be taught at a university (5.2). I will pay particular 
attention to recent criticisms and developments in medical education. 
The major concerns of the General Medical Council (GMC), who are 
responsible for overseeing medical education in the UK, are the lack of 
educational content of medical courses, and the need for medical 
schools to address the process by which they might help students to 
acquire the skills and sensitivity in dealing with people which I 
discussed in chapter 3. It is easy enough to recognise these 
deficiencies, but it is more difficult to know how to address them 
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educationally. I will, therefore, go on to discuss whether morality, the 
personal attributes I discussed in chapter 3 (judgement, comprising 
ethical sensitivity, ability to interpret and insightfulness) and even 
communication'skills', can be taught (5.3.1). I will also consider how 
medical students might develop some of the broader aspects of the 
humane attitude (5.5). I will end the chapter by describing two courses 
which have been made possible because of the GMC's new framework 
for undergraduate medical education and report on the outcome of 
one of them (5.6 - 5.9). 
I have described the attitude which enables the good doctor to reach 
insightful judgements as a 'humane' attitude. Now, many writers on 
medical ethics would gloss this as an ethically sensitive attitude, and 
take the view that what the good doctor needs in addition to technical 
competence is a capacity for ethics. This is certainly important, and I 
shall say something about it (5.3.2). But, as I have already suggested in 
chapter 3, the concept of the humane doctor is wider than that of the 
ethical doctor. The humane doctor has an educational breadth, as well 
as an ethical sensitivity. I shall develop the idea of the educated doctor 
as an introduction to the broader idea of the humane doctor. It will 
emerge that the humane doctor who can exercise insightful judgement 
or phronesis is both broadly educated and ethically sensitive. 
186 
5.2 EDUCATION AND TRAINING 
As an arts graduate entering medical school I was puzzled by the 
comments of some of my medical teachers (usually of the older 
generation) that I would be an 'educated doctor'. The implication of 
this was that medical degrees were in some way lacking educationally 
and that I was fortunate to have had a good educational experience 
before I came into medicine. These comments were disconcerting to an 
idealistic entrant to medical school, particularly when I had just 
experienced how high the demands for entrance to medicine were. 
How was it that medical schools were attracting the highest achievers 
in secondary schools but those who had gone through the experience 
of medical education did not regard themselves as educated? 
Part of the answer to this question lies in the poor state of medical 
education in recent years and the disappointment many aspiring 
doctors felt at the experience they had had at university as intelligent 
young people. But there is another way in which this question can be 
answered. Doctors who consider themselves not 'educated' may still 
feel that they are competent practitioners and well able to do the job 
that their university studies prepared them to do. We may say, then, 
that they might consider. themselves as 'trained' doctors. Let us now 
consider the distinction between these two concepts of education and 
training, since the distinction is the key to the idea of the humane. 
These distinctions are based on the writings of the philosopher of 
education, RS Peters163 164 
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Both education and training may be regarded as processes through 
which an individual must pass in order to become educated or trained. 
However, we do not tend to speak of a particular end or subject matter 
when we refer to education, as in 'I was educated in art or physiology': 
this sounds strange to us. But when we talk of someone as being 
'trained' the immediate questions are 'In what? ', 'To do what? ', or 'For 
what? '165. Training implies preparation for carrying out a particular 
task or to learn a specific skill. Medical students might be trained to 
take blood from patients or to examine the heart correctly. Such 
activities involve a narrow focus on the task and practice in order to 
develop the ability to carry it out. In contrast, we never speak of a 
person being 'educated' for a specific end. 'Education' is connected 
with 'educere' = 'to lead out' and implies a broadening and widening of 
the vision and the mind. The first distinction, then, between education 
and training is that training necessarily involves a narrowing of the 
focus to concentrate on learning a specific task or skill whereas 
education has to do with opening out, with releasing and liberating' 66. 
The second point which distinguishes education from training is that 
educational processes must have what Peters calls a wide 'cognitive 
perspective'167. Subjects such as science, literature and history are 
regarded as valuable educationally because knowledge of these 
subjects contributes to knowledge and understanding in many other 
areas. For example, we would be surprised to hear a scholar of 
Dickens speak only of the fact that Dickens' books are good stories 
without referring to the social comment and social history they 
contain. In the same way, the botanical process of apoptosis, which 
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describes the 'falling away' of leaves from the trees in autumn, has 
been used by medical scientists in cancer research to stimulate an 
understanding of a similar process in cells. 
In other words, it is not a sufficient condition of being educated that 
someone has had a training in science or history. It is possible to be a 
scientist or a historian without seeing the connections with other 
disciplines or the wider world, although such scientists or historians 
may not be very effective. The ability to make connections and be 
excited by such connections between one discipline and another 
reflects a certain attitude of mind : an attitude that we would associate 
with the humanely educated person. This is Adam Smith's point 
(discussed in 1.6) to which I can now return: 'philosophy is the science 
of the connecting principles of nature'. This attitude of mind is 
reflected in the idea that education is of the whole person, not just one 
part of the mind or body, as in training; and it is characterised by 
openness to ideas and experiences and a willingness to change in 
response to these ideas and experiences. 
It is difficult to contemplate how such an attitude of mind can be 
encouraged by the educational process. It might be argued that this 
openness is present in some students and not in others and it cannot be 
put there if it is not there already. This is a particular problem in the 
context of vocational courses like medicine because students tend to 
regard as valuable only those classes which they see as directly 
relevant to the job of being a doctor. Medical students have 
traditionally looked down on subjects such as psychology or sociology 
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which they see as being at best common sense and at worst 
unimportant to their future clinical work. 
Peters' third point about an educational process is related to the 
second. We have characterised the educated person as someone who 
is open to new ideas and who is able to see connections and make links 
between different disciplines. It follows from this that such a person 
must be open to being changed by these new thoughts and ideas or, to 
use Peters' terminology, his whole 'outlook may be transformed'. It is 
possible for a person to be trained as a car mechanic or a cook and not 
be changed by the experience. The knowledge they have gained 
remains external to themselves as persons and can be lifted and laid 
when required. In contrast, an educational process involves the whole 
person and the knowledge they acquire becomes integral to them and 
cannot be laid aside; rather it affects other thoughts and experiences 
they have and may unexpectedly bring about new ideas when they are 
focusing on an apparently unrelated subject. 
We can say, therefore, that an educational process should bring about 
change in its subject. Peters takes this further, in a fourth point about 
education, by saying that the change should be for the better, not the 
worse168. In other words, something valuable or worthwhile for its 
own sake must be passed on by any process regarded as education. 
This point may seem to make any discussion about whether the 
process of learning medicine should properly be called education a 
pointless one as medicine is clearly a worthwhile thing to do. 
However, Peters' point is related to the value of the knowledge and the 
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subject in itself rather than on what it equips the student to do. In 
medicine, the study of things like human biology, psychology and 
sociology may be regarded as intrinsically valuable as these subjects 
provide ways of making sense of the world and widening the student's 
understanding of it. A degree in arts does not equip students for any 
particular job but those who ask arts students, 'What is your degree 
for? ' are entirely missing this point. The point of doing it is purely for 
the experience of studying subjects which will broaden the mind and 
widen the outlook in a valuable way. 
Part of a degree in medicine involves learning things which cannot be 
regarded as intrinsically valuable or as making a change in the person 
who learns them. The knowledge of how to take blood from a patient 
is only of extrinsic value, as assisting in patient care, and in no other 
way. Repeating the act many times may make the students more 
skilled and dextrous but it will make no change in them cognitively. 
This is not to say that being trained in this skill is not important; 
education and training must go hand in hand in learning medicine. 
It follows from this fourth point about education that if the educational 
process should aim to bring about a positive change in someone 
through the study of something worthwhile then the person engaged 
in the process should be interested in, and come to care about, what 
they are doing169. It would be difficult to call someone educated who 
had been through a degree in English literature and after graduating 
never picked up a novel or read a poem again. Education is not a 
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process that ends after school or university is finished. As Peters' 
expresses it: 
'to be educated is not to have arrived; it is to travel with a different 
view. 'l70 
Fifthly, if the educated person is to care about his subject and to allow 
it to change his outlook the educator must adopt person-respecting 
methods in his educational approach. Learning by coercion, 
indoctrination or repetition cannot be called education as it will not 
involve understanding or widening of the person's perspective, as I 
have described. Knowledge gained in this way will tend to be'inert'171 
with no possibility of change or development. Training can involve 
processes such as coercion, imitation and repetitions. A surgeon who 
wishes to be trained in laparoscopic surgery must begin by copying his 
superior's technique and then developing his own by repeating the 
operation many times. It would be perfectly legitimate in this training 
process for the teacher to insist that the trainee surgeon performed the 
operation in a certain way if this was the safest and easiest way to get 
the best results. But this could not count as an educational process. 
In summary, then, we can say that an educational process must lead to 
an opening out and a broadening of the educated person's perspective, 
and what is learnt should be have intrinsic value. The educated person 
should be open to being changed by the process, and that change 
should be positive and valuable. In contrast, training may require a 
narrowing of the focus to concentrate on learning a specific task and 
there is no expectation that the trained person will be changed by this 
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process or that he will think differently about the world as a result. 
Rote learning, imitation and even coercion, may be useful techniques 
for training, but these have no place in the process of education. 
Where does the process of learning medicine fit in with these ideas on 
training and education? 173 We might want to suggest that, as medicine 
is a vocational course whose aim is to produce people who can work as 
doctors at the time when they complete the course, it is primarily a 
training process. This conclusion might seem, in the light of my first 
point about the distinction between education and training, to have 
some validity. In contrast to students who graduate with arts degrees, 
for students who have taken a degree in medicine it is quite clear what 
their course is for, and we might describe them as 'trained' to be 
doctors. Inasmuch as the medical degree has this narrow focus of 
preparing students to be doctors it might again be more appropriately 
termed a training activity rather than an educational one. However, 
this is an oversimplified account and can be criticised in three ways. 
Firstly, educational as well as training activities take place within the 
context of a medical degree. Students may be trained in the skills of 
clinical examination by copying an experienced clinician but they also 
take courses in which they learn about biochemistry, physiology and 
human anatomy. These courses can be taught in a way that 
encourages a broad understanding of the human body and its 
functions in the normal state - understanding which is valuable 
for its 
own sake and can be the focus of continuing interest and study beyond 
graduation. 
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Secondly, one of the points about a training activity was that it has a 
narrow focus which prepares the trainee for a defined task. It would 
be very difficult to describe the task of the doctor in this way. 
Medicine comprises many jobs and requires adaptability in its 
practitioners. Rightly or wrongly (see 3.5), patients expectations of 
their doctors are wide and spread beyond the confines of any narrowly 
defined clinical training. It would be inappropriate, therefore, to 
describe the process of preparing students for the job of being doctors 
as having a narrow focus. 
The third criticism of my initial description of medicine as a training 
involves a challenge to the distinctions made by Peters between 
education and training. These distinctions need not be as exclusive as 
has been suggested. The account given above assumes that an 
educational process aims at the growth of understanding (an aim 
intrinsic to the activity) and that a training process aims at gaining 
some skill which will make no difference to the understanding the 
trainee has about what he is engaged in (an aim extrinsic to the 
activity). However, this may not be the case in all situations. It may be 
that in order for an educational aim to be achieved (i. e. for 
understanding to be advanced) the student needs to achieve a training 
aim first. An example here might be that for a student fully to 
understand the three dimensional anatomy of a woman's pelvis he or 
she must first learn the skill of pelvic examination. 
In conclusion, then, preparing students to become doctors is both an 
educational and a training activity. In that both these processes are 
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involved, and that medicine has a broad focus, it is a legitimate 
concern of universities. 
I said that the 'humane doctor' is broadly educated and has an ethical 
capacity. The question now arises as to whether, and if so how, a 
medical course can provide a broad education and at the same time 
improve the ethical capacity of its students. I shall begin with the 
question of teaching morality or ethics. 
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5.3 TEACHING MORALITY 
As we have seen, the doctor has evidence-based knowledge and skills, 
and applies them in a humane manner in the clinic. The problem of 
how best to teach the knowledge and skills is a large topic on its own. 
Medical schools have been experimenting world-wide on 'problem- 
based learning' and other methods. The jury is still out on these 
experiments, and I shall not here enter into these debates. Just as 
difficult is the question of whether, and if so how, humane attitudes 
can be taught, and, if they can be taught, what room there can be in the 
curriculum for such teaching and how can it be integrated with the 
aims and objectives of medical education. These are the questions 
which will concern me in the next few sections of this chapter. 
There can be some concerns, as I have said, about whether the teaching 
of morality and attitudes to medical students is successful or even 
possible. It may be that the only way some students will learn such 
things is by experiencing more of life for themselves. However, the 
reality is that those of us who are involved in the education of future 
doctors have an obligation both to the students, to prepare them for the 
problems they will encounter, and to their future patients, who need to 
be protected against the insensitivities of the young. The GMC lists 
twelve 'attitudinal objectives' in Tomorrow's Doctors174 and these 
include: 
(a) respect for patients and colleagues that encompasses, without 
prejudice, diversity of background and opportunity, language, 
culture and way of life; and 
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(e) awareness of the moral and ethical responsibilities involved in 
individual patient care and in the provision of care to populations 
of patients; such awareness must be developed early in the course. 
Hence, teaching morality or ethics is a curriculum requirement. 
I will discuss four methods of raising awareness of attitudes and of 
moral issues. They are not, of course, exhaustive or exclusive, and 
indeed the employment of a combination of them would be desirable. 
As an introduction, however, I shall consider the logically prior idea of 
the morally good doctor. 
5.3.1 The morally good doctor 
There is an element of the logically odd in the idea of the morally good 
doctor which can be brought out if we compare it with the idea of the 
morally good plumber or the morally good airline pilot. In the (highly 
unlikely) circumstance of someone saying 'Mr X is a morally good 
airline pilot' we might judge that two claims had been run together: 
Mr X is an airline pilot' and 'Mr X is morally good'. These two claims 
are only contingently connected, and are oddly yoked together in that 
we tend to appraise morally and appraise technically in different types 
of context. Thus it would be perfectly possible for someone to be a 
pilot (or a plumber, or a musician, or a systems analyst, or a gardener) 
and not be morally good. It is even possible for someone to be a good 
pilot, plumber, musician, systems analyst, gardener, and not morally 
good. For in these cases, the occupational names refer to the technical 
skills or sets of skills which define a given occupation, whereas the 
term 'morally good' refers to the character of the person as such who 
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happens to have the skills. Moreover, the technician may even exercise 
the skills for a bad end. For example, let us imagine a good (i. e. highly 
skilled) computer operator who is not only morally bad, in that he 
exploits his employees, beats his wife etc., but also uses his computer 
skills to hack into confidential files about patients which he proceeds to 
sell to insurance companies. Thus we can say of some skilled persons 
(i. e. a good pilot, builder ... ) that (a) personally they are bad, and (b) 
that they may sometimes use their skills for a bad end. 
Can the same be said of the doctor? Plato certainly thought so. He is 
quite explicit that the good doctor can be a good poisoner. He adopts 
this position because, in common with other Greek thinkers, he 
classifies medicine as a techne, a craft comparable to that of the 
carpenter or ship's captain. For Plato, the 'good doctor' is 'good at' 
something: moral goodness in our sense does not come into it (Plato, 
Republic. Bk. 1). Indeed, the Hippocratic Oath, which requires the 
physician to work for the benefit of and not to harm patients, is 
probably not concerned with 'beneficence' and 'non-maleficence' in the 
modern sense. The Hippocratic Oath refers to the 'art' i. e. 'craft' of 
medicine and is concerned that the craftsman (the physician) should 
not attempt to do what his skills do not enable him to do to his 
materials (patients). In terms of this approach the good doctor will 
certainly have virtues, but they will be the virtues of the good 
craftsman rather than moral virtues in our modern sense. To teach 
someone to be a good doctor would therefore be to teach a complex 
craft. Plato does, of course, discuss the question of whether moral 
virtue can be taught, but he does not think that moral virtue is a techne. 
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If we agree with Plato, then, we are agreeing that the phrase 'morally 
good doctor' is odd because of the juxtaposition of technical excellence 
and moral excellence in the one phrase. But is Plato right in seeing the 
practice of medicine as just a techne, or more accurately, should we in 
the modern world think of medicine as just a set of skills? Are there 
any special moral qualities which are needed by the doctor qua doctor? 
The dominant fashion in medical ethics for the last twenty years has 
been to assert that a doctor requires the following moral qualities: a 
desire to avoid harming the patient (non-maleficence), a desire to help 
(beneficence), a desire to act justly and a desire to respect the patient's 
autonomous decisions. The trouble with these 'four principles' is not 
that they are irrelevant to the life of a doctor: it is that they are relevant 
to any occupation, because they are among the basic principles 
governing harmonious and co-operative social life. There is nothing 
specific and essential to medicine about them. Are there any moral 
qualities which are specific to, or at least integral to, the practice of 
medicine? 
To find these we must first look at what doctors actually do, and what 
they do is intimately connected with the needs of patients (3.5). 
Typically, patients will have an illness, disease, injury, ailment (all of 
them real or imagined), or will require advice on diet, contraception or 
future lifestyle. As a result of their real or imaginary conditions 
patients will feel vulnerable, confused, insecure, powerless, hopeless, 
aggressive, despondent.... To respond well to patients who may 
exhibit a range of these characteristics a doctor will need to be humane 
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and compassionate, to be imaginative in the sense of being able to see 
the problem from the patient's perspective, and to convey calmness 
and equanimity. Other occupations may also need such qualities, but 
they are integral to the practice of medicine. In other words, the 
practice of medicine is not simply the exercise of a techne, because 
moral qualities are built into it. It will follow that the oddness of the 
phrase 'morally good doctor' is not that of an incongruous yoking 
together, but that of verbal redundancy. 
The Position I have reached is sufficiently complex to require re- 
statement. We began by drawing attention to the fact that the 
expression 'morally good doctor' is logically odd. If we construe the 
oddness in terms of an analogy with 'morally good carpenter' it will 
consist in the running together of two distinct modes of appraisal - the 
technical and the moral. If the practice of medicine were simply the 
exercise of a techne or set of skills we would have correctly identified 
the source of the oddness. But medicine is more than a techne. Certain 
moral virtues (not the 'four principles') are intimately bound up with 
the practice of medicine: the good doctor must have at least some 
moral virtues. In other words, at least some qualities of the morally 
good person, such as compassion, imagination and equanimity, must 
be built into the concept of the good doctor. Because of the nature of 
the material on which the doctor works - human beings - the art of 
medicine must be more than simply a technique. To put it another 
way, the concept of a doctor is not morally neutral, as that of 
'carpenter' or 'pilot' might be; it is evaluative. Hence the oddness of the 
phrase 'morally good doctor' is the oddness of pleonasm; for doctors to 
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be morally good is for them to act as good doctors. This is not to say 
that doctors must have every moral virtue, but only that good medical 
practice must be humane and governed by practical wisdom or 
phronesis. We hope, of course, that the doctor also acts in terms of the 
'four principles', but then we all should, for they are amongst the 
principles of good citizenship, rather than anything especially to do 
with medicine. 
5.3.2 Methods of teaching medical ethics 
I shall not discuss methods in detail here, for there is a large 
literature175 176 177 178 179, but simply mention four methods which can 
be used in conjunction. The first is the most traditional and consists of 
a lecture, often given by a moral philosopher, on basic theories of 
moral philosophy. Unless this is well done it can easily seem remote 
and abstract to medical students, although it can be much more 
successful with practising doctors who have already experienced 
problems for themselves in the clinic. The initial impetus to the health 
care ethics movement came from a fusion of medical concerns with 
moral philosophy, and that is still the main source of energy. When 
moral philosophy dominates, however, the discussion can easily 
become too abstract. The reason is that philosophers tend to use 
fanciful examples to test the edges of concepts. But when this practice 
is carried over into the teaching of medical ethics it can seem alien to 
medical realism. One antidote to abstraction is to use case-histories. 
This is the second and most common method of teaching ethics. It 
appeals to students because actual cases can be used and this creates 
the atmosphere of realism which is essential if medicine, nursing, or 
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other health care students are to treat the subject seriously. Certainly it 
is important that cases should be related to general principles and 
broad lessons drawn from such discussion, but without the clinical 
details students will lose interest. 
Reservations about the 'case-history approach' to the teaching of 
medical ethics have been expressed by Coope180. He makes three 
points: that case histories can suggest that moral decision making is 
harder than it really is, that factual details can obscure the moral 
features (if any) in a case and that the very consideration of some sorts 
of cases can be corrupting or de-sensitising. There is something of 
merit in all three points, although the criticisms are robustly (perhaps 
too robustly) rejected by Gillon181, for all that is really being advocated 
by Coope is care and realism in the case-histories that are chosen. 
Clearly, case-histories have an important role to play if they are seen as 
'triggers' to discussion, and as stimuli for thought. They are essentially 
'coat-pegs' on which to hang concepts and views. I shall not discuss 
them further, since their effectiveness is widely known. 
A third method of teaching ethics is the use of a diary. Students are 
encouraged to record problems they may encounter in their clinical 
work, or which they note in the work of others. This again is effective 
in that it relates ethics to the student's own experiences. 
A fourth method is the use of the arts. This is now being widely 
recommended. What can medical students learn from the arts? 
Downie182 has argued that literature and drama gives rise to moral 
questions and also develop our capacities to answer them. It is 
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tempting to follow the philosophers and think of the resolution of 
moral questions in terms of the application of principles supported by 
rational argument. Principles and logic certainly have their place, but 
the arts can extend our imaginations and deepen our sympathies and 
these capacities are also essential to the wise, humane and caring 
doctor. The point here is that philosophers, like biological and social 
scientists, must stand back from the phenomena and present their 
accounts in detached prose style. On the other hand, the arts involve 
us directly and make us vividly and emotionally aware of what it is 
like to be in the situation which the philosopher and social scientist 
discuss, of what it means to be ill oneself, or to be a relative or helper 
of someone who is ill. In this way the arts develop compassion, 
stressed by Gregory (3.4). Moreover, the arts can provide a cognitive 
shaping to emotion. There is a danger that those in the caring 
professions develop a generalised attitude of caring. The arts can help 
us develop what I shall call compassion-in-the-particular-situation. 
I have already maintained (3.3) that communication skills are of 
importance to the good doctor. Downie argues183 that this is one area 
to which the arts can make a major contribution. For example, 
literature focuses attention on language, on the connotations and 
resonances of words used to describe or express feelings and fears. 
There is a two-way process here. We tend to concentrate on the 
doctor's communication with the patient, because it is for failures there 
that doctors are often criticised. A study of the many ways in which 
literary writers communicate with their readers can be of help here. 
But patients also try to communicate, and awareness of the nature of 
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the anecdote (2.5) can help doctors to understand what patients are 
telling them and how patients perceive their illnesses184. 
Painting, as Downie points out, brings out the non-verbal ways in 
which feelings or attitudes can be expressed. Consider, for example, 
the sympathetic portrayal of the doctor in the painting 'The Doctor' by 
Sir Luke Fildes185, which hangs in the Tate Gallery in London. The 
main features of this painting (from the medical point of view) are the 
curve of the doctor's back as he leans forward, the concentration of his 
gaze and the shadowy figure of the anxious parents behind the sick 
child's bed. As an illustration of the doctor-patient relationship this 
has an eloquent sensitivity which communicates itself more directly 
than a treatise. No amount of science, or philosophy can succeed in 
conveying with the subtlety and infinite variety of the arts this basic 
aspect of human relationships and therefore of doctor-patient 
relationships. 
Teaching communication skills can be seen as a 'techne ', simply a 
morally neutral skill. But if it is taught via the arts it is embedded into 
a moral framework. The student learns by imaginative identification 
with the situation depicted in the art. 
These then are four methods of teaching morality. There are others, 
such as role-play, but they are all compatible and some combination 
would be desirable. It is to be hoped that these methods and others 
will raise the ethical consciousness of medical students. But ethical 
sensitivity is only one of the two components in the humane attitude. I 
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shall now move on to consider other broader aspects of the humane 
attitude. 
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5.4 MEDICAL ETHOS 
Before making a suggestion about how the second component in the 
humane attitude might be cultivated I shall outline the nature of the 
unconscious resistance within medicine to such a development. It 
derives from what I shall call, following Downie and Charlton, the 
medical 'ethos'186. I shall summarise their argument. 
The medical ethos is a practical one, in that it is directed towards 
action. This would seem to derive from the constraints of clinical 
practice, in which a decision must always be made, even if that 
decision is to postpone the decision. 
This shows in the medical view of science. As I have argued (1.7), for a 
doctor, science is a goal-directed activity, and the direction is towards 
improved clinical practice. In contrast, the scientist is regulated by 
goals internal to science itself (this is what is meant by science 'for its 
own sake'). It also shows in medical impatience with speculation of all 
kinds: indeed a 'short attention span', sometimes showing itself as a 
hard-headed approach, is often a fault of clinicians - although it is a 
'fault' which has the benefits of efficiency and productivity in clinical 
practice. 
The authors point out that 'decision' is a key word, because it is also 
characteristic of doctors to be decisive. When the caricature doctor is 
at fault it is more often for deciding too soon (without sufficient 
consideration of evidence) than too late: at any rate doctors do not 
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usually experience much psychological difficulty about making up 
their minds. Such resolution contrasts with the attitudes of some other 
professions - and is one explanation of why doctors tend to adopt a 
dominant role on committees! Again, medicine is characterised by a 
high level of collegiality or solidarity. This is a great source of 
strength, as well as a possible source of harm, as when in the face of 
any criticism there is a tendency for doctors always to stick together. 
Downie and Charlton then proceed to examine how medical education 
is involved in the process of producing the medical ethos. 
One part is the evolution of an esprit de corps. Various factors combine 
to produce esprit de corps within the medical school. Firstly, the 
students are divided into classes (often large) each of which is treated 
as a unit, and the classes are all taught together in big lectures and 
practical sessions whenever this is possible. Furthermore, all the 
students in the same class share a curriculum which is broadly, and 
sometimes exactly, the same as those of other dass members. Such 
features are common to many medical schools during the preclinical 
period. The sheer bulk of information may forcibly impose the subject 
on the minds of the undergraduates. To some extent the medical 
students are usually physically set apart from other undergraduates in 
a medical school or college. And, commonly, curricular activities are 
reinforced by informal students' societies. Such factors may play a 
greater or lesser role in inculcating a sense of loyalty, tradition, or 
whatever it might be called, even in the earliest years; an attitude 
which becomes directed partly at the institution and its members, but 
also towards medicine itself. 
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In the clinical years the process gathers momentum; the university 
terms are longer and vacations shorter; a standard of quasi- 
professional behaviour and dress is encouraged; 'out of hours' study is 
increasingly expected. Some factors are established explicitly, by 
lecture or textbook; but most of the medical ethos comes from 
apprenticeship, from the learning process described as 'modelling', 
whereby the acolyte becomes identified with the 'master' across a 
whole range of interlinking behaviour, attitudes, and emotions. This is 
the time during which the beginnings of a 'bedside manner' are 
adopted, and ways of relating to patients, other health care workers 
and the public are internalised. This induction may be very enjoyable; 
and it is usual that the clinical years at medical school are the time of 
the greatest idealism concerning the values of a medical way of life. 
Downie and Charlton point out that the fact of professional solidarity 
is a double-edged weapon, but its benefits should not be 
underestimated. In the first place, medicine is intrinsically an 
unpleasant job, in the sense that it involves contact with blood, sweat 
and tears (and worse); but, more seriously, it involves life-and death 
decisions and actions. All of which means that a mistake may have 
consequences of the utmost seriousness - and everybody makes 
mistakes. It is of the greatest importance that, on the one hand, 
mistakes can be acknowledged and corrected; and, on the other hand, 
that the junior doctor is supported through the mistakes to develop the 
highest level of skill (because if 'everybody makes mistakes' then this 
applies particularly to the inexperienced new recruit). 
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The important point for my argument is that the medical ethos is not 
the whole story because it is inevitably incomplete. It is concerned 
only with certain limited aspects of life - with illness and disease. 
Medical solidarity can allow medicine to overstep its bounds - it can 
lead to a lack of perspective. If medicine is to function properly it must 
be placed within the scheme of society as a whole - its limits defined, 
its relationship to other world-views made clear. It is not satisfactory 
that the medical viewpoint should simply take over all other 
viewpoints by default, that the problems of life should all be 
medicalised. So that while the existence of what I have called medical 
ethos is important, I must also emphasise that this will be a good thing 
only if it is taken in perspective. Doctors, through a combination of 
excessive busyness and solidarity, can easily lose their broad 
perspectives to become, not just workaholic, but blinkered to the point 
of not knowing when to use their medical skill - although they might 
know very well how. This is often said to be the characteristic sin of 
the surgeon - yet it applies across a much wider spread of the 
profession. Hence it is important for the humane doctor to have not 
only ethical sensitivity but a broad perspective on life. This is 
necessary to ensure insightful judgement. 
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5.5 BROADENING THE ETHOS 
Granted this resistance to a broad humane outlook in medicine, how, if 
at all, can we teach medical students and anyone else in the health care 
profession to acquire the humane qualities necessary for excellence in 
the practice of the profession? Or how can we broaden the ethos? One 
suggestion is that the practice of medicine can be humanised through 
the experience of what can be called a 'counter culture' 187. 
In an academic sense, in medical education, this may mean exposing 
students to other disciplines in other academic contexts. Medical 
students often have the impression, and are encouraged in it by 
medical teachers, that they have an intellectual and moral superiority 
over other students. Perhaps it should be part of their education - it is 
in some universities - to be obliged to submit themselves to other 
disciplines. In the USA, for example, medicine is most often a 
postgraduate degree. This has two beneficial consequences: students 
are a little more mature when they begin their medical studies, and 
they have already been exposed to an academic counter culture. We 
can even go beyond the purely academic and suggest that students 
should be encouraged to, and should be given curriculum space to, 
engage in activities which are not academic at all - sport, youth work 
and so on. It is from this counter culture, rather than from the 
exclusive study of medical ethics, that a sense of our common 
humanity may come. 
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But it is important to remember that while the development of a broad 
vision is an important aspect of a doctor's humane attitude, there is 
another aspect. Sometimes decisions are complex, and sometimes 
policy decisions are required. In this second area ethical skills can be 
helpful, provided they are supplemented by scientific knowledge. 
In summary, I drew attention to the odd-sounding concept of 'the 
morally good doctor'. At first analysis this seemed to be nothing other 
than the gluing together of the idea of the good, i. e. skilled doctor, and 
the morally good person. But on more careful examination it emerged 
that there are some moral qualities necessary for the practice of the art 
of medicine, such as equanimity and compassion. I suggested that 
these moral ideas are an important component in the broader concept 
of the 'humane doctor', or the doctor who exercises phronesis in 
addition to techne. Can we teach students to acquire this ethical 
component? Lectures on moral philosophy, case studies, the keeping 
of diaries, and the arts can all help in learning decision making, but 
for the development of other aspects of the humane attitude, 
immersion in a counter culture is the central idea. 
211 
5.6 THE HUMANE ATTITUDE AND PRACTICALITIES 
It might be argued that even if my views on the humane doctor have 
something to be said for them they have no realistic hope of being 
adopted by medical faculties. Now this would have been true a few 
years ago, but an influential and authoritative document has changed 
all that. The new structure of the medical course laid down by the 
GMC in their document Tomorrow's Doctors 188 provides a golden 
opportunity for non-medical subjects to be introduced in some depth 
to medical students in the form of special study modules (SSMs). 
Before describing the content of two such modules I will explain in 
general terms what modules are designed to achieve in the new 
curriculum structure. 
Tomorrow's Doctors describes the SSMs in this way : 
'They are no less important than the core curriculum but they 
focus not on the immediate requirements of the pre-registration 
year but on the long term intellectual and attitudinal demands 
of a professional life that will constantly be challenged by 
growth of knowledge and change of circumstance...... They will 
give scope for variation in educational style and content and 
will provide opportunity for experimentation in curriculum 
design........ the overall consequence will be a widening of the 
outlets for the expression of individuality and the 
competitiveness of medical schools. ' (p. 7) 
And in commenting on the proposed subject matter of the modules it 
says: 
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'the modules offered will depend on the interests, resources and 
individual enthusiasms of medical school staff and to some 
extent on the wider range of opportunities within their 
universities. It will be anticipated that the majority of modules 
will be based on subjects directly related to medicine ....... but 
they need not be exclusively so. As medical research advances, 
it will inevitably become increasingly dependent on the ideas 
and techniques of other disciplines....... it is hoped that the 
student of tomorrow may be drawn to some of these other 
disciplines and that opportunities to study, for example, a 
language or to undertake a project related to literature, or the 
history of medicine, may be offered. '(p. 9) 
The implication, then, is that as well as contributing to the process of 
making a doctor the modules should be a source of intellectual 
challenge for the students, harnessing their individual interests and 
enthusiasms. 
The GMC's recommendations are timely. A survey of the hopes and 
concerns of a class of first year entrants to medical school189 has 
identified 'self-fulfilment' and 'personal challenge and variety' as their 
second most important hope (after the desire to help patients). Their 
most important concern (after family and personal relationships) 
related to a 'loss of self' ; in particular there was a fear of becoming 
'isolated' about 'issues outside [of] medicine'. Medical schools are 
fortunate in that they attract intelligent and well motivated students, 
but these students often have interests which lie outside the narrowly 
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scientific and medical content of the core. The SSMs clearly have a role 
in stimulating these individual interests and preserving and 
developing the sense of 'self and of self-awareness which is essential to 
sympathetic doctoring. 
5.6.1 Three categories of SSM 
The GMC in 'Tomorrow's' Doctors' stress that SSMs should not deal 
entirely with medical subject matter, although most of them will, and 
they appear to identify three different types of SSM: the medical, the 
ancillary medical; and the non medical. It is important to stress that 
there are three different types of SSM, since, with the narrowing of the 
compulsory part of the curriculum within the core, the SSMs might 
become merely a repository for all the medical subjects that have been 
ejected. The GMC make the point that medicine cannot exist in a 
vacuum and that it is becoming increasingly important that students 
have some understanding of other disciplines on which medicine is 
increasingly coming to rely e. g. mathematics, physics and computing. 
SSMs with this kind of subject matter we might call 'ancillary medical' 
SSMs as they have a non-medical subject matter but are directly 
relevant to the practice of medicine. A further distinction should be 
made between these first two types of SSM (the purely medical and 
the ancillary medical) and a third type, the 'non-medical'. Tomorrow's' 
Doctors suggested that students might study a language, literature or 
history. This is a radical suggestion as medical students have never 
before been given time within the curriculum to study subjects with no 
direct relevance to medicine. I wish to explore in more detail the 
justification for the inclusion of these different types of SSMs in the 
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new style curriculum, concentrating in particular on the ancillary 
medical and non medical options. 
(a) Medical SSMs 
The inclusion of purely medical SSMs is easy to justify. In a crowded 
curriculum (even after pruning) it is impossible to include every 
medical subject area relevant to the experience of doctors. Here is an 
opportunity for students to pursue their own medical interests and for 
medical schools to demonstrate their strengths. For instance, not every 
medical school will have experts on tropical medicine able to offer a 
course to students. The medical SSMs, therefore, provide a chance for 
specialised work at the undergraduate level. 
It is important to stress, however, that to make the SSMs merely a 
series of clinical clerkships in minor medical specialities would be to 
defeat the purpose of radical curriculum change. The SSMs may 
indeed provide students with the opportunity to study in more detail a 
medical subject not included in the core but this period of study should 
differ from their mainstream clinical teaching in such a way that the 
learning process has not purely been one of osmosis but also of 
personal discovery (5.2). 
(b) Ancillary medical SSMs 
Tomorrow's' Doctors makes a case for what I have called ancillary 
medical subjects, such as mathematics, physics, the social sciences and 
philosophy, on the basis that the 'ideas and techniques' of these 
disciplines are increasingly informing the development of medicine. 
It 
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is in this context that the concept of transferable skills can be 
introduced. Transferable skills are those which are learned in a non 
medical context and then are transferred to be used in a medical 
situation. This concept has been discussed in relation to thinking skills 
courses by Professor N. C. Boreham19. He expresses some doubt 
about whether a skill learned in one context can be transferred to 
another, particularly if the skill has been learned in a 'classroom' 
context and is to be used in a practical situation. However, if the skill 
learned is the same skill then this is surely possible. An example of 
this might be computing skills. There might also be ancillary courses - 
often seen in the context of business and industry - where students 
learn about working in a team. The advantage of learning these skills 
in a context outwith medicine is that students can more easily focus on 
the particular skill they wish to acquire without worrying about such 
things as their lack of knowledge in front of patients. I will discuss the 
acquisition of the skill of analysis of argument in the context of an SSM 
in philosophy in a later section (5.9). There are, therefore, a wide range 
of ancillary subjects which might contribute to the training of doctors 
and the choice depends on the interests and ingenuity of the particular 
medical school and its university. 
(c) Non-medical SSMs 
Thirdly, let us turn to the non-medical subjects. In general terms, the 
GMC sees SSMs as fulfilling an educational aim in as much as the 
students undertaking them will study a subject in depth and that it will 
be a subject that excites their interest and which they will research 
personally. This certainly applies to non-medical SSMs. However, 
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learning medicine is also a training exercise191 and even non-medical 
subjects can provide training in skills which are relevant to the practice 
of medicine. In addition, non-medical subjects can help develop the 
human qualities essential in a good doctor; and involvement with 
other disciplines can help medical students avoid the insularity which 
characterises medical classes. I wish now to discuss in more detail the 
four areas where non-medical subjects might make a contribution to 
the development of future doctors: education, training, development of 
personal qualities and broadening social contacts. It will become clear 
how these are elements in the perspectival component of the humane 
attitude, and as such will influence the doctor's insightful judgements. 
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5.7 THE HUMANE ATTITUDE 
5.7.1 Education 
As I have discussed in 5.2 an educational activity should satisfy certain 
criteria: it should be worthwhile and valuable for its own sake; it 
should have a wide cognitive perspective; it should stimulate interest 
and dedication in the student; and it should transform his outlook. A 
course in philosophy, for example, will allow the student a chance to 
read some of the great thinkers and help him to understand different 
ways of looking at the world. A course in medical history can put 
present medical discoveries in perspective and give the student some 
insight into the fact that medical knowledge is not set in stone, a strong 
impetus for continuing his education through life. Such courses will 
give students the opportunity to stand outside their more narrowly 
focused medical activities and look on them from a different viewpoint 
thus encouraging a critical and questioning attitude. Medical schools 
are ideally situated to institute such courses as they are, for the most 
part, within universities where experts in many disciplines are on 
hand. 
5.7.2 Training and transferable skills 
Non-medical subjects can provide training in skills which are useful in 
a medical context. I have already introduced the idea of transferable 
skills and it can be used once again to justify the training potential of 
non-medical subjects. One example here might be a course in media 
studies. Here the student might be expected to learn about 
interviewing people and to use this skill in the context of interviewing 
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patients. The role of the medical interviewer is the same as that of the 
journalist in that both are trying to get at the truth of the situation. 
They differ in that the journalist aims purely to present the information 
to an audience, whereas the doctor aims to use the information to 
make a diagnosis and decide on treatment. However, medical 
students can learn from the journalist's investigative approach the 
importance of focusing entirely on what the patient is saying. In the 
non-medical context this can be practised without at the same time 
being distracted by giving the patient an answer. A subject like 
philosophy (which also fulfils the educational criteria) can teach 
students to order thoughts, construct an argument and reach a logical 
conclusion. These skills are essential in diagnosis where the doctor 
must gather information to support a thesis and go through logical 
steps to reach a conclusion. This is an important consideration in 
medical training. 
5.7.3 Personal development 
We have seen that non-medical subjects should be allowed in SSMs 
because of their educational and training value. However, the practice 
of medicine is not just concerned with knowledge and skills but also 
with a humane and sympathetic approach to people. JS. Mill in his 
essay On Liberty asserted: 
'It really is of importance, not only what men do, but also what 
manner of men they are that do it. Among the works of men, 
which human life is rightly employed in perfecting and 
beautifying, the first in importance surely is man himself. '192 
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There has certainly not been much thought given to 'perfecting and 
beautifying' medical students through their educational process; rather 
that process has tended to brutalise and dehumanise193. It is here, 
perhaps, that a study of the arts, in the form of plays, poems, books 
and paintings, can best be justified. Of course, studying the arts is also 
educational in that it widens the understanding and has an intrinsic 
value. But in demanding an emotional response the arts allow the 
reader or viewer to discover their own hidden values and prejudices 
and to challenge them. In other words, the arts help students to 
develop self-awareness and enhance their understanding of the human 
condition. For young people, who emerge at the age of 22 or 23 to 
become doctors, the arts may provide some experience of life, albeit at 
second hand, which is essential for their development as caring people. 
One example of this potential of the arts to challenge values and beliefs 
would be in a study of the book Trainspotting by Irvine Welsh194. This 
book deals with the story of a young drug user and his friends and is 
graphic in its descriptions of the process of 'shooting up' and 
uncompromising in its portrayal of the degradation that addiction 
brings. But in his use of humour and pathos, the author gives the 
addicts a human face. This book would force students to face up to 
their attitudes to drug users so that they can recognise and overcome 
any feelings of fear or disgust and help those who present to them as 
patients. So far in medicine it has been the role of ethics teaching to 
instruct students on their approach to patients but an understanding of 
ethical principles will not develop the sensitivities in the way that a 
study of the arts can. 
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5.7.4 Reducing insularity 
Finally, in the course of studying non-medical subjects, students will 
have the opportunity of meeting people in other faculties. Medical 
classes tend to be rather insular because (as I have said), unlike in other 
faculties, the whole year follows the same curriculum. SSMs can 
provide some variety for students and allow them to show their 
unique interests. Having the chance to get to know teachers and 
students in other disciplines will help break this insularity and may 
also, ultimately, foster better relationships between doctors and the 
outside world. 
5.7.5 Devaluing SSMs 
Despite the contribution which ancillary and non-medical SSMs can 
make to enriching the life of medical practice there is a risk that they 
may be marginalised in the curriculum. This process can take the 
obvious form of discouraging students from taking them by stressing 
the importance of the medical SSMs in passing final exams. One way 
round this is to follow the example of Aberdeen's new curriculum 
where SSMs have been placed after finals are completed. 
But there is a more subtle way of devaluing non-medical SSMs and 
SSMs in general. The problem is that if SSMs are to be given a 6-8 
week slot, or two to be covered in 10 weeks19s, then students will not 
be able to 'master comprehensively'196 the subject they have chosen. It 
would therefore be better if medical students could attend classes 
taught in other faculties throughout a whole term or even a full year of 
study. This must surely be possible now that medical students' 
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timetables are no longer going to be as crammed as in the past. This 
kind of scheme also has the advantage of making use of existing 
courses rather than having to create new ones when medical teachers 
are much exercised already with creating the core. If such study is not 
possible, then courses will have to be carefully designed so that they 
do not merely provide a skim through the subject but provide the 
student with a satisfying educational experience. 
In conclusion, the introduction of SSMs to the curriculum has been 
proposed in order to improve the educational profile of medical 
schools. But in providing the chance to offer many subjects, not just 
medical, a new educational opportunity can be exploited. The 
neglected area of personal development can be more explicitly 
addressed through a study of the arts; and study in other disciplines 
will help future doctors appreciate the knowledge and skills of others. 
If the GMC's proposed revolution in medical education is to work then 
the opportunities presented by SSMs must be grasped with both 
hands. Medical schools should make use of their wider university 
context to allow students to study courses offered in other faculties and 
should not obstruct their enthusiasms by rigid timetableing or too 
much assessment. We may, then, in ten years time start producing 
doctors with a thirst to pursue their education throughout their lives 
and who are more rounded human beings. 
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5.8 AIMS AND OBJECTIVES 
5.8.1 Performance objectives 
The standard educational approach when creating new courses in 
medical schools at present is to start by defining the course 'objectives'. 
The category of objective in use is the 'performance objective'. 
Performance objectives are behavioural indicators of the ways in which 
students will have changed by the end of a coursei97. Their 
advantages include communication of intent to prospective and actual 
students and to other academics, the need to consider in detail the end 
points or outcomes of teaching, and the provision of a basis for a 
systematic approach to course design, including assessment. 
But not all useful learning is both predictable at the outset and 
demonstrable by the performance of some newly-learned skill198. An 
objectives-led approach also implies that the outcome of learning is the 
only important aspect, with the process being irrelevant. In the course 
described above, dependence upon performance objectives can be seen 
as both restrictive and destructive. For example, (a) it is likely that 
some changes which will occur in students will not have been 
foreseenl99 ; (b) the precise direction of many of the changes is 
unpredictable, and dependent upon such factors as pre-existing 
individual knowledge, attitudes and maturity; (c) many changes will 
not be quantifiable, and therefore, not conducive to precise objective 
formulation. Indeed, this may be true of any course in which the 
emphasis is on attaining knowledge and attitudes rather than skills, or 
where the aim is to educate rather than train. These are some of the 
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objections to objectives; others have been considered by Macdonald- 
RoSS200 and Eisner201. The latter moved to correct the imbalance 
caused by exclusive emphasis on'performance objectives' by 
proposing the concept of 'expressive objectives'. 
5.8.2 Expressive objectives 
The focus of 'expressive objectives' is not on the student's ability to 
perform a task, but with less demonstrable changes like the 
development of skills and strategies in approaching problems, or 
appreciation of the ambiguities and interpretative problems of written 
or spoken language, or the ability to write a piece of clear and 
expressive English. 'Expressive objectives', therefore, are concerned 
with the process aspects of a course rather than the outcome. 
Process-led approaches to higher education have been proposed by 
Stenhouse202, and more recently by Laurillard203. Stenhouse generated 
a 'process model' for course design, which he describes as more 
appropriate than objectives models for areas which centre on 
knowledge and understanding. The aim of this model is to develop 
understanding, rather than to gain knowledge. This is done through 
inquiry and exploration leading to 'induction into knowledge', which 
cannot be transferred but must come from within; students can be led 
to knowledge. Essentially, in this model, teaching then becomes a kind 
of extended conversation204. 
This 'process model' has two important implications for this module. 
First, development of the teacher is inevitable alongside the 
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development of the student. Teachers will learn both from the student 
and from the process of teaching. They can never teach the same way 
twice. This allows greater evolution, both for the teachers and for the 
course, than if the course were following a more prescriptive 
objectives-led model. Secondly, to use the language of social 
anthropology, the very process of learning can itself generate 'latent' 
outcomes which may be more important than the 'manifest' 
outcomes2O5. For example, students might discuss a poem and come to 
understand that it is open to three interpretations. Knowledge of what 
these three interpretations are is the 'manifest' outcome' of the 
discussion. But the 'latent' outcome is that students become aware that 
what patients say or do may be open to several interpretations. In 
other words, for a medical student, the importance of discussing a 
poem may derive from what they learn from the process of discussion 
itself rather then from its outcome. If we take the analogy of someone 
going on a journey: their interest may be as much in what is learned on 
the journey as in the destination. 
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5.9 SOME POSSIBLE COURSES 
Having described the way in which the SSM can contribute to 
introducing arts and humanities subjects to medical curricula, I will 
now outline two courses which have been designed for medical 
students taking SSMs. One is in literature and the other in philosophy. 
The philosophy module has already been taken by 10 second year 
medical students and I will describe their response to it, including how 
they felt it contributed to their development as doctors. By describing 
the two courses I hope to demonstrate that students will experience a 
broadening of their educational experience practically- as they will be 
taught by non-medical teachers and along with arts students - but also 
in terms of the kind of experience it is. As I have just discussed in 5.8, 
an objectives-led approach to education which focuses on the outcome 
of the education is not appropriate for courses which aim to develop 
students' awareness of their personal attributes so the courses focus on 
a process-based approach. 
5.9.1 An SSM on Literature 
I will describe this module in terms of literature but it would be 
adaptable, if resources were available, to other arts or some mixture of 
arts. 
For this module to be successful it is important that we attract the right 
number of enthusiastic students to take it. They are likely to be offered 
a wide selection of SSMs. How are they to appreciate what this course 
will have to offer? Many students are attracted to the new curricula 
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being offered by medical schools and appreciate the change in 
emphasis from training to education. This SSM expresses the new 
medical education ethos and will interest students because it will 
enable them to explore aspects of medical practice in a novel way. 
Moreover, increased personal contact between students and their 
teachers in the new curricula also facilitates the dissemination of new 
ideas in medical education. This module provides a unique 
opportunity for personal contact and fruitful discussion between 
students and staff on a wide range of topics pertinent to medical 
education. It should be noted that courses like this have been run in 
the past on a voluntary basis both in Glasgow206 and Melbourne207 to 
the acclaim of students. 
(a) The course 
I propose a four week course which will involve the participation of: 
" Students in small groups 
" University-based tutors from different departments and faculties 
" 'Expert' lecturers to participate in the plenary week. 
An outline of the course structure is given in appendix 5.1. 
There will be an introductory week, which will include staff and 
students from all participating departments. The week will be built 
around a single theme : 'The Links Between Literature and Medicine'. 
Activities will be mainly small group based and will include: 
" Expert presentations and workshops e. g. creative writing, literary 
criticism, philosophy of literature, other art forms. 
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" Discussing in small tutor led groups a prescribed set of literary 
works which have been read in advance (examples of possible texts 
for the course are given in appendix 5.2). 
" Discussion of a piece of work selected in advance by each student 
for its relevance to the theme of the week. 
"A group project of a literary nature to be presented at the end of the 
week. The scope for this is wide but might include the performance 
of a short play, the designing of a magazine, or some form of 
creative writing. 
" Discussions between individuals and tutors aiming at identifying 
projects to be worked on for the rest of the module. 
" 'Field visits' - evening attendances at theatres, poetry readings etc. 
For the rest of the module the students of each group will work on the 
assignments they have chosen individually under the guidance of their 
tutor. Most of this time will be spent in private study but there will be 
at least 2 tutorial sessions per week, one for the group to meet together 
and another for the tutor to meet each student separately to discuss 
their work. The groups will meet again at the end of the module for 
one day for the reading of creative work and for an evaluation of the 
module to be carried out. 
(b) Assessment 
The students' assessment will be based on 2 assignments which they 
will decide on during the course of the plenary week and work on for 
the rest of the module. 
1. Submitted Essay (minimum 2000 words). 
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This should be related in some way to medicine and should show 
evidence of appropriate reading and a critical approach to its analysis. 
Suitable titles might be; 
(a) Take any one or more novels of the nineteenth century in which 
death and dying play a prominent role. Analyse the attitudes 
expressed and compare them with our own. 
(b) Discuss the portrayal of the doctor in the plays of Ibsen. How 
can doctors learn from a study of these works? 
(c) What can be learned from Wordsworth's poem 'The Idiot Boy' 
about human attitudes to mental handicap? 
(d) Discuss the evolution of the medical soap opera. 
2. Creative Piece/Literary Criticism 
The second assignment would involve students in some creative 
writing or (if they do not feel able to do this) an in-depth literary 
criticism of a work which they would choose with the guidance of their 
tutor. The main specification should be a relevance to medicine, 
though a broad view of this relationship is important. 
(c) Conclusion 
I have outlined an SSM in Medicine and Literature. The impetus 
towards designing this course has come from the GMC who are 
expecting medical schools to include a wide range of subjects - not just 
medical - within the new framework. Literature seems to fit closely the 
GMC requirements for the content of an SSM. Equally important, it 
offers an alternative educational approach which stresses the 'process' 
rather than the 'outcome' of the course. Thus, the course certainly aims 
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to develop an understanding of the main themes by means of personal 
inquiry, and the structure of the course encourages this as it is consists 
of a mixture of individual reading followed, and supported by, 
reflective and interactive small groups. Furthermore, by having the 
aim of understanding as the only predicted outcome, this development 
can proceed in many different directions, all of which may be 
appropriate, without the fear that the students are 'not doing what 
they're supposed to'. This model allows greater freedom for the 
teaching of the course while maximising the learning. It is neither 
appropriate nor desirable that the outcome of the module (expressed in 
performance objectives) should dictate and even stultify the 
achievements of the students involved. It is, therefore, an appropriate 
module for developing the humane attitude which some influential 
doctors have found lacking in contemporary medicine208. As Sir 
William Osler put it: 'the humanities are the hormones'209, they 
catalyse thought and humanise practice. 
This module is more appropriate for students in the senior, clinical 
years of their medical courses as it is important for them to draw on 
their experiences with patients as they read the texts. I have not, 
therefore, as yet had the opportunity to run this module for the 
students as the new curriculum structure in Glasgow has yet to reach 
the senior years. I will now describe a module in philosophy which 
has been run for a group of 10 medical students in their second year. 
As with the literature module, the focus educationally is not on the 
learning outcomes of the course but on the process of doing 
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philosophy and on the skills and understanding that this can 
contribute to the developing doctor. 
5.9.2 An SSM on philosophy: The Individual in Society 
In February 1998 the first student intake into the new medical 
curriculum at Glasgow University took their first group of SSMs and 
ten of them chose to do a module in philosophy. The title of the 
module was, 'The Individual in Society; an introduction to social and 
political philosophy'. This module was a collaboration between the 
departments of general practice and philosophy and this enabled the 
medical students to take part of a course which was being taught to 
students of philosophy in their first year. There are problems with 
laying on arts courses in medicine and the main one is getting teachers 
who are prepared to take on the extra burden of teaching medical 
students. The model provided by this collaboration, where the module 
'piggy-backed' on a course in philosophy, may be a useful one for other 
courses. 
It seemed particularly appropriate to include philosophy amongst the 
first group of SSM options that students could take at Glasgow. The 
GMC in Tomorrow's Doctors said that: 
'The modules offered will depend on the interests, resources 
and individual enthusiasms of medical school staff and to some 
extent on the wider range of opportunities within their 
universities. ' (p. 9) 
Glasgow University has a long standing tradition in philosophy and 
major figures such as Francis Hutcheson, Adam Smith and Thomas 
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Reid were at one time professors of philosophy there. Philosophy has 
long been considered a central subject in the MA degree. Centuries of 
endorsement of the educational value of the study of philosophy 
would certainly be an encouragement to those of us who are interested 
in education but the course needs to be justified in terms of its 
relevance to the future development of medical students as doctors. 
I will describe the course - it aims, structure and assessment - and go 
on to show how the two main aims are related to the education of 
doctors. The question of whether the course succeeded in its long term 
purpose of broadening the outlook of future doctors cannot yet be 
answered, but I will describe the initial evaluation by the students and 
their assessment of whether the course was valuable for them. 
(a) The course 
The course had two main aims: 
1) To encourage the students to adopt the techniques of 
philosophical analysis in their approach to an argument; and 
2) To expose them to the broadening experience of an academic 
culture different from their own. 
The first aim relates to the fact that philosophy can teach students to 
think and argue in a valid and coherent way. The second aim refers to 
the idea of a counter culture which I have already discussed (5.5) and 
relates more to the actual experience of doing the module rather than 
its content. I will say more about these aims and their importance in 
the context of medical education later. 
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The module provided ten second year medical students with the 
opportunity to spend five weeks studying Plato's Republic in the 
context of a course of lectures on political philosophy. SSMs have the 
advantage that they are 5 weeks blocks set aside from the rest of the 
course and students can concentrate solely on their module subjects 
during this time. The medical students were, therefore, able to fit in 
with a pre-existing course on political philosophy which was about to 
start at the same time as their module. The lectures and reading 
material from this course became part of the module. The co-existence 
of the two courses had another advantage in that the medical students 
were taught alongside the arts faculty students and were taught by 
philosophers who were not specially angling their material at a 
medical audience. These points are important in terms of the second 
aim, that of exposing the students to a different academic culture. 
The lectures were delivered by two lecturers, one dealing with the text 
of The Republic in some detail, and the other giving an overview of 
political philosophy from Hobbes onwards. Two seminars involving 
the whole group were held each week on Mondays and Fridays. The 
Monday seminar focused on the understanding and analysis of 
argument. The students were set an analytical exercise to do at the 
start of the module (see appendix 5.3) and one at the end (appendix 
5.4) to see how their analytical skills had progressed. The Friday 
seminar clarified points raised in relation to the lectures and the 
reading of the set text. Two seminar papers were set to guide and 
focus the students' reading, one on 'Plato's views on education', and 
the other, 'Plato's view of the family'. Apart from attending these 
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classes the students spent their time reading, writing and, most 
importantly, thinking. 
Assessment of the module consisted of three parts: 
1) The class essay, consisting of 70% of the marks. Students were given 
a choice of two titles: 'Do we have a moral obligation to obey the laws 
of the state? ' and, 'To what extent can one justify the criticisms of 
democracy which Plato's makes in The Republic ? '; 
2) Two seminar papers, contributing a total of 20%; and 
3) The second analytical exercise, which gained 10%. 
The students were, therefore, kept quite busy during the module, 
being involved in an educational experience quite different from what 
they had encountered at university so far. Most of them had not 
studied philosophy before and they had certainly not experienced the 
kind of teaching structure that the module provided. The content of 
the module, in that they were studying Plato and more general 
political philosophy, was entirely new to all of them. These issues 
raise the question of justification of the module in the context of 
medical education. Of what benefit is five weeks of philosophy to 
medical students, and why should they learn about Plato? In 
answering these two questions I will return to a consideration and 
justification of the two aims of the module. 
(b) Why philosophy for medical students? 
I have already discussed the subject of transferable skills (5.7.2) and 
this module is an example of a non-medical subject which can teach 
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doctors in training useful skills. One of the major criticisms levelled at 
recent medical education has been that students, particularly in the 
pre-clinical years of their education, have been so busy digesting large 
amounts of information, they have never had the opportunity to think 
for themselves. Once they start their clinical training, however, they 
are expected to be able to piece together the various bits of information 
that make up a case history and come to a logical conclusion on 
diagnosis. The main reason why philosophy has been a major part of 
university arts courses for hundreds of years is because it can teach 
people to think. Clinical diagnosis requires the doctors to be able to 
sort out information about a patient, order it and construct arguments 
for or against certain conclusions (diagnoses). Philosophy can teach 
students how to go about this, but also when conclusions can be 
strongly or weakly argued, or valid or invalid. A major part of the 
module focused on leaning about argument and students were taught 
the steps to take in constructing arguments. 
Besides leaning how to do this for themselves, the students also 
learned to recognise when others were making arguments and when 
these arguments might be valid or invalid. This was a particular 
revelation to them (as I will show in the evaluation) as they had been 
used to accepting much of what they were told. Most of the students 
commented that they had begun to question received wisdom with 
much more confidence by the end of the module. In other words, they 
were beginning to adopt Enlightenment attitudes: Sapere audi or, in 
Kant's paraphrase, Have courage to use your own reason'210. 
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These two skills, the ability to make an argument and the ability to 
identify and criticise the arguments of others, both relate to the first 
aim of the module. As skills, they were part of the training that the 
module provided. But learning about philosophy is also an 
educational activity (5.2) and part of the module's value here was that 
it distanced the students form the pervading culture of their medical 
education and medical class and placed them in the arts faculty 
(physically and intellectually) and amongst philosophy students and 
teachers. This was the second aim of the module: to provide a 
broadening academic experience and one that the students would 
recognise and value as different. 
(c) Why should medical students study Plato's Republic ? 
The Republic was chosen as the set text for the module for reasons that 
are relevant to both of the module aims. To broaden their educational 
experience, the students read the text with a view to discussing and 
developing a view on the moral, cultural and political themes that 
were raised, many of which were as relevant in Plato's Athens as they 
are to us today. In relation to learning about argument, The Republic 
presents a series of arguments that the students could discuss and 
analyse. 
There are a number of parallels between the society of Athens and our 
own. Athens was a democracy much influenced by public speakers 
and this mirrors our society where the media have a similarly 
powerful role. Greece was a collection of city states, a bit like modern 
Europe, with some in Greece wanting unification. The issue of 
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European union is a hot one in this country at the moment, particularly 
in relation to currency union. Education is a central issue in The 
Republic and is one that closely concerned the students who were 
taking the module as they were the first group to experience the new 
style of medical education at the University and their views and 
reactions are being constantly sought. The students were asked to 
write seminar papers on Plato's discussion of education and on his 
view of the family. 
The study of The Republic was set in the context of a series of lectures 
on social and political philosophy and one of the 'core' themes 
emphasised by the GMC in Tomorrow's Doctors (p. 17) is 'Man and 
Society'. By this the GMC were thinking mainly of human 
development and sociology and psychology relevant to medicine, as 
well as ethics. However, by studying The Republic, (and hearing about 
other themes in political philosophy in the lecture course) the medical 
students were able to consider some of the fundamental reasons why 
society exists in the first place. Plato deals with the reasons why 
people live together in communities : humans are frail beings and need 
the protection of a group, and there is a need to share human resources 
in the form of the diverse range of talents that people have. Without 
reference to religious morality, Plato deals with the moral values 
which, of necessity, must rule human society granted these human 
needs and vulnerabilities. This approach opened the students minds 
to a deeper understanding of the origins of our society's make up and 
of the values which allow it to function. 
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These issues are all part of our modem social and political agenda and 
it is important for any educated member of our society to have a view 
on them. In The Republic these issues are raised for the students' 
consideration in a controversial way as the book takes the form of a 
series of dialogues between Socrates and the various young men of 
Athens. This structure encouraged the students to form their own 
views, as they found themselves agreeing or disagreeing with the 
protagonists in the dialogue, and enhanced their understanding of the 
construction of arguments. 
We hoped, therefore, that both the content as well as the structure of 
the teaching of the module would help the students to develop the 
ability to express their views coherently, constructively and, most of 
all, with convincing arguments. 
(d) Evaluation of the module 
Having discussed what happened in the module and what its 
ambitious aims were, it is important to give an idea of whether the 
module achieved these aims or not: did we manage to turn the 
students into philosophers? Evaluation was carried out in two ways, 
firstly, by a conventional questionnaire, which asked the students 
about their reasons for taking the module and what they thought of the 
structure, content and educational value of the module; and secondly, 
by comparing the two analytical exercises that the students did at the 
beginning and end of the module, to see how their analytical skills had 
progressed. 
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Turning first to the results of the questionnaire (a copy of the 
evaluation form is in appendix 5.5 and the results are represented in 
graphical form in appendix 5.6, graphs 1-6. ). Most of the students had 
taken the module because they were keen to do an arts subject again, 
having missed the opportunity to study the arts since leaving school 
and nine out of the ten wanted a complete change from medicine 
(graph 1). We asked the students' views on the fact that we did not set 
knowledge objectives for the course in the form of a learning contract 
and they were all in favour of this (graph 2). They did feel, however, 
that they required more feedback on how they were doing. The 
students felt stimulated by the discussion in seminars and by the new 
ideas that were introduced (graph 3). They were keen for more 
discussion time and more time spent on clarifying issues they did not 
understand from their reading and lectures. The group seemed to 
have handled the content of the module well and most felt subjectively 
that they were better able to analyse argument by the end of the 
course. Most also said that they would be able to describe the major 
arguments of The Republic to a friend (graph 4). 
Turning to the students' views of the educational value of the module 
for themselves, all had discussed the module with their colleagues 
indicating that we had achieved an important prerequisite for an 
educational process - that the students had become interested and 
engaged in what they were doing (c. f. 5.2). Most of them, indeed, 
wanted to do more philosophy in the future and had ideas they wished 
to pursue (graph 5). They were asked specifically about the value of 
the module in medical educational terms and the most frequent 
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comment here was that they would now be less inclined to accept 
things that they were told without justification and that they would be 
more critical of what they were told (graph 6). 
The second part of the evaluation involved a comparison of the first 
and second analytical exercises as a more objective measure of whether 
the students had succeeded in learning the skills of analysis. All of the 
students displayed some improvement over the course of the module 
and I have provided, in appendix 5.7, the full text of student HM's 
exercises as an example of their progress. 
In summary, then, this module was designed to broaden both the 
students' education and their views of society and its structures and 
the process by which it helped them to do this enabled them to learn 
the techniques of philosophical argument and how to apply it 
themselves. The initial evaluation would imply that we has succeeded 
in the short term. A concluding comment made by one of the group 
about the module was that 
'It has opened my mind'. 
We hope that they will continue into the rest of their education as 
doctors with open minds. 
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5.10 CONCLUSIONS 
1) There are problems concerning the nature of the 'humane attitude', 
and how to teach it. 
2) The humane attitude has an ethical component and a broader 
educational component which provides perspective. 
3) Education must be distinguished from training. 
4) The ethical component in the humane attitude can be taught via 
moral philosophy, case studies, keeping a diary, the arts and any 
combination of these. 
5) The 'ethos' of medicine is such that a 'counter culture' is required, 
supplied by the study of the non-medical subjects which provide the 
perspective. 
6) The GMC has made the study of non-medical subjects possible by 
insisting on SSMs which may be non-medical. 
7) These may require 'expressive objectives' rather than 'performance 
objectives', for education is a 'process' and not just an 'outcome'. 
8) Two such SSMs - in literature and in philosophy - were outlined. 
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CHAPTER 6 
CONCLUSION 
The title of my thesis is Evidence and Judgement, and I have examined 
these concepts as they apply to medical research, to clinical practice, 
and to public health, bearing in mind the Scottish Enlightenment idea 
that the aim of true science is the discovery of the 'connecting 
principles of nature'. I then considered how contemporary medical 
undergraduate courses could be modified in the light of the GMC 
recommendations so that future doctors would have a more balanced 
and educated understanding of the role of evidence and judgement in 
the professional life of doctors. 
The concept of evidence, as it is used by scientists, is logically related 
to that of a hypothesis. Information, data, observations and 
experiments become 'evidence' when they are for or against a specific 
hypothesis. Moreover, the hypothesis concerns what is universally or 
at least generally believed to be the case. The concept of evidence as 
that is used by detectives or forensically differs in these two respects: 
the data and observations suggest a hypothesis, rather than confirm or 
disconfirm one, and the hypothesis is about a particular or specific 
state of affairs rather than one which is more generally the case. The 
concept of evidence which applies to medical research is like that of the 
scientist, and the concept which applies to clinical consultations is like 
that of the detective. The reason that the detective model of evidence 
is appropriate for the clinician is that he is dealing with specific 
patients. The relevant evidence for the clinician to establish diagnosis, 
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prognosis and treatment comes from or applies to this particular 
patient. 
The sources of evidence in the clinic are, therefore, of different kinds. 
One important source is, of course, that obtained via scientific routes, 
with which a clinician should be familiar from the science elements in 
his training, from scientific papers, and from the advice of other 
scientifically minded clinicians. This kind of evidence must be adapted 
to suit a given patient from a given social environment. A second 
source of information about the diagnosis will be the patient's own 
stories or anecdotes. We can say either that anecdotes are not 
evidence, but rather are an alternative source of relevant information; 
or we can say that anecdotes are a kind of clinically relevant evidence. 
They are certainly of importance to the clinician. 
In adapting the scientific evidence to the specific patient, and in 
making sense of the patient's anecdotes, the doctor is involved in the 
process of interpretation. He may also have insights into the situation 
which may lie behind the patient's presence in the surgery. 
Interpretation and insight are describable as forms of understanding. 
The good doctor must, in addition, be sensitive to the ethical nature of 
the doctor-patient relationship. Interpretation, insight, and ethical 
sensitivity are expressed in humane judgement, and 'judgement' is the 
other major concept of the thesis. 
In discussing science it emerged that judgement is also an essential 
part of the scientist's activities. He must constantly consider whether X 
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is really an example of Y or supports his conclusion. The same is true 
of the judgement of the detective. These are technical manifestations of 
judgement. But, as I have said, judgement is also exercised by the 
doctor in the clinic as he interprets the patient's symptoms, listens to 
the anecdotes, decides how far to urge a specific treatment and how far 
simply to comply with what the patient has heard from a neighbour is 
a good treatment. This judgement, compounded of technicalities, 
interpretations, insights and ethics, is obviously partly moral and 
partly non-moral. It becomes explicitly moral, of course, when it 
involves joint discussion with the patient to obtain informed consent. 
This judgement-complex, with the extra strand of rhetoric, is also 
involved in communicating to the patient the salient features of 
diagnosis and treatment. 
It emerged that evidence and judgement are also involved in public 
health medicine. The scientific evidence here derives from 
epidemiology, which might seem an objective, neutral, judgement-free 
science. But judgement is involved in several ways. First, and most 
obviously, it is involved in deciding what to do with the findings as a 
matter of public policy. For example, should there be a 'girls only' 
policy with respect to the rubella vaccine or a 'girls and boys' policy? 
The answer to this question involves an amalgam of the technical and 
the moral/political. Secondly, and less obviously, the decision about 
which epidemiological studies to undertake in the first place involves 
the same judgmental mixture of the technical and the moral and 
political. 
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I argued that the ability to make judgements of this complex kind 
derives in part from the possession of what I called a 'humane' 
attitude. This attitude is partly a moral attitude but involves another 
element, an element which comes from being broadly educated as 
distinct from narrowly trained. 
The final chapter of the thesis was concerned with how, if at all, the 
medical curriculum can be widened to aid the development of the 
humane attitude, or how medical training can become truly medical 
education. I suggested that Special Study Modules could help here, 
with the blessing of the GMC. I concluded with an account of two 
such SSMs, one of which, in philosophy, has already been piloted at 
Glasgow through the co-operation of the Departments of Philosophy 
and General Practice. It is through this kind of co-operation, in a 
University setting, that the broad educational aspects of the medical 
curriculum can be realised. This will result in the creation of 'the good 
doctor', in whom evidence is tempered with humane judgement. 
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Appendix 5.1 Outline of the Module 
Week One Plenary week 'Expert' lectures and 
workshops 
Week 2/ Small groups Reading 
Week 3 Individual work Small groups 
Working to assignments 
Week 4 Small groups Finishing assignments 
Days 1-4 Individual Work 
Week 4 Plenary Reading Assignments 
Day 5 Assessment 
Evaluation 
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Appendix 5.3 
ANALYTICAL EXERCISE 1 
DUTY AND ENJOYMENT 
Identify and evaluate the arguments in the following passages. Which position is 
morally more praiseworthy and why? (Do not exceed 1000 words) 
John and Mary each spend an evening a week as a voluntary helper in a hostel for 
down and outs. They work the same hours and do equal amounts of useful work 
When asked why they spend some of their time in this way, they replied as follows: 
JOHN 
Not for the fun of it I can tell you! Attending to the needs of a dirty, quarrelsome and 
occasionally violent crowd of down and outs is not my idea of a good time. There 
are plenty of things in life I enjoy doing, and sometimes it's a real grind to drag 
myself away from other things and go down the hostel for my evenings stint - I'm 
afraid I'm not one of those people who go all sentimental about the needy and 'just 
love' helping them. At the same time I recognise that something has to be done for 
these down and outs, and that, having on the whole a pretty comfortable life, I ought 
to do something to help those less fortunate than me. It's a matter of conscience with 
me. I just can't accept that I'm free to ignore the needs of other people. Call it a duty, 
if you like - the word is a bit old-fashioned but I can't think of a better one: I just 
think I have a duty to do something for those worse off, so I work at the hostel. 
Sometimes I almost wish I didn't have this damned sense of duty - life would be so 
much more comfortable if I didn't; but I'm stuck with it, and I couldn't rest and 
would feel guilty if I didn't do what I felt I ought to do. 
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MARY 
Originally I started working at the hostel because of John, who's my boyfriend -I 
was daft about him at the time and thought it would help me to keep him if I showed 
an interest in this voluntary work kick of his. But now - honestly the real reason I 
carry on working at the hostel is that I enjoy it so much. The people you meet are so 
interesting, it's like reading a novel, hearing all their stories of how they got to down 
and outs. And we all have such laughs together - you'd never believe they could 
have such a sense of humour. And I just love to see the gratitude in their faces when 
you've made them feel wanted and cared for - one old lady was in tears of happiness 
when I mended her skirt for her, and then I stared crying too, out of a sort of love for 
her, really - you know what I mean? I was thinking of my old granny - and we both 
crying and smiling together, and I felt so nice and happy inside. I get really high on 
the whole experience down at the hostel - it's so satisfying to help others like this -I 
honestly get more pleasure from my stint at the hostel than from anything else I do - 
I look forward to it all week. And it's so fulfill I feel I'm doing what really suits, 
what will make me really happy in life, and it has made me decide to take up this 
sort of social work as a career. 
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Appendix 5.4 
ANALYTICAL EXERCISE 2 
LIES 
Identify and evaluate the arguments in the following passages. Which position is 
morally more praiseworthy and why? (Do not exceed 1000 words) 
FRANK 
Telling lies is wrong in itself. It's an abuse of the gift of speech - telling lies can 
hardly be the purpose of speech, can it? It's one of those things that people in all 
times and places have held to be wrong, and it's easy to see why they've condemned 
it: if everyone went around telling lies, society would break down. Obviously, then, 
you mustn't lie. Lies poison relationships between people, and every he pushes us 
further down the slippery slope to total distrust and isolation. It's all very well to 
say, "Tell a he if the consequences justify doing so", but you can never know the 
consequences your acts will have. You wouldn't like to be lied to, would you? - well, 
then, don't tell lies yourself. We need to know the truth - how otherwise can we live 
our lives as free and responsible people? To be lied to is really to have your freedom 
denied and your human dignity affronted - we have a right to be told the truth. 
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ANN 
Telling the truth may often be right and desirable, but people can make a silly fetish 
of it. Someone whose conscience would never let them tell a lie is in the grip of a 
silly obsession like people who can't bring themselves to step on cracks in the 
pavement - they need to see reason. Lies are often harmless - what harm does it do 
to tell someone you liked their performance in a play, even if you thought they were 
awful? - and often beneficial, even necessary; a doctor may know it would utterly 
crush someone to know the truth, and if we tell a thug were his intended victim is, 
we're indirectly responsible for the victim's smashed-in face. If other people are 
profiting by lying - say, getting welfare benefits by giving false information - you're 
simply denying yourself your share if you don't he too, and that's silly. Anyway, 
truth isn't always attainable and may not even exist. People see the world in 
different ways, truth can be a subjective thing, it can be sheer tyranny to insist that 
your vision is the truth and someone else's is false. 
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Appendix 5.5 
Student Evaluation Form 
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Philosophy SSM : Evaluation 
This is the first time we have run this course so we are very interested in your views. 
Please express you views as honestly as possible so that we can develop and improve 
the module for the future. 
Please ring choices or delete as appropriate 
EModule 
Choice 
These are the reasons members of the group gave for choosing this module. 
all that apply to you and add any others I have not included. 
Previous experience and interest in philosophy 
Wanted complete change from studying medicine 
Wanted different perspective on medicine/society 
Had missed the opportunity to study an arts subject 
Wanted to grasp a rare opportunity to study philosophy 
Other 
Module structure and teaching methods 
Please tick 
F71 
F-I 
LII 
I was clear from the start about what I was expected to do. 
Strongly agree agree neutral disagree strongly disagree 
This module differed from your medical studies in that we used a mixture of seminars 
and lectures. 
I felt comfortable with this mode of course delivery 
Strongly agree agree neutral disagree strongly 
disagree 
Please delete 
There was too much/sufficient/not enough time spent in seminars and 
lectures 
There was too much/sufficient/too little written work 
My time was too heavily/sufficiently/to little occupied with module work 
Seminars 
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The seminars clarified points of misunderstanding from my reading and the 
lectures. 
Strongly agree agree neutral disagree strongly disagree 
I had the opportunity to express my ideas in the seminars 
Strongly agree agree neutral disagree strongly disagree 
The tutors dominated the seminars. 
Strongly agree agree neutral disagree strongly disagree 
I felt stimulated by the introduction of new ideas. 
Strongly agree agree neutral disagree strongly disagree 
My own views were challenged. 
Strongly agree agree neutral disagree strongly disagree 
Comments 
Module content 
I now have a better grasp of how arguments are constructed. 
Strongly agree agree neutral disagree strongly disagree 
I am now better able to analyse arguments. 
Strongly agree agree neutral disagree strongly disagree 
I am familiar with the major arguments in The Republic. 
Strongly agree agree neutral disagree strongly disagree 
I would be able to describe these arguments to a friend. 
Strongly agree agree neutral disagree strongly disagree 
EGeneral 
Points 
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My interest in philosophy has been further stimulated by this module. 
Strongly agree agree neutral disagree strongly disagree 
I discussed the module with other students. 
Strongly agree agree neutral disagree strongly disagree 
This module has introduced ideas that I wish to develop further. 
Strongly agree agree neutral disagree strongly disagree 
I was aware that I was in a different learning environment from medicine. 
Strongly agree agree neutral disagree strongly disagree 
Comments 
This module has been valuable in the context of my medical education. 
Strongly agree agree neutral disagree strongly disagree 
If you agree, please try to explain why 
Suggestions for the future 
What do you think was good about the module? 
What was not so good? 
How might we improve the course for the future? 
Would you recommend this module to other students? 
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Appendix 5.6 
Results of evaluation in graphical form Graphs 1- 6 
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Appendix 5.7 
HM's Analytical Exercises 
Analytical exercise 1 
DUTY AND ENJOYMENT 
Lohn 
Arguments: 
doesn't enjoy work - actively dislikes it 
it prevents him from doing other things 
recognises that the people in the hostel need help 
recognises that he has the means to help 
to know this and not help would trouble his conscience 
he does help 
Analysis: 
John has a highly developed sense of duty which makes him feel uncomfortable if he 
acts in a way he knows is wrong. 
He is also socially aware and knows that, although helping out might not benefit 
his 
enjoyment, it will help others' lives. 
It he didn't help out in the hostel he would feel 'guilty' and his spiritual comfort 
would suffer - therefore his life is improved overall 
by helping. 
Is doing it and they are not for himself but for the community. 
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max 
Arguments: 
started work to impress John 
this is no longer the case 
she finds the people interesting 
she gains emotional satisfaction from them 
Mary enjoys working at the hostel 
so she works there 
Analysis: 
Mary first started working at the hostel for purely self motivated reasons, but she 
claims this now irrelevant. 
She finds her life enriched by her work and so continues to work there 
for her 
enjoyment and satisfaction. The fact that she is helping the needy is a pleasure 
to 
her, not an obligation she feels to them. 
Although, as Mary enjoys helping people, she is probably a 'nicer' person than John, I 
don't think her view is morally praiseworthy. She is using the hostel as a route to 
her 
own happiness, and her prime motivator is not other people's'. 
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Analytical Exercise 2 
LIES 
EMOS 
His passage is a muddle of arguments, all of which give different reasons why telling 
a lie is always wrong. I will try and split them into premises and conclusions, and 
then say what I think of them. 
the purpose of speech is to tell the truth 
it is wrong to deviate from our natural purposes 
therefore it is wrong to tell any lie 
I am not convinced by this argument as I do not believe either of the premises. He 
has made a claim about the purpose of speech which has no basis except a 
teleological viewpoint which I do not share. I don't agree that we have 'natural 
Purposes', so how can it be wrong to deviate from them? 
2) all lies have been thought wrong in all times and places 
established views are right 
therefore it is wrong to tell all lies 
Again, I disagree with both premises - all lies are not always thought wrong (as 
Ann's arguments clearly show) - and established views are not necessarily correct. 
3) 'if everyone went about telling lies, society would break 
down' 
This is an appeal to the imagination - 'What if... '. However, Frank 
is not just talking 
about 'bad' lies, and in our society white lies (not to mention the worse forms) are 
extremely common, with no break down of society, on the contrary, they may help to 
keep it running. 
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4) all lies create problems in relationships - distrust and 
isolation 
every he we tell makes it easier for us to tell more 
therefore don't start telling lies - it's a slippery slope 
This is a convincing argument, apart from the all lies' clause, as it includes white lies 
which often make relationships possible. 
5) a he may be justifiable only if you can be sure that it will 
result in good 
we can never know the consequences of our actions for 
sure 
therefore no he is justifiable 
Frank does not believe premise 1 but is using it to form a counter argument. I also 
disagree with it but in the opposite direction. I feel it can be moral to make decisions 
based on the probable, or even possible, outcome. 
6) you wouldn't like to be lied to 
do unto others as you would have done to you 
therefore don't he 
This is an appeal to the imagination, but also fails to convince me by including all 
lies. I can think of many situations in which I would rather be told a lie than the 
truth. 
7) we need all of every truth to be free and responsible 
we have a right to everything that allows us to be free and responsible 
therefore we have a right to all of every truth 
Again the inclusion of all truth lets this argument down. 
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Frank has set his views out clearly - most of his arguments are good even if I don't 
agree with them myself. The main gist of Frank's argument is that it is the act of 
lying itself that is immoral. He therefore sees any lie as wrong, even if it seems to be 
for the best. He backs this up in argument 5, but his defence rests on his belief that a 
lie is wrong in itself, so to be justifiable there must be definite good effects which 
cancel out the wrong. If, like me, you don't feel that it is the he that is wrong in itself, 
but rather some of the reasons you might tell it for, it appears that not to tell a he, 
which would to all appearances bring a good effect, would be immoral (the reverse 
of Frank's argument). 
If you take a morally praiseworthy viewpoint to be one where the individual has 
thought long an hard about the issue and come up with a set of ideas which are in 
accordance with the person's basically held beliefs and which seem to them to be 
morally right, then I think you have Frank, though I am not convinced by his 
argument. 
An 
I will now try to analyse Ann's arguments. 
1) it is unnecessary to be obsessive about stepping on cracks on the 
pavement 
always telling the truth, no matter what, is like being 
obsessive about telling the truth 
therefore it is silly to be obsessive about telling the truth 
This argument is not very successful, as it employs a bad comparison. There is no 
reason given why telling the truth is like cracks on the pavement. 
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2) something is wrong only if it cause harm 
a lie doesn't necessarily cause harm 
therefore lies which don't cause harm are not wrong 
3) something which will cause net harm is wrong 
sometimes telling the truth will cause harm 
therefore it is wrong to tell the truth if it will cause net harm 
These arguments (2 and 3) can be taken together as they are the converse of each 
other. An is expressing a utilitarian viewpoint, that an action is morally right if it 
leads to 'good'. If you accept the first premise it is a very convincing argument. 
4) some people tell lies and get benefits from them 
if some people are doing something there is no reason for you not to 
therefore there is no reason not to tell lies which give benefits in 
cases when others are 
This argument is not at all moral, but Ann is arguing to do what is best for her, 
without the consequences to others. 
5) absolute truth may not exist 
it is silly to insist upon some abstract thing that may not exist 
therefore it is silly to insist upon the truth 
6) truth can be subjective - there can be more than one valid 
answer 
if there are multiple valid viewpoints and it is wrong to 
insist that only your's is right 
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therefore it is wrong to insist that you version of the truth is the only one 
These arguments (5 and 6) are taken together became they are moving away from the 
concrete 'right and wrong' to a more abstract concept of truth (or truths). Ann is 
hypothesising that there is no one truth, but many, depending on who are where you 
are. If this is so, it is impossible always to tell the truth, and the elegance of the 
concept, and hence its claim as a moral ideal, is destroyed, even in cases where the 
truth seems obvious. 
I agree with a lot of Ann's arguments, but I don't think that she is as moral as Frank. 
She has a number of separate ideas on why it is not necessary always to tell the truth, 
some of which, such as 2 and 3, can be argued from a moral point of view, but others 
are more self-interested. She seems to be much more flexible to different 
circumstances than Frank, which is more in tune with our world, but she lacks the 
same strong beliefs. 
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